

SPAIN IN EUROPEAN RECONSTITUTIONS
OF 1814 - 1815.

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SPAIN IN EUROPEAN RECONSTITUTIONS
OF 1814-1815.

INTRODUCTION.

In this treatise it will be shown how Spain having participated in the 18th century controversions, shared in the reconstitutions of Europe after the fall of Napoleon. This subject was selected because there has been no adequate treatment of Spain in the reconstitutions of Europe, 1814-1815, although Spain played a not unimportant part during this period. In the preparation of this account many difficulties were encountered. There are no books in the English language that give an extensive story of this period of Spanish history, except from the angle of the Peninsular war. Many writers have touched lightly the results but never have discussed the full participation of Spain. Besides being short and inadequate, the treatments have often been prejudiced and erroneous. For this reason it was necessary to consult several sources in order to ascertain the correctness of a single event.

In Spanish sources, the accounts have been even more prejudiced and exaggerated. Even the dispatches and reports of the diplomatic service abound in mis-

representations of the principal facts. The Spanish writers were also very unreliable in recording events in their chronological order. For this reason the material had to be carefully reassembled.

The period of this research — the close of the 18th century — marked the doom of old despotisms and ushered in the century of the peoples. The decaying structure of the old European order was battered by the force of the 18th century revolutions. In France the first wave of revolution realized nearly all that had been thought out and there was lacking only a masterful leadership to shape the new forces into matured institutions. Napoleon seized the opportunity and by extraordinary foresight and daring, organized these new institutions and carried his plan over all Europe. Archaic traditions, measures, and systems crumbled. Europe had to be remade — reconstituted along new lines. The changes made necessary to overcome the ambitions of Napoleon were accepted. The old order could neither be "restored" nor "reconstructed", because it had been destroyed. There was no place for reaction. Once committed to the new order, nations could not turn back. A totally new situation existed. Statesmen had to concern themselves with shaping a policy that would preserve the gains of the Revolution and lend itself to insure the future peace and security of Europe.

Napoleon's empire reached its greatest magnitude about 1810, but crumbled rapidly before the combined forces set against it. When he fell the military gave way to diplomacy and statesmen took up the task of re-constitution in Europe.

The men charged with this duty realized the magnitude of their task. They were men trained to moderation and reason. By no other means could they have overcome the power of Napoleon. Certain aims and declarations had been made during the progress of the war which were accepted as the principles upon which peace would be made.

It was of the greatest importance that Europe had the faith to leave worn out despotism behind and accept the trust for the future. That the good of the old could be preserved and the bad of the past could be left behind gave a new hope and a new faith. The new order released those motives that were to accelerate progress. The people now shared with the King that feeling of potency. The theory of Divine Right had been lost. Success against Napoleon had required a compact of closer relationship between the state and the people than had ever existed before.

The full nature and importance of the reconstitutions can be reckoned by evaluating the history of the 19th century. The history of all Europe turns upon those years of reconstitution 1814-1815, and only by a correct interpre-

tation of those first years of rehabilitation can the true significance of subsequent history be realized.

Only in Spain was the true import of the new age spirit not fully realized. The King returned the despotism of the past, because there was no force potent enough to oppose unrestricted reaction. Having faltered at the opportune time, Spain was slow to catch the significance of the new age. Moderation was unknown; only the extremes found a way which led to dissention, intolerance, and impotency.

While Spain was trying to participate in European reconstitutions, the influences of the past were so deeply seated in the national consciousness, that ultimate success was retarded. At the same time that Spain was resisting the introduction of French institutions by Joseph, the people had carried on in the king's absence a popular government in his name. They had drawn up a constitution and asserted the sovereignty of the people. But unfortunately the success of the revolt against the French had brought about a premature restoration of Ferdinand by direct negotiations with Napoleon. Ferdinand thereby, avoided those restrictions which the Allies might have wished to impose upon him. His restoration accomplished, the Allies found their efforts futile to impose condition upon him, or to question his sovereign right.

Thus in Spain there was a restoration of the old forms

initiating a reaction against the net gains of the revolution. The task of national readjustment was intrusted to an untried monarch who had neither the ability nor desire to improve the condition of his kingdom. Being rather devoid of any plan or motive, he was content to resume the indolent and incompetent methods of his fathers.

The consequent weakness of Spain invited the interference of more aggressive nations. Unable to cope with her own difficulties, the colonies were encouraged to emancipate themselves from the feeble authority of Spain.

Spain could not understand that only by casting a veil over the past and looking to the future could she keep pace with the more enterprising nations and benefit from the things she might have done. However Spain could not entirely escape the new spirit but not knowing what it was faltered in her course. To understand Spain today, it must be known what yesterday she was and hope that tomorrow she will not be less.

CHAPTER I.

THE PROBLEM of SPAIN at the CLOSE of the 18th. CENTURY.

Part I.

THE ANCIENT REGIME.

The problem of Spain at the close of the 18th century was to keep pace with enlightened Europe. Possessed as she was of an archaic regime, which was burdened with the traditions of the past, she could only choose between a regeneration within her dominions or fall a prey to the more enlightened nations.

The preceding centuries had brought to Spain a condition similar to that in other parts of Europe which was to be broken down by the revolution. The principal feature of the old regime had been the suppression of various older organs by which particular interests had expressed themselves and an increasing tendency to erect a strong central government embracing all power in the State. The absolution and divine right established in the 15th and 16th centuries continued to flourish until the end of the ancient regime. In Spain, this idea was cast down for a brief period but soon to revive with the return of Ferdinand VII.

The king was all powerful, absolute and despotic, if it pleased him to be so and with a family in which tradition was followed so strictly, there was no probability that

anyone would care, or possess the mental aptitude, to acquire advanced theories of rule. Charles III and Charles IV brought about some innovations within their kingdom but few of them were lasting. The attempts of Charles III were the more note worthy yet he could hardly hope to raise a nation fallen into hereditary decay within a generation -- still less could he insure the future.

The political structure of Spain was a loose assortment of executive officers all bound to the king but having no co-ordination among them selves. The chief minister, Consejero de Estado, was nominally the real representative of the king yet other ministerial positions were quite important ones. Each minister performed his duties in his own way, without any regard as to how any other department of government was being conducted. War and peace might be made without the knowledge of the treasury department or the judicial department. Loans, local or foreign, might be ordered without any knowledge coming to the state or diplomatic service. Favoritism and prestige were the principal qualifications for office. The highest positions were often occupied by men, who had no education or ability of any kind. At the time of the greatest concern to Spain, her diplomatic service was filled with men of prominence and vanity, but without ability. The posts at London and Paris were held by men who preferred to return home where their vanity might

bring them greater pre-eminence. The post at Berlin was held by a man who could afford to pay his own expenses and who was more interested in the arts and literature than the cases of diplomacy.

Nominally, the state and local government were advised by a council of patriotic citizens who had the interests of their nation at heart but in reality no such power existed. The ancient Cortez was discontinued and only the Council of Castile survived. This body was made up of partisans appointed because of their subservience and birth. The body had no real power, was seldom called together for any purpose and never as a consulting or legislative assembly. Charles III called the Council in 1760 to swear allegiance to the crown prince. Charles IV called it only one time and this one occasion was that they might formally swear allegiance to him. Upon this occasion, however, Charles asked a second favor of them; that they formally and secretly suspend the Salic law. When the Salic law was promulgated in Spain 1713, it was also decreed that the heir to the throne be born in Spain. Charles was born in Naples and while no real concern was felt, there would always be a point open to criticism unless he be formally proclaimed by the council of Castile.¹ A second reason for secrecy was the trouble between Louis XVI and his people. Charles had a vague idea that perhaps France might call upon Spain to furnish

a prince to mount her throne, but if the French should learn of the suspension of the law in Spain, it would void any chance of a Spanish Bourbon gaining the throne of France. The decree was granted by the council but lay dormant until proclaimed by Ferdinand VII just prior to his death.

The local government had a semblance of power and there was an advisory body or council. The corregidor or captain general as he was familiarly entitled, really exercised the royal authority in city and province. The authority of the local council was lost in the same manner as that of the higher council of state. All authority had been taken back except a bare remembrance of it in Navarre and the Basque provinces. Thus there was no power except the church to balance that of the King.^(1a)

The colonies were governed by vice-roys and captain generals, who held absolute power. They had deliberative councils modelled after that of Castile but as in Spain, the power was never exercised. The relations of Church and State were much the same as at home, except that the king retained the right to nominate to all benefices.⁽²⁾

Spain was not balanced for a prosperous people. The people were poor, ignorant and fallen into the depths of degeneracy. The middle class, which is the prosperous and directing force of any nation, was broken up by imprudent measures of earlier monarchs. The Jews and

Moors had been driven beyond the borders and left too great a burden on those who remained of the commercial class. Failing to get relief by a just distribution of the burdens of State, the more energetic men left Spain to seek their fortune elsewhere, while those who remained, gave up hope and sank into indolence and despair.

The incompetence of the administration had lost Spain much of her prestige in the colonies. Privateers and foreign vessels smuggled and traded in the colonies and preyed upon the Spanish ship lanes. Until after the battle of Trafalgar, the link between Spain and her colonies was practically broken. Spain only exploited her colonies, trade was restricted to the mother country and principally to licensed ports. Into these colonies she introduced all the vices of her political, social and religious life.⁽³⁾ The riches drawn from the colonies made work a thing to be detested and promoted only a superficial aristocratic class, which was non productive and little interested in the State. To seek gold abroad or starve at home was honorable but to engage in trade or industry was to forfeit all claim for generations to the highly prized distinctions of noble blood.⁽⁴⁾ People preferred to starve and to be left alone, rather than labor and be levied upon by the State. Besides there was no protection to the peasant class from brigandage or the claims of the nobility. Free grants of

land did not entice the peasant to better his lot because the government attempted to fix prices on bread and food which made producing unprofitable.

The population lagged far behind the governmental desire for progress. There was such general quickening of thought or emancipation of expression as preceded the French revolution. The condition of the country incapacitated them from grasping any intellectual movements. The social life was worse than the political. The influence of the clergy suppressed natural manifestations of gaiety. The natural austerity of the national character had degenerated into a gloomy harshness, from which it was difficult to rise. Religious observances, varied by love intrigues were the only occupations of the leisured classes. The governmental prohibitions upon the freedom of action, forced serious social and economic privations upon the nobility and peasant classes. The nobility were obliged to live near the royal family and forego the active management of their estates. This prevented the cooperation between the nobility and peasants that was so necessary to happiness and prosperity.

The Nobility had long since lost its political significance but pride, wealth and privilege were potent and a real obsession among them. Kings could hold down political power by granting empty social honors to which the attention of the Nobility was directed. Charles III

created the "Order of Charles III", while Charles IV created the "Noble Ladies of Maria Louisa." Many grantees could sit in the presence of the King without removing their hats, were privileged to have personal body guards, and could demand a salute from lesser officials. (5)

The arts and literature were not prosperous because the press was closely guarded. The press had been greatly liberalized but still a strict censorship was maintained over the liberal tendencies coming in. The schools of art and literature almost disappeared, with the exception of Goya the painter. For since there was no appreciation of art, there was no incentive to create. The schools were still under the guidance of the clergy and Jesuits, but marked improvement was made in the latter part of the 18th century as will presently be pointed out. In spite of the aids of the government toward progress in the schools, there still did not exist any feeling of national obligation to teach the people how to read and write. Education was a luxury to be had by those who could afford to buy it. Education progressed slowly; they had no standards of their own, consequently they were obliged to imitate others until the Spanish schools could be brought up to a point of expression and authority. Only in the large cities did education flourish so that by 1800, Madrid could boast of schools equal to those of

other capitals of Europe.

The Church held considerable power and the monarchs were so steeped in religion that Spain often approached the theocratic State, but a theocratic State is not stable, for its spiritual discipline is not always strong enough or sure enough. (6) Charles III curtailed the power of the Church and of the inquisition, to such an extent, that the Church could no longer punish those who wrote against the hypocrisy of religious orders. Legally the inquisition was impotent, but the government could not break the fanatical faith of the lower classes. (7)

ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM.

Charles III had been educated in Italy and exercised his first Kingly duties as ruler of the Two Sicilies 1738-59. He came to the Spanish throne 1759 as a despotic ruler but happily for Spain as an enlightened despot with a determination to raise the nation out of its lethargy of centuries. Much to their surprise and chagrin, he forced upon the unwilling Spaniards a series of reforms that did much to break the traditional degeneracy and restore Spain to a favorable position among the progressive and prosperous nations.

He surrounded himself with able men. Grimaldi and Squillace he brought from Naples. Floridablanca, Aranda, Jovellanos and Campomanes he found in Spain. With these men he began his program to drive away the parasites and

adventurers from the court, reform taxation, provide an army, place workmen in factories, quicken intellectual life and reclaim the State from the power of the Church. (8)

The political reforms were few except measures for balancing the budget, revision of tax burdens and those of a legislative character. He co-ordinated his ministerial offices into a closer union than had been before and gave loyal support to his ministers in the performance of their duties. However, his greatest accomplishments were in the economic and social innovations which he introduced into the national life.

Compomanes directed the principle economic reforms such as prohibiting further conveyances of lands to the Church, 1763; subjecting Churchmen to a military tax, directed at those who joined religious orders to escape military duties and taxation, 1765 ; partition and cultivation of pastoral lands and sustaining the right of enclosure, 1768-70; encouraging foreign tradesmen to practice their artistry in Spain, exempting them from taxation and examinations 1772; releasing trade restrictions and abolishing certain monopolies in the colonies which added greatly to their prosperity, 1778; removing examinations and restrictions from apprenticeships thereby encouraging individualism as against the collective theory in industry, 1782; and removing barriers that prevented women from engaging only in restricted industry and trade, 1784. (9)

During the whole period of the reign of Charles III, Campomanes worked on a series of canal and irrigation projects, built coach roads and established post routes through the country. To provide stone used in public buildings, quarrying was encouraged. To promote commerce shipbuilding was revived and ports rehabilitated. To enliven manufacture especially in textiles, foreign capital was solicited.

To insure success of economic revival, Charles III knew the importance of social and educational advances. The manorial system caused social and political life to be centered in the local village and prevented the natural intercourse that promotes a common national spirit. He hoped to break down this feudal survival by extending state supervision to public school and breaking the monopoly of Jesuit schools in the rural districts. He intrusted to Jovellanos and Aranda the task of revising the educational and financial structures in order to revive learning with state supervision and financial assistance. (10)

Queen Amalia, wife of Charles III, wrote in 1766, "In everything there is something of barbarism together with a great pride," and as to women, "one does not know what to talk about with them; their ignorance is beyond belief." (11) It was to overcome such tragedies of human life that Charles replaced Jesuit teachers by those who underwent competitive examinations in 1767; he started

private schools for girls in principal cities, 1768; appointed directors to each of the twenty-four Universities, to control the curriculum, 1769; appointed censors to watch over religious and political studies, 1770; required professors to put their lectures into writing and present them to the schools, 1774; and entirely revised in 1780 the primary education in Madrid. These educational advances reduced illiteracy and met an excellent response. By 1787 more than one-fourth of the children between the ages of seven and sixteen were in school. (12)

The Church and Jesuits were a great detriment to the plans of secularizing the schools. The Jesuits had always maintained small schools but the teachings had been scanty and principally religious in character. The Jesuits were very active against Charles because of his desire to change traditional customs. They opposed bitterly and successfully in 1766 his decree to change the native costumes. (13) In 1767, however, Charles succeeded in gaining the same result by indirect methods. Jovellanos for instance made the slouch hat an official head piece of the public hangman and thereby forced a new hat to be accepted by the people. For their opposition, the Jesuits were expelled in 1768, as was being done in other states in Europe. Bull fighting was abolished. Vagabond nobles, numerous in Spain, were sent to the army with the ranks of distinguished soldiers. (14)

Efforts to remove social and racial inequalities were inaugurated. In 1783, certain trades were made honorable and although it had always been the custom to give office only to the *hidalgos*, tradesmen were made eligible to hold office. In the same year, gypsies, provided they give up their special dress, were granted the right to seek employment and take residence in cities. They were given legal status and deemed no longer a tainted race.⁽¹⁵⁾ Granting Jews a right to live where they pleased was a great stride toward racial tolerance. They were not to be restricted to special quarters, were not to wear any device that would indicate their race or ancestry. Three years later, 1785 they were permitted to serve in the army but racial prejudice prevented a full measure of success to these designs. In 1802, however, the Jews lost these earlier privileges by a decree which denied the right of residence within Spain to any Jew who still professed the faith of his fathers.⁽¹⁶⁾

One characteristic of the movement was a certain philanthropic democratic sentiment that attempted betterment for the masses. It was an ideal that became widespread through Europe, due to French writers and it came to be a sort of a fad of high society. They even went so far as to formulate political doctrines of a democratic character but none of these ideals were ever placed upon a legal basis.⁽¹⁷⁾

Thus, within the short space of twenty-five years

Spain received a greater impulse toward internal regeneration than she had experienced in the two hundred years preceding.

Charles IV, 1789-1808, attempted to continue the excellent work of his father, but he possessed neither the ability nor inclination to promote the welfare of his dominions. He soon allowed his ministerial offices to fall into the hands of favorites and incompetents. With the passing of the old ministers he never succeeded in replacing them with men of equal talent.

However the accomplishments of the preceding reign were not entirely lost and a few further changes were made to bring the resources under state control and to further the intellectual progress. Charles IV was handicapped in social and economic progress by the influences of France and the Revolution, yet these same influences were directly responsible for some of the reforms in his reign.

The necessity of supplying the treasury with more money to meet the ever increasing expenses and the inability to bring in the wealth from the colonies forced Charles IV to tax and take from the church many privileges it still enjoyed. In 1793-95 Charles reaped the harvest of a fatal mistake he made a few weeks after his accession in January 1789. The public debt was due and the treasury had no money with which to pay. He decreed that the old debts would be recognized only upon the condition that the

creditors subscribe to a new loan, an amount equal to three times their present holdings. The new loan was successfully made but the public treasury never again had the money with which to retire the loan and investors eventually lost. (18) The crisis came in 1793-5 when the war with France used up the scanty resources at hand and in order to balance the budget, Charles named a committee, Caja de Amortizacion and charged it with the task of revising the national finance. (19) This committee was unable to perform the task assigned and was succeeded by a second committee called Suprema de Amortizacion. This committee found itself as powerless as the first and Charles was obliged to meet the crisis by increasing taxes. A special land tax on church property was levied in 1793-5; in 1789 a decree forbade further land entail and in 1795 a heavy tax was placed upon all lands so held. Three years later, he decreed the sale of entailed land as well as property of the irregular clergy and charitable institutions. (20) A further removal of trade restrictions in the colonies increased their prosperity but because of the war, Spain was in no position to transport this added wealth. In 1789 as a result of Campomanes's economic program, the state roads were nearing completion and a coach line was extended into France at Bayonne; mail service was established twice a week. The ease of travel required better animals to supply the coach lines and a

decree was published encouraging horse breeding. (21)

Exemption from taxes was the incentive to improve this occupation. The undertakings of the past reign, such as the work on harbors, navy and agricultural projects, were pressed forward until Spain even after the defeat at Trafalgar, still possessed a fleet of fighting ships that was formidable. (22)

The educational and intellectual advancement had lost its momentum, yet the spirit of reform was continued by Godoy, who, as chief minister, declared himself a liberal. He was tolerant with the church yet required cooperation in matters of church and state. Navarre voted compulsory primary education in 1795, a policy conforming to the State inspection and governmental control of education. (23) In 1797 the Deposito Hidrografico, organized for the purpose of making and storing maps, became one of the most reliable sources of map production in Europe. (24)

The national sport of Bull fighting was restored by Charles IV but in 1805, upon the pretense that it was not an aid to agriculture or cattle raising and not consistent with the culture and sentiment of the times, it was abolished. This decree was really a political measure sponsored by Godoy in his contest with Ferdinand for popular favor. The people criticized Godoy severely for the "Fiesta de Toros" were occasions to acclaim Ferdinand. (25)

The strides toward progress, while not lasting in every

instance, were notable achievements and comparable with those of other nations of Europe. The attempts to wipe out the last vestiges of feudalism were in advance of those same achievements in countries which are now judged not by their past history, but by what they are today. It is indeed unfortunate that Spain should have placed such faith in one so unworthy as Ferdinand who violated the trust she placed in him.

PART II.

CHARLES IV.. HIS FAMILY.. ABDICATION..

Charles IV came to the throne "when men stood on the edge of stupendous changes", but little did he realize the fateful years ahead for him or the part he was to play during the course of them. He thought he was monarch of a nation more peaceful than other in Europe and surrounded by ministers who had virtually forced his subjects from their centuries of lethargy. Charles IV had endeavored to stop the general decline, but had only suspended for the moment, the melancholy course. The momentum gained under Charles III was soon lost. Under Charles IV, Spain descended to the lowest form of degradation even though the finer qualities of the nation were only benumbed. (26)

Floridablanca, the resolute old minister was dismissed, February 1792, nominally for having tried to influence a court decision against the Marquis of Mancas. (27) Floridablanca no longer possessed the prudence that had distinguished his earlier years. The threat of the French Revolution frightened him and he became violently reactionary. He tried to repel all the doctrines and writings that were contrary to the Ancient Regime, as the democratic propaganda without made him an absolutist within. (28) He had Charles issue a stern decree that brought protests from

all Europe. In April 1791, all newspapers were suppressed, save one in Madrid, the border closed to prevent passage of ideas, literature or propaganda. In July the order was extended; all persons who were foreigners, either resident or transient, had to swear allegiance to Charles IV, except the Catholic religion, and renounce all claim or right of appeal to their own nation for protection.⁽²⁹⁾ He thought of a war on France as if it were against pirates or evil doers. Such conduct was very irritating to the pride of a country in a time of feverish excitement. When all nations accepted the adherence of Louis XVI to the new constitution, Floridablanca advised Charles to refuse. He asked that Louis XVI be allowed to go to some neutral land, threatening war should France refuse.⁽³⁰⁾ This was a direct challenge to the Revolution and Bourgoing, the French ambassador, warned Charles that such policies were endangering Louis XVI rather than aiding him. Charles consequently feared to continued longer with Floridablanca and accepted the first opportunity to drive him from office and in February 1792, dismissed him.⁽³¹⁾

Count de Aranda, a staunch liberal, was given the post and changed the policy of Spain toward France and the Revolution. When France was invaded from the north, Bourgoing demanded a declaration of policy from Spain. Aranda knew the internal condition of Spain would not support a war to a successful conclusion, so he advised

Charles to declare his neutrality. The hesitant manner with which Aranda handled the situation brought upon Spain the contempt of France and the displeasure of the Allies. An attempt was made by Aranda to negotiate an agreement with Bourgoing that would sustain the Spanish neutrality policy. But Aranda was suddenly dismissed, (although not banished), by Charles in the midst of the negotiation. (32) The country was amazed at the sudden action of Charles but the respect for the throne prevented any expression of displeasure. The people were all the more amazed to learn that an untried and ill informed court favorite was to be intrusted with the government, at a time when Spain needed, so badly, a man of tact and diplomatic ability. Count de Aranda was succeeded November 1792, by Emmanuel Godoy whose only recommendation for office was the support of an indolent Queen, Maria Louisa. (33)

Godoy came from a well known family but was comparatively uneducated. He, like other petty aristocrats, sought a position in the government of church and had secured a place in the Palace guard from which position he rose rapidly to court favorite. His idea of success in government was to put through a few insignificant reforms for he lacked the ability to reflect and had no perspective.

The internal condition of Spain was going from bad to worse. The efforts of Charles to balance the budget were futile, even though he had given full powers to the

Supreme de Amortizacion. Money had been squandered upon a navy because Floridablanca and Aranda feared England. The land entail and church endowments kept a large part of the potential wealth idle and wasting in spite of the decrees against enhancing the riches of the church. Vested interests hid their money to avoid taxes and people of all classes still considered it unworthy to engage in trade or industry. People were crowdinn into the unproductive careers of Church and State.

The principal task of Godoy was foreign relations. Charles was in a dilemma and knew not which way to turn. He feared the Revolution for what it might do to his kingdom, yet he darednot antagonize the French assembly for what it might do to injure Louis XVI. The assembly might say and do what it pleased, he had neither the nerve nor ability to do either.

The consequent war with France quickly wasted such meagre Spanish resources as were available. The first year, 1793, popular acclaim favored the war. The blind bigotry of the people made them believe it their duty to punish those, who had murdered the Lord's annointed, besides it afforded them an opportunity to rid themselves of the thrifty French merchant who interfered with their leisurely ways. (34) The people of all classes came to the government with their money and resources. A few insignificant gains were made during the first campaign, but in 1794 disaster

fell upon the Spanish army along the whole battle front. Charles called a council at Aranjuez to discuss the situation and formulate plans for the coming year. Count de Aranda was present and read a paper that reflected upon the conduct of Godoy. Aranda committed a tactical error, for Godoy represented the King's person and Charles banished the aged man for the insult. Nothing came of the meeting and great difficulty was experienced in raising new quotas of troops or provisions for their use. The people criticized Godoy severely for the peace of Basle, 22 July 1795, but with no adequate force to repel an invasion, it was a matter of prudence to end hostilities. The terms of the treaty were favorable to Spain since France relinquished all peninsular conquests in return for the Spanish half of San Domingo island in the West Indies. Charles rejoiced at the favorable terms and in token of his good fortune, he bestowed upon Godoy the title "Prince of the Peace."

Popular disgust grew as Godoy flourished under the infatuation of the Queen and the complacency of Charles. A paper appeared in Spain at this time with the headline, "Con todo el mundo guerra y Paz con Inglaterra."⁽³⁵⁾ Godoy explained this away as the work of the Duke de Infantado who was notoriously pro English in his sentiments. Charles was advised at the same time by Domingo Iriarte, ambassador at Paris, to keep peace with France, not as a

choice between good and bad but between two evils. Amid the confusion as to policy, Godoy determined to renew an alliance with France which was signed 18 August 1796 at San Ildefonso, a full discussion of which will follow in a later chapter. Godoy was probably driven to this extreme even in the face of home politics, by a fear of England who was displeased over the cession of West Indian territory to France.

From this time on until May 1808, Spain was completely dominated by France and it marks the beginning of the end for both Charles and Godoy. Neither Charles nor Godoy was able to break the spell cast over him. If they went to war, France would probably overrun the peninsula and cause their downfall at home, while if they remained allied to France, they would earn the contempt of Europe, as eventually they did of Napoleon.

Charles had no policy because he was incapable of formulating one, and Godoy was being critized from all parties because he seemed prone to deal with both sides and gain only the displeasure of all. Saavedra and Jovellanos represented the strong sentiment in Spain and Truguet, the French ambassador, demanded that in the name of France Godoy be dismissed.⁽³⁶⁾ It was a sad blow to Charles for he had so completely given himself over to Godoy that he knew not to whom he might turn, but he complied with public demands and on 29 March 1798, Godoy

received his dismissal.

Several men were tried and passed rapidly through the office. Saavedra and Jovellanos took up the task but Jovellanos soon tired of the intrigues and went home to Asturias in August of the same year. Saavedra retained the prime position with Don Luis Urquijo as minister of State. Urquijo had been recalled from London at the break of diplomatic relations in October 1796 and was sent to the Batavia Republic. His rank was raised to ambassador so that he might read his correspondence to the court in person. The foreign policy of Urquijo, which will be explained under foreign relations, and the personal animosity of Godoy, who still retained the supreme confidence of Charles, forced him to retire in 1800 as an exile. Charles lost nothing by the banishment of Urquijo for the man was vain, ignorant, rash, and presumptuous with no qualities at all to fit him for any important position. (37)

Saavedra's ministry was responsible for the expulsion of French emigres, the exclusion of British goods from Spanish markets and a warning to priests to be careful of French feelings. The last measure was necessary because many French non-juring priests were taking refuge in Spain. (38)

Godoy was back in full power by 1802 and Charles continued to bestow honors upon him. Godoy accepted all

favors even though he knew that he was countenanced by the people only through their respect for the throne. Godoy deserves thanks for one act of his at this time. He introduced Pedro Cevallos into the foreign office. Cevallos held this important position almost continuously until 1817 when he was given the embassy at Naples and later at Vienna. Cevallos served Charles, Joseph, Cortez government, and Ferdinand and conducted himself ably at all times. (39)

Charles became seriously ill during the year 1801 and there was much thought given as to what might happen in case of his death. Godoy and Queen Maria Louisa prepared to protect themselves for neither was sure of the disposition of Ferdinand toward them. They only feared what might happen and set to work planning to induce Ferdinand into a marriage with Maria Theresa de Bourbon, a niece of Charles IV and sister to the wife of Godoy. This plan failed. Godoy then planned to gain dictatorial power by having himself placed at the head of all the armed forces of Spain. Charles agreed and gave Godoy more titles - Grand Admiral of the Navy and Generalissimo of the Army. A Council of Admiralty was created, a new navy building was erected and a great expense put upon the country. A special battalion of guards was created with Godoy's brother in command and Godoy asked the Council of Castile what its attitude would be in case there should be a change in the line of success-

ion. (40)

Lucien Bonaparte, in the spring of 1802, intimated that Napoleon might ask for the hand of Maria Isabel. Charles was furious at the suggestion and hastened to arrange a marriage with the Bourbons in Naples. A double wedding in October 1802 united Maria Isabel and Ferdinand with a brother and sister of Naples. This marriage had a far reaching effect upon Spain. The Bourbons of Naples were extremely pro-English and Maria Antonio kept up a correspondence with her mother by means of which many secrets of the Spanish court passed to England. (41) Napoleon also gained intelligence of the intrigue at the Spanish court through intercepted letters. Both England and France were enabled to follow the course of Spanish politics, local and foreign, by means of the active participation of Maria Antonia in the affairs of the Spanish court. The information gained by France and England was very instrumental in determining their attitude toward Spain. Maria Antonia retained her British sympathies and exercised a great influence upon Ferdinand. She talked very frankly and was soon detested by other members of the Royal family. (42)

From this beginning, two parties steadily developed a rivalry between Godoy and Ferdinand that terminated with the riots at Aranjuez. Ferdinand was aware of the rumors that had been circulated about Godoy and his mother, and received his first offer of aid from Napoleon as a result

of it. Count Azora, the ambassador at Paris, told Napoleon of the rumor and Napoleon authorized Azora to assure Ferdinand armed intervention in his behalf. (43)

Inspired by Maria Antonia, Canon Escoiquiz resumed his position as adviser to Ferdinand. Escoiquiz had been private tutor to Ferdinand and had been appointed to that position by Charles because of his religious character as Canon at Zaragosa. He was a very ambitious man and began to aspire after greater prominence by countering the policies of Godoy with the rival claims of Ferdinand. Charles retired him to Toledo where he remained until the rivalry between Godoy and Ferdinand became a matter of public concern. (44) He started an espionage against Godoy and soon the priests were preaching openly against the favorite.

Maria Antonio died in May 1806, and her death ended some of the strong propaganda against Godoy, but Ferdinand was also free to marry again. Ferdinand had taken the popular side of the ever increasing English sentiment, but after his wife's death, he assumed a new role that played into the hand of Napoleon. Ferdinand, under the guidance of Escoiquiz, turned to Napoleon in order to break the only support of Godoy. (45) Marquis Beauharnais, the French ambassador, was made the medium of this intrigue because Escoiquiz could find no other safe avenue open to them. (46) The intrigue began in January 1807 but things moved slowly

due to the fact that Beauharnais did not readily catch the significance of affairs.

Ferdinand appealed to Napoleon through Beauharnais, 11 October 1807, for aid in disposing of the malignant igotists and councillors who surrounded his father. He also desired that Napoleon would grant him a princess of his august house for a wife. (47) Escoiquiz had prepared documents for Ferdinand, among which was a proposal to Charles that he look after the morals of Maria Louisa and another giving blank powers to the Duke de Infantado, a partisan of Ferdinand, as commander at Madrid. (48)

A party, headed by Gonzales O Farril, a ranking army officer and Luis Azanza, ex vice-roy to Mexico and intendant in Spain, was working to take advantage of circumstances to overthrow the tyranny of the Church and State as well as to get rid of Godoy. The party was very active since the rivalry between Godoy and Ferdinand had become so intense. The leaders of this party believed that Napoleon could and would lend his assistance to the regeneration of Spanish prosperity and free government.

The high handed manner in which Napoleon had deposed the Bourbons in Italy was a source of alarm to Charles and Godoy. Both feared that he would not hesitate to act similarly toward the Spanish throne even though Godoy was, at this time 1807, conspiring with Napoleon for despoiling the Portugese Kingdom. Godoy set about trying for an

agreement with England but was informed that she had already made contact with the other party and refused to treat. Godoy became desperate and played a desperate game as popular hatred toward him became more bitter. Charles received a note informing him that his son was plotting against him. In consequence of the note, Charles ordered a search of Ferdinand's apartment, 28 October 1807, in the Escorial palace. The evidence was conclusive that Ferdinand was not loyal to his father. (49)

The next day Charles wrote a letter to Napoleon setting forth all his family troubles and on the same day had Ferdinand placed in confinement charged with treason. The people of Madrid found the city walls placarded, 30 October, with news of the plot of Ferdinand. The effect was not as anticipated for the people regarded the whole affair as another attempt of Godoy to injure Ferdinand. The second decree giving pardon to Ferdinand and restoring him to full favor was followed by a letter to Napoleon seeking his advice. (50) Godoy graciously offered himself as mediator and on 5 November, a full reconciliation was effected between Ferdinand and his parents.

The letters of Ferdinand asking forgiveness were his own. They are unfortunate documents not because of his repentance, but because of their form. In the letters, Ferdinand placed the onus upon his advisers and repudiated them entirely. He made no effort to save them from the rigors

of the law. The prosecutor brought charges of treason against the persons involved, but Charles found it necessary to exile Escoiquiz, the Duke de San Carlos and the Duke de Infantado because the courts refused to convict.

Ferdinand admitted to his mother that he had written to Napoleon and Godoy then realized that he had been duped. There was no reason to believe that Napoleon could deal with both sides and be sincere with either. The revelation was a keen disappointment to Godoy since the treaty of Fontainebleau, regarding the Portugese project, 27 October 1807, had assured him further honors and the support of Napoleon. The full extent of this treaty will be discussed in the following chapter. Events moved rapidly from now on until the end. The French troops entered Lisbon, 30 November, while other army corps occupied Spanish fortresses and places of vantage. There was no particular anxiety as yet on the part of the people for each party believed that the troops were coming in their interests.

Ambassador Izquierdo in Paris was going back and forth from Duroc, grand marshal of the Palace, to Talleyrand who at the time was suspended from his position as minister of foreign affairs, in an effort to learn the real motives of Napoleon. He hoped to learn a great deal from Duroc whose wife was a Spaniard but he found Talleyrand the more loquacious. Talleyrand could speak only in a semi-official manner but was willing to suggest. Izquierdo suggested

that perhaps Napoleon would give Ferdinand a princess, take to the Elro river as a guarantee, open up the Spanish colonies to France, enter into an offensive and defensive alliance and give Charles the title "Emperor of the Americas." Izquierdo did not know that he had so closely guessed the idea that Napoleon entertained at the time. He had suggested only to draw an answer from Talleyrand. Isquierdo was suddenly ordered out of France by Duroc at Napoleon's command and 24 February 1808, left for Madrid. (51)

The affairs at Madrid were rapidly drawing to a conclusion. Charles, Godoy and Ferdinand were still working for Napoleon's support. The people were restless and public opinion was rapidly crystalizing, needing only a spark to inflame a popular insurrection. The reports of Izquierdo revealed that Napoleon would countenance no interference with his plans, and Godoy, seized with consternation, advised the flight of the royal family.

The flight of the family was objected to by all concerned. Charles opposed it because he still believed that Napoleon was his friend. Ferdinand opposed any plan that would remove him any great distance from Madrid or that would jeopardize his opportunity to mount the throne. Ferdinand firmly believed that Napoleon would be his protector. The people opposed it because they did not wish to be deserted and they believed that the intercession of

Napoleon would insure the elevation of Ferdinand to the throne.

Godoy finally prevailed upon Charles and convinced him of the necessity and convenience of leaving Madrid, and suggested that the Royal family should go to the Royal Palace at Aranzuez, some thirty miles away from Madrid. Charles took cognizance of the general apprehensions of the people and to allay their fears, issued on 16 March, a proclamation in which he assured them that, "the troops of my dear ally come with ideas of peace and friendship." The advance of the French troops was a part of a plan conceived by Napoleon to gain peaceful possession of Spain by provoking the royal family to flee before his army, as we shall see in the following chapter.

Ferdinand was dissatisfied with the plans of Godoy and upon leaving Madrid, revealed the Godoy intended to remove the family to America. The report circulated rapidly. The soldiers prevented fatal injury to Godoy although he was badly beaten and stabbed by the infuriated mob. He reached the prison completely exhausted and fell fainting upon the guardroom floor. The mob sought to kill him but Ferdinand upon the urgent pleas of his parents, interposed and dismissed the people.

Charles knew that Ferdinand would be satisfied with nothing less than his abdication. Pedro Cerrallos, foreign minister, and José Caballero, minister of Grace and Justice

rallied to the cause of Ferdinand and Charles asked Cevallos to prepare a decree of abdication. Charles voluntarily signed his abdication at seven P.M. 19 March, 1808, and remarked to Strogonoff, the Russian minister, and other diplomats gathered about him that his motive was to place the responsibility of the government upon younger men.

The announcement of the abdication electrified the nation. The people were not concerned with the manner of the abdication. They had their beloved Ferdinand - nothing else was of more importance. The people pinned their faith on Ferdinand who was by law succeeded to the throne. He was living in the affections of the people who thought of him as an oppressed Prince and supposed him to be endowed with the talents to be an excellent King. ⁽⁵²⁾ "The unfortunate nation; between an insolent favorite, a guilty Queen, and an imbecile King knew not to whom it might give its heart. It gave to the Prince who was not much more worthy of love than his parents. ⁽⁵³⁾

Ferdinand was acclaimed throughout the nation. Celebrations were held, feasts given, the people gave themselves over to frenzy and delirium. His picture appeared everywhere while the palace and other places of Godoy were sacked and every remembrance of him was destroyed.

Charles and Maria Louisa retired to a country estate until some definite arrangement for their future could be

agreed upon. They began a program of vilifying Ferdinand as an ungrateful son who had given himself over to the malignant advisers who surrounded him. They sought Napoleon and his representatives for aid in regaining their throne or a place where they might spend their life in comfort.

Godoy was placed in confinement at Pinto, a short distance from Madrid. He was intrusted to the custody of General Castular, who was subject to the orders of Murat, commander of the French forces in Madrid. The Spaniards had desired to keep Godoy in their custody, but Murat demanded that Godoy be placed subject only to his orders.

FOOT NOTES. CHAPTER I.

1. Hume, Modern Spain. p. 11
- 1a. Butler Clark, Modern Spain. 6
2. Ibid 7
3. Lavissee, Political History of Europe. 108
4. Butler Clark, Modern Spain. 8
5. Chapman, A History of Spain. 413
6. Guerard, French Civilization. 280
7. Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain. 550
8. Lavissee, Political History of Europe. 108
9. Chapman, A History of Spain. 416-20
- For Economic Reforms, see Chapman 415-20
10. Chapman, A History of Spain. 472
- For Educational Reforms, see Chapman 472-75
11. Ibid 472
12. Ibid 473
13. Ibid 420
14. Ibid 422
15. Ibid 414
16. Idem
17. Ibid 412
18. Hume, Modern Spain. 10
19. Lafuente, History of Spain. Vol. XXVI Chapter 5
20. Chapman, Modern Spain. 415
21. Hume, Modern Spain. 46-48

22.	Chapman, Modern Spain.	450
23.	Ibid	473
24.	Idem	
25.	Lafuente, History of Spain. Vol. XXVI.	I96
26.	Thiers, Consulate and Empire. Vol. V.	I49
27.	Lord Holland's REminiseences.	70
28.	Lafuente, History of Spain. Vol. XXVI.	II5
29.	Hume, Modern Spain	I3
30.	Ibid	I5
31.	Idem	
32.	Ibid	I8
33.	Thiers, Consulate and Empire. Vol. V.	I56
34.	Hume, Modern Spain.	26
35.	Villa Urrutia Relaciones. Vol. I.	I6
36.	Hume, Modern Spain.	35
37.	Lord Holland's Reminiscences.	92
38.	Hume, Modern Spain.	38
39.	Lafuente, History of Spain. Vol. XXVI.	242
40.	Thiers, Consulate and Empire. Vol. V.	I60
41.	Chalice Rachel, Secret of the Courts of Spain	9
42.	Hume, Modern Spain.	63
43.	Ibid	62
44.	Lafuente, History of Spain. Vol. XXVI.	24I
45.	Thiers, Consulate and Empire.	I66
46.	Hume, Modern Spain.	8I
47.	Thiers, Consulate and Empire.	I66

48.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI.	241
49.	Hume, Modern Spain.		87
50.	Ibid		92
51.	Thiers, Consulate and Empire.	Vol. V.	266
52.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI.	246
53.	Thiers, Consulate and Empire.	Vol. V.	156

CHAPTER II.

RELATIONS OF SPAIN WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE
TO 1808.

Spain and France had been leagued together for more than a half century. This relationship had not always been an equal affair because France usually dominated the settlement whether she had any just reason to do so or not. Spain because of her tremendous riches drawn from her colonies, had been able to obtain a position in European politics quite out of proportion to her proper merits. The last century had been a discouraging one for Spain because the increasing importance and strength of the other nations had diminished that of her own. The 18th century, in the main, had been one of humiliation to Spanish diplomacy and the 19th century was to relegate her to a place of secondary importance.⁽¹⁾ Spain felt obliged to mingle in European affairs and lend her support to any cause that would enhance her position, but unfortunately the time of greatest stress found her possessed with the most unworthy King in a century.

Charles IV retained, for a while, the ministers of his father and perhaps the most resolute and imperturbable of them was at the head of the government. The first signs of the French revolution had caused him to turn away from the democratic doctrines of France, but force of tradition drew

him and his country into the maelstrom that was engulfing Europe.⁽²⁾ One of the first occasions to draw Spain into contact with revolutionary France was the Nootka Sound controversy, 1789-1794, with England.

English ships had been captured in Nootka Sound, a place of refuge on Vancouver island. Spain claimed this unsettled territory and demanded sovereignty over it — to the exclusion of England. Before attempting a peaceful settlement of the controversy with England, Spain claimed the aid of France, 6 April, 1790, and called upon the French assembly to fulfill the stipulations of the Family Compact, a defensive alliance between the kings of France and Spain. The assembly agreed to do so, but before any action was taken, Charles IV and the British minister reached an agreement which was at once put into treaty form, 24 July, 1790.⁽³⁾ This was an odd affair, with Spain detesting the Revolution as such, yet falling back upon tradition and acknowledging the Revolution by requesting its assistance. The death of Louis XVI, January 1793, brought an end to the Family pact and it was never revived although numerous attempts were made to do so after 1814.

The internal affairs of France were in a violent state of change with numerous demands by the assembly that were contradictory to all tradition and methods of the past. The nobility had fled France, but was ordered to return by 1 January 1792, the clergy had been ordered to swear to the

new governmental regulations of the church. The army commanders were ordered, 19 November 1792, to destroy existing forms of government, confiscate the property of the nobility and clergy, and set up a constitutional form of government in all conquered territory.⁽⁴⁾ All of these measures effected Spain for she was harboring emigres and clergy of France, she was opposed to the republican form of government and besides the decree was a direct threat to any existing form of government in case the fortune of war should continue to favor France. The idea of a people seizing power and ordering a king to do their will was an outrage to the tradition of absolute monarchy and Charles as a true Catholic relative, and ally of Louis XVI wished to do all he could to extricate Louis from his precarious position.⁽⁵⁾ Charles used his diplomatic service in behalf of Louis by offering neutrality to France, by imploring England to join her in intervention and by direct entreaty to the Convention, asking to be mediator between France and her enemies. Charles authorized his minister in Paris to do all he could to save Louis, but the assembly voted to execute the king even after ambassador Ocariz was sure he had bribed a majority of their members.⁽⁶⁾

The French were in no mood to meditate or take a prudent course especially after the battle of Jamappes, 23 October 1792, had exalted their position. The French government ordered ambassador Bourgoing to demand of Spain

an alliance of war.⁽⁷⁾ Aranda, minister of state in Spain had contemplated the possibility of war but knew that Spain was in no condition for war and advised Charles to declare neutrality.⁽⁸⁾ Progress was made by Aranda and Bourgoing in shaping a neutral policy when suddenly Aranda was dismissed, November 1792, by Charles. The policy of Aranda had not been agreeable to the British and Prussian governments and Godoy, a court favorite, desiring more rapid advancement used English and German pressure in securing his dismissal.⁽⁹⁾ Godoy, an untried and incapable court favorite, was promoted to Aranda's position and refused to proceed with the treaty negotiation until France should apologise for the murder of Louis XVI, but the French assembly had not yet learned the art of making apologies and, 7 March 1793, answered the dilatory tactics of Spain with a declaration of war.⁽¹⁰⁾

Spain joined the coalition against France, 25 May 1793, by signing a treaty of alliance with England.⁽¹¹⁾ The war was popular in Spain during 1793, but the next year brought reverses to Spanish arms and Godoy was severely criticized for a policy that brought an invasion into Spain. The war demonstrated how incompetent her government was and also that no further progress could be made against France until she were weakened. The enthusiasm for war was submerged in defeat and Spain asked for peace.⁽¹²⁾ Spain felt no humiliation over her defeat since Austria and Prussia were obliged to bow also before the French in their period of

highest exaltation.⁽¹³⁾ Charles was elated that France offered to restore the peninsular conquests for the Spanish half of the Isle of San Domingo. Spain was severely criticized for making the peace of Basle, 22 July 1795, especially by England. The coalition had stipulated that only a peace common to all should be agreed to by any power.⁽¹⁴⁾ This was another bone of contention.

Spain was now between two powerful nations. The French were a threat if she favored the Allies and England was a threat if she favored France. During the course of the last century, she had disentangled herself from most of European politics by withdrawing from the low countries and Italy, but she could not escape the necessity of dealing with France and England. Spain only wished to hold her place of dignity, but to France, "Spain was the Coblenz of the south " while to England, Spain was only a "fief of the regicides."⁽¹⁵⁾ "All or none is the attitude England has taken. The nature of this war, Pitt has told me, does not permit us to distinguish between enemies and neutrals," thus wrote the Spanish ambassador from London.⁽¹⁶⁾ About the same time Charles was advised by his minister in Paris to keep peace with France, not as a choice between good and bad but between two evils.⁽¹⁷⁾

England frowned upon the treaty of Basle because France was strengthened in the West Indies, she had lost Spain as an ally and had not entirely forgiven her for the assistance

to the United States in the War for Independence. The Anglo Hispanic relations were none too cordial and Godoy foolishly made advances to France for a treaty of alliance.⁽¹⁸⁾ England had retained a treasureship taken in 1795, she had refused a subsidy to Spain, her ships were breaking into the Spanish colonial trade and courting an open break with Spain.⁽¹⁹⁾ Godoy may have been duped into thinking that the Directory in France would not long survive and caused the Spanish government to believe there was a chance to rehabilitate the French throne.⁽²⁰⁾ The Directory was anxious to gain control of the Spanish fleet and seized the opportunity to draw Spain into a treaty of alliance.

An alliance was formed, 18 August 1796, by the treaty of San Ildefonso. The terms of the treaty were unfavorable to Spain in which she had all to lose and little to gain. Each nation agreed to an offensive and defensive alliance, to equip and mann their fleets which were to be held at the command of France, to keep twenty-four thousand men ready to aid the other but if either was not directly attacked, it might make a peace if not prejudicial to the other. This article is quite significant in view fo article 18 which read, "Since England is the only nation against whom Spain is aggrieved, the present alliance holds only against her and Spain will remain neutral to all other powers with whom France may be at war." Article 15 of the treaty gave France an option on a preferential rate for all products of

her soil and manufacture.⁽²¹⁾ This treaty was a direct threat to England and put Spain face to face with England over the old problem of colonial and maritime predominance. It was very easy now to find occasion for war and Charles, upon some flimsy pretexts, declared war, 6 October 1796, on England.⁽²²⁾ The war was a disaster to Spain for English ships defeated her in battle and ravaged her trade along the coast of the Americas.

The representatives of the warring powers met at Lille, April 1797, for general peace discussions. England had offered to make peace with Spain if France would give back the cession of territory in San Domingo, but France refused.⁽²³⁾ In the general discussions at Lille, Spain's emissaries were neglected and refused admittance to the conference. Minister Cabarrus, an associate of the ambassador at Paris, was able to talk only with Lord Malmesbury who agreed that Gibraltar would never be an object of conquest but one of barter or compensation.⁽²⁴⁾ The war with England brought in France and her satellites as a matter of course and on, 28 June 1797, the Batavian Republic joined Spain by declaring war on England.

The period of the consulate in France marks a change of attitude toward Spain. The French heretofore had scorned Spain but treated her as a power. Napoleon began to dominate her as if she were only a province of France.⁽²⁵⁾ Charles began to think that he was on the wrong side and

made some effort for peace but was not successful. His efforts were only half hearted for he was at the same time humiliating himself by assisting Napoleon depose the Bourbons in Italy. Charles did pluck up enough courage to ask that one of his sons be given the crown in Naples,⁽²⁶⁾ January 1799.

The allies were working all along to separate Spain from France but the ignoble compliance of Charles to French dictation prevented success. England was ready to be friendly and Russia offered money, ships and men, even threatened war.⁽²⁷⁾

Lafuente tells us that the relations between France and Spain as Napoleon found them were sad to relate but historical necessity required it to be told. "Our squadrons were moved by orders from Paris, our ships sent along the coasts of Europe, to America, to the Mediterranean or wherever the French government wined. One time Charles asked the return of one fleet and it made the good ally so angry that Charles, in order to regain French good graces, wrote a most humiliating letter which he addressed 'To my grand friends.' 'You have always my friendship, believe me, that our victories, which I see as mine, could not enhance it nor misfortune cool it. It has been ordered that my agents in the various nations shall look after our affairs with the same or greater zeal the if they were mine Moreover our friendship is not only firm as

it is now but pure, frank and without reserve. We will secure the happy triumphs to obtain from them an advantageous peace and the universal recognition, there is no Pyrennes which will divide us.' " (28)

Finally Russia declared war and Charles announced, "that those mutual ties of political interests between France and Spain, excited the zeal of the powers of the coalition who under the pretexts of reestablishing order, proposed to disturb it the more and despotize those nations who did not stand against such ambitious desires." (29) Charles was completely taken in by the amazing success of the French and dared not resist them, besides Napoleon was qualifying all his resolute demands by presenting Charles with fine horses and fine arms. He covered the women of the court with expensive presents and much flattery. (30)

The legal ravages on Spain by France began with the treaty of San Ildefonso, 1 October 1800, between Berthier and Urquijo. The treaty of 1 October 1800, provided in general terms that France would acquire a suitable arrangement of territory in Parma for which Spain was to cede Louisiana and give France six ships of seventyfour guns each, laden and manned. But the treaty said nothing of the millions of francs paid to France through the vague and obscure negotiations of Urquijo and Muzquiz at Paris. (31) Since this treaty was in general terms as to Parma and

Louisiana, a second treaty was necessary to define the terms. Lucien Bonaparte came to Madrid for that purpose as well as to dominate the Spanish government.

Napoleon had ordered Admiral Mazarredo to join the Spanish fleet to the French fleet in 1799, but Mazarredo had refused upon the theory that the Spanish coasts needed protection.⁽³²⁾ Urquijo had been very favorable to France because he knew that French interference had caused the fall of Godoy and his own elevation to the position as minister of State. He also was in a contest with the church party due to his efforts to effect a separation from Papal domination in church matters. His position was becoming all the more precarious because he beleived Mazarredo deserved the support of the Spanish government. Godoy, who was watching for an opportunity to regain the office, as well as the downfall of Urquijo, suggested that Napoleon should be asked to send some one else as ambassador in the place of Lucien. Urquijo was susceptible to the idea and passed the suggestion on to Paris, the immediate result of which was that Lucien hastened his arrival and demanded the dismissal of Urquijo and Mazarredo.⁽³³⁾ Godoy resumed actual control of affairs although Saavedra continued for a time as the nominal head of the government. Lucien and Godoy, on 21 March 1801, drew up a treaty at Aranjuez as a supplement to the one of San Ildefonso. The treaty provided that the

Duke of Parma should renounce in perpetuity the duchy with all its dependencies and the Spanish government guaranteed the renunciation. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany renounced by the Grand Duke and guaranteed to France by the Emperor of "Germany" would be given in lieu of Parma. The Duke of Parma was to go to Florence, sustained by the French government; the prince to be known as King of Tuscany and have all the honors due that office. The transfer of Louisiana to France was confirmed and as the family established in Tuscany was of the Spanish house, this kingdom should remain to Spain perpetually. The Duke of Parma, who renounced in favor of his son, should be reimbursed with money by Charles and Napoleon. (34)

In the meantime, two other treaties were negotiated that form a part of the entanglements between France and Spain and which resulted in the eventual complete domination of France over Spain. Napoleon determined to strike at England through Portugal and needed the cooperation of Spain to carry his project into effect. A treaty at Aranjuez, 29 January 1801, signed by Lucien and Urquijo was an ultimatum to Portugal but gave her the opportunity for peace by closing her ports to the English and opening them to France and Spain. Portugal was also to cede Spain a portion of territory having at least one fourth of her population to serve as a hostage or as a guarantee for the return to Spain of the island of Trinidad, Mahon or

Malta, also she must pay an indemnity for injury to Spanish subjects and to indemnify France in a like manner. Napoleon promised military aid to Spain and showed apparent indifference by allowing Spain to get all conquests over and above the expenses in case the campaign did not result in complete success. The command of the armed forces was given to Spain, but the significant part of the treaty was article 10, which stated that since France was primarily interested, then France shall have the dominant part in making the subsequent peace. (35)

A fourth treaty was signed, 13 February 1801, by Godoy and Lucien. It provided for a triparte plan of a attack on England. The first part was to be under a Spanish officer who should have five ships each from Spain, France, and the Batavian Republic to attack Brazil and the West Indies. The second part provided a French officer with ten ships each of Spanish, French, and Batavian origin should attack Ireland. The third part of the general plan provided for a joint attack upon Trinidad under a Spanish officer and an attack upon Surinam under a French officer, and to make a contact if possible with Russian forces so as to embarrass England on the Mediterranean Sea. France was to provide five army corps, one of which was to be placed on the Spanish border for use in the anticipated campaign against Portugal.

The war of Oranges between Spain and Portugal was the

immediate result of this treaty-making program. Portugal was in no condition to resist and the whole campaign was completed in the month of May 1801, ending with a treaty, 6 June 1801, at Badajoz.⁽³⁶⁾ The peace permitted Charles and Godoy "two unwarlike men, to pin warlike metals upon each other," and to attach Olivenza province to Spain as an object of conquest.⁽³⁷⁾ The old treaty of alliance was resumed between Spain and Portugal, but it was not to effect in anyway the alliance of Spain with France.

Napoleon was not satisfied with the terms of the peace and threatened both Spain and Portugal.⁽³⁸⁾ He received no indemnity nor any part of Portuguese territory that might be used as an object of trade or barter. A subsequent agreement gave France a belated indemnity of twenty five million francs and as an era of peace was breaking over Europe, Napoleon turned his attention to other matters.

The preliminary peace with England, 1 October 1801, neglected the prayers of Spain for the return of Trinidad but Talleyrand assured Count Azara, new ambassador at Paris, that restitution would be made in the final draft of the treaty at Amiens.⁽³⁹⁾ The treaty at Amiens, 27 March 1802, did not restore Trinidad to Spain. Azara was obliged to sign the treaty the ceded the island to England. In spite of the disregard of Spain at Amiens, Napoleon

demanded Spanish ships for subduing the general uprising in San Domingo.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Spain and Russia signed a treaty in Paris, 4 October 1801, which merely declared that peace existed and provided for an exchange of ministers, on 1 January 1802, or sooner if possible.⁽⁴¹⁾

The period of peace proved to be only a quiet before the storm when war was to break out on greater proportions than before. The interval was no relief to Spain because Napoleon insisted that the subsidie be paid just the same. The confusion attached to payments in kind led to a treaty of Paris, 19 October 1803, between Azara and Talleyrand in which the subsidy was reduced to money terms. Spain was to pay six million francs per month and by way of compensation, Spain was permitted to remain neutral and act the part of a neutral to all other powers.⁽⁴²⁾

When the war was resumed between France and the other powers, overtures were made to get Spain on the side of the Third Coalitions. Pitt, the English minister, was hopeful that the spirit of the Spanish nation would be awakened and that the power of Napoleon would be broken by a general uprising of the people against tyranny. In Spain, there was a patriotic people opposed to the policies of Godoy, the directing head of Spanish policies. The people abhorred his administration and private life. The marriage of Ferdinand to Maria Antonio of Naples was opposed by Godoy and Maria Louisa who took advantage of each opportunity to

oppose him. Maria Antonio and her mother corresponded and conspired against Godoy and Napoleon.⁽⁴³⁾ Some of these letters were intercepted and Napoleon showed them to the Spanish ambassador.⁽⁴⁴⁾ The letters revealed secrets of the Spanish court which were to be passed on to the British government by Marie Caroline, mother of Maria Antonio. Godoy and Napoleon planned to get rid of these objections and entered into another treaty of alliance, January 1805, which was similar to past ones, and as usual involved a sacrifice for Spain.⁽⁴⁵⁾ There was a vague offer of protection to Godoy against all his enemies if he yielded fully in opposing England in the new alliances.

The chief purpose of the alliance indeed, was to further Napoleon's plans against England. Napoleon needed greater resources to carry out an invasion of England and had called upon Spain to furnish the subsidy which she had promised in 1801. However the campaign against England required greater naval strength. In lieu of the subsidy therefore, Napoleon was willing to accept French control of the Spanish fleet which he joined with his own.

During the summer of 1805, there was a continual game of war between the British and the French-Spanish fleets, each seekin an opportune time to strike at the other, but Napoleon's plans were frustrated for his

naval commander never had a favorable opportunity to aid him in his ambitious enterprise. Dispairing of success in this venture, Napoleon suddenly in August 1805, turned his army toward the east and determined to crush England by subduing the continents. (46)

Meantime, on 21 October 1805, at Cape Trafalgar, the British fleets under the command of Lord Nelson, decisively defeated the French-Spanish fleet.

Napoleon having learned from Trafalgar that he could not defeat England on the sea, determined to ruin her commerce and defeat her through an economic blockade. In November 1806, he issued his Berlin decree by which he declared the blockade against British ports and strict rules effecting the commerce of other countries. In order for his program of blockades, the continental system as it was called, to be effective at all, it had to be effective everywhere. Napoleon must have the support of every country in Europe, with a coast line, if he were to succeed.

Spain was nominally loyal to Napoleon and would comply with his wishes, but Portugal persisted in opposing his will. Napoleon early in the year of 1807, outlined his plan to the Spanish. He insisted that Spain adhere strictly to the continental system and that she must join France in demanding that Portugal also comply. (47) Spain must aid France in a war on Portugal if she refused. By October 1807, the army reorganization plans of Napoleon were complete

and he was able to make his demands upon Spain and Portugal more impressive by ordering the army corps of Junot to Bayonne. Spain joined France in an ultimatum to the Prince Regent of Portugal demanding that he close his ports to England and arrest all English merchants. The demands were refused as Napoleon expected. (51) Junot therefore was ordered to Portugal, 18 October 1807, and on 27 October 1807, Duroc and Izquierdo signed the treaty of Fontainebleau.

This treaty of Fontainebleau provided for a kingdom of Lusitania to be created in northern Portugal for the duke of Parma. The province of Alemtejo and Algarves were to be given to Godoy as the Prince of Algarves. The remainder of Portugal was to be held subject to a general peace. Neither Lusitania nor Algarves could make war of peace without the sanction of Spain and in case the remaining portion of Portugal were returned to the House of Braganza, it might be accepted only upon similar terms. The king of Etruria was to cede his kingdom to France. The territorial integrity of Spain was guaranteed to Charles who should have the title "Emperor of the Americas." (48)

Napoleon despised the Spanish Bourbons because they were not enterprising enough to resist him as the family in Naples had done. He feared the Spanish Bourbons would attempt to betray him again or if they did not do so willingly, they would actually by allowing Spain to

sink further into decay. "When he thought of the past greatness of Spain, he visualized the possibility of a strong Spain again who would endanger his own succession in France." (49) "It was his intention to proceed then to Madrid, convoke the Cortez and leave to them the task of reforming their government and to choose a sovereign of their own choice whom he had determined should be one of his own family." (50)

Murat left Bayonne, March 1808, unaware of Napoleon's actual plans against Spain. He was only a military commander and conducted himself as such. He was admonished by Napoleon, 29 March 1808, to act prudently for "they still have energy. You have to deal with a virile people. They already have the courage, they will soon have all the enthusiasm which you meet with among men not worn out by political passions. The aristocracy and clergy are masters of Spain. If they become seriously alarmed for their privileges and existence, they will rouse the people and instigate an eternal war. At present, I have many partisans among them. If I show myself as a conqueror, I shall soon cease to have any If war breaks out, all is lost." (51)

"Napoleon understood the power of the people, but neither he nor any one had foreseen riots at Aranjuez. All the calculations in which the essential element, the Spanish character, was suppressed, deceived the Convention, led

the Directory astray and ended by drawing Napoleon into the most fatal of his enterprises." (52)

BAYONNE.

Murat, upon his arrival in Madrid, 23 March 1808, was hailed as a deliverer. The city gates were thrown open, food was given, and outstretched hands greeted him. The people were in a state of happy excitement for they had heard many remarkable rumors about Napoleon and the troops of Murat were expressive. People believed that progress from the Pyrennes was coming, that thequisition would be ruled out and that free thought would prevail. (53)

There were some however, who were skeptical of the pretended motives of Napoleon and when Ferdinand returned from Aranjues to Madrid, 24 March as King, it was necessary that he explain the presence of the French. He explained it thus: "These esteemed guests are the troops of our intimate and august ally, the Emperor of the French, and have not come in a hostile capacity, but to execute the plans formulated with his Majesty against the common enemy. " (54)

Because Napoleon had expected the Royal family to flee before his army, he had given no instructions to Murat or to Beauharnais, the ambassador. At a loss what to do, Beauharnais and Murat, set the rumor afloat that Madrid would soon have the honor of entertaining Napoleon and

that an envoy was expected at any time. General Savary was the envoy and he began the intrigue that was to draw the whole Spanish family to Bayonne.⁽⁵⁵⁾ Napoleon's ultimate object was completely disguised by pretensions of friendship. Beauharnais, assuring Ferdinand the protection of Napoleon, suggested a marriage with one of the daughters of Josephine.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Step by step, the French induced Ferdinand to go meet Napoleon and escort him to Madrid. They flattered him and deceived his advisers.

Upon hearing that Napoleon was coming to Spain and had already arrived at Bayonne, Ferdinand had sent a committee, including his brother Carlos, to greet and accompany him to Madrid. However, the suggestion of a French princess or a wife appealed to Ferdinand and he was easily persuaded that he too should go to greet Napoleon. On 11 April, word was again received that Napoleon had left Paris and Ferdinand prepared to meet him.

General Savary was a member of Ferdinand's party and by his flattery and pretensions of friendship, lured Ferdinand on toward Bayonne. Several of Ferdinand's friends cautioned him not to leave Spanish soil, but Escoiquiz, his old tutor, urged him to go on. As the party passed through Vitoria, the citizens begged Ferdinand not to go any farther and so determined were they that he should not, the harness was torn from the horses

drawing his carriage. (57) Carlos and his friends had learned at 10 A.M. on 20 April, the real intention of Napoleon and they set off at once to warn Ferdinand. But it was too late, Ferdinand had already crossed into France and was surrounded by a troop of cavalry under the command of the Prince of Neufchatel and General Duroc. (58) In the evening of the same day, they arrived in Bayonne.

Napoleon soon revealed his plans. (59) He required Ferdinand to renounce the crown of Spain for which he would receive that of the Kingdom of Etruria. Don Carlos, his brother, was required to renounce his succession rights to the Spanish crown and in like manner, received similar rights to that of Etruria in case Ferdinand should die without issue. Napoleon promised to respect the religion and the territorial integrity of Spain. Should Ferdinand refuse to accept these conditions, the Napoleon was prepared to carry them into effect by force if necessary. Napoleon conveyed these requirements to the Duke of San Carlos, the Duke of Infantado and Escoiquiz who had met with him in a preliminary conference.

Conforming to a suggestion from Napoleon that they select one man to represent them, the Spanish selected Pedro Gomez Labrador to negotiate with the imperial foreign minister Champagny who would represent Napoleon. In order to facilitate the negotiation with Champagny, Cevallos prepared a memorandum for Labrador to use. The

memorandum contained a resumé of Napoleon's proposals as well as a reminder to Labrador that if Ferdinand were not free to return home, all negotiations would be null and void. Labrador was to state that Ferdinand had resolved not to yield to Napoleon since neither his honor nor his duty to his vassals permitted him to do so. The people had a right to elect in case the reigning house should become extinct. If the emperor refused to deal, Ferdinand hoped Divine Justice, the dispenser of thrones would protect his cause. (60)

Labrador and Champagny met on 29 April, at Bayonne where Champagny demanded as a preliminary act, the cession of the crown. Labrador rebelled against the loss of his crown and replied that "he did not, and , before God, he hoped he never would, have the power to cede it." (61) The conference ended abruptly and the guards were doubled about Ferdinand's apartment. Napoleon sent at once for Escoiquiz. He told Escoiquiz that if, by 11 P.M. that evening, he did not bring Ferdinand's renunciation and the demand for Etruria, that he would deal on the morrow with Charles who could arrive by then. Escoiquiz reported to his associates and Cevallos begged Ferdinand not to cede. On 30 April, Escoiquiz asked Napoleon for Etruria but Napoleon replied that it was too late. (62)

Charles and Maria Louisa reaching Bayonne on 30 April, were accorded a hearty welcome. The attitude of Charles

changed everything. He agreed with Napoleon who now told Escoiquiz that Charles protested the nullity of his own abdication, and required Ferdinand to return the crown to Charles. (63)

A correspondence resulted between Charles and his son. In a letter of 6 May 1808, Ferdinand wrote that Charles might consider the letter as his renunciation. (64) A letter of 2 May, by Charles, contained one passage that revealed his idea of the Kingship which is well worth repeating here. He said, " I am King by the right of my forefathers; my abdication was the result of force and violence. I have nothing to receive from you; nor can I consent to the convocation of the cortez, an additional absurdity suggested by the inexperienced persons who attend you. I have reigned for the happiness of my people and I do not wish to bequeath civil war, uniting popular juntas, and revolution. Everything should be done for the people and nothing by the people. To forget this maxim were to become the accomplice of all the crimes that must follow its neglect." (65) The negotiations were completed 6 May, by treaties between Napoleon, Charles, and Ferdinand. General Duroc drew up the treaties and signed them for Napoleon. Godoy, who had been sent to Bayonne by Murat, signed for Charles. Escorquiz signed for Ferdinand and Carlos, who had been made a party to the renunciation.

Charles renounced all goods and property belonging to the crown of Spain and Napoleon agreed to provide Charles and his family with a chateau at Compiègne with a thirty million franc pension to be paid by the French treasury. He also agreed to maintain the religion and the national integrity of Spain and to allow Charles an appropriate title. In the treaty with Ferdinand, Napoleon agreed to give an estate in Navarre and a pension of four hundred thousand francs. Ferdinand and Carlos renounced the throne and received a title of Royal Highness which they could use in France.

Two days earlier, on 4 May, Charles had issued a proclamation to the Spaniards in which he said, " To maintain property and public tranquility against enemies, exterior as well as interior, we have thought it fit to nominate our cousin the Grand Duke of Berg lieutenant general of the Kingdom. We command the councils and captain generals to obey his orders." (66) This proclamation annulled all authority in Spain to the Bourbon family and Murat hastened to send all remaining members of the immediate family of Charles to Bayonne.

Ferdinand, Carlos, and Don Antonio, their uncle, were ordered to Valencay, a castle owned by Talleyrand. They left Bayonne, 17 May and under the guidance of colonel Henri of the police elite, arrived in Valencay on 19 May. Charles and his family were sent to Compiègne

for their future residence. Some time later Charles complained of the climate and was permitted to live in Marseilles. While at Marseilles, Charles was offered asylum on board a British battleship, but upon advice of Godoy, declined the invitation. (67)

Ferdinand, ill advised, went to Bayonne. The assurances of General Savary and Murat had so completely deceived him that he could see no danger. Bayonne was the final act of a sad drama. All the personages of this drama had been obedient to the omni potent will of the Emperor. The father and son had passed the crown to the Emperor, yet neither of them had any just right to pass the crown or rights without the consent of the Spanish nation. (68)

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30.	Idem.		
31.	Villa Urrutia, Reclaciones.	Vol. I	17
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33.	Hume, Modern Spain.		56
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50.	Edinburgh Review December 1816.	Vol. XXVII	487
51.	Correspondance de Napoleon I.	Vol. XVI	531
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55.	Annual Register 1808.		137
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58.	Annual Register 1808.		138
59.	Talleyrand, Memoirs.	Vol. I	281/2
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62.	Idem.		
63.	Idem.		
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65.	Idem.		
66.	Ibid.		226
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CHAPTER III.

LIBERATION. THE NEW ORDER INSTITUTED.

ATTEMPTS AT RECONSTITUTIONS.

PART I.

BONAPARTISM. JOSEPH IN SPAIN .

Spain had been unable to resist the forces of the French revolution, but when Napoleon, by his energetic ability overcame these forces, the Spanish people admired him and hoped to have a happier relationship with him. He was hailed as the restorer of the church and as the protector of Ferdinand. They believed that all their humiliations were caused by the insolent favorite who directed the affairs of their government. For a while, Napoleon flattered them, yet exploited them by bestowing magnificent presents upon their king. However, as soon as they realized that Napoleon did not intend to assist them in deposing a profligate minister or in restoring Ferdinand, they turned against him and hated him. He became the conqueror, the emperor of the French who would humiliate them and violate their integrity.⁽¹⁾

They arose against him and with no king or prince to guide them, their achievements are the more notable for they gave all Europe a new measure of hope and a new conception of the might of the people. It was from their humble beginnings that all Europe learned to prepare along new lines the great alliance for the war of

liberation. The first evidence of this new strength was in the heroic defense with which the Spanish people resisted the entry of Joseph into Spain.

After the affair at Bayonne, Napoleon had the throne of Spain, but had some difficulty in disposing of it. In the latter part of 1807, when passing through Italy, Napoleon met the Queen of Etruria, Maria Louisa at Milan and told her that he had no intention of keeping his promise regarding the Kingdom of Lusitania.⁽²⁾ As she was without any source of revenue she asked Napoleon for aid.⁽³⁾ Napoleon then thought of placing his brother Lucien and the Queen together and suggested their marriage, but after a six hour talk on the night of 12 December at Mantua, Lucien refused both the Queen and a throne.⁽⁴⁾ Napoleon had on 3 December, at Venice, vaguely offered the throne of Spain to his brother Joseph who at the time was King of Naples. This offer was not accepted and on 20 February, Napoleon wrote to Joseph offering the throne of Spain with the Ebro river as the northern boundary. Joseph's refusal of this offer reached Paris on 2 March. Napoleon was angry because of the refusal and on the next day started Julia, wife of Joseph, toward Naples. Napoleon next offered it to his brother Louis, but he too was satisfied where he was and refused.⁽⁵⁾

Napoleon showed a semblance of consideration for Spain by inviting to Bayonne one hundred and fifty men

among whom there were two archbishops, six bishops, six men of the religious orders, sixteen canons, twenty priests, ten grandees, ten gentlemen with titles and ten without titles, forty councillors, two admirals, two generals, three professors, fourteen merchants, six Spanish Americans and the rest unclassified.⁽⁶⁾ These men were invited to be present at the installation of Joseph as king and to participate as a legislative assembly, in the name of Spain. Many of them refused but about ninety did participate. There were a few others in Bayonne who joined this group of adherents to Joseph. Many of these men were well known in public life or were to gain a political reputation during the next few years. Among them we find Luis Urquijo, exminister of State. The Duke del Infantado, friend of Ferdinand, later a cavalry leader, had served as ambassador at London. The Duke de Frias had been special ambassador for Godoy in Paris in 1806 for the purpose of extending a welcome to Napoleon upon his return from Prussia. Fernan Nunez had been special envoy for a Bonaparte wife and later was ambassador at London and Paris. Pedro Cevallos had been minister to Charles and Ferdinand and was later ambassador at Naples and Vienna. Vincent Galiano became a distinguished member of the Cortez and subsequently leader of the 1820 revolt against the government of Ferdinand. Ignancio Muzquiz was the accredited ambassador to Paris.

Manuel Lardizabal, a native of Mexico, became a radical royalist in the Cortez. Joseph Mazarredo was the admiral, who had refused to obey Napoleon in 1799. Jovellanos had been a minister for several years and became president of the Junta. Joseph Azanza and Gonzalo O' Farril were the leaders of a party that had opposed Godoy. O'Farril had been refused as the envoy of Spain to Paris, because he was Irish, even though he had been a ranking officer of the Spanish Corps gathered in anticipation of an attack on Ireland. (7)

Joseph chose a cabinet of representative men including Urquijo, as secretary of state; Cevallos, as foreign minister; Azanza, as minister of the Indies; Mazarredo, as minister of marine; O'Farril, as minister of war; Jovellanos, as minister of the interior; and Cabarrus, an exile, as minister of finance. Fernan Nunez was chosen Grand Huntsman, while the Duke del Infantado, with several others, were given palace offices. (8)

All the Spaniards considered it a mandate from the Emperor to do homage to Joseph and they were presented in four groups, Grandees, the Council of Castile, the Inquisition, the Council of the Indies, and Haciendas, and the army. (9)

Joseph accepted the offer of the throne, 10 May, and came to Bayonne on 6 June, Napoleon proclaimed him King and lieutenant general. Joseph proclaimed a

constitution which had been written by M. de Esmenard, a Frenchman, but a long time resident of Spain. The constitution was of a liberal nature. It provided for a Parliament of the three estates to meet every third year, a Senate with wide powers and charged with the guardianship of the liberties and the press. It abolished torture, reduced the number of convents and freed land from mortmain and entail. It was a great step toward responsible government and was workable except for the lack of political education of the people. The ministers were responsible for the execution of the laws, but responsible to the King only. A minister of state signed all acts of the government. The members of the Senate were appointed by the King, with all Spanish infants members exofficio. The president of the Senate was chosen by the King and served for one year. (10)

Joseph started from Bayonne, 9 July, and arrived in Madrid, 20 July, but entered the city without his Spanish cabinet. The cabinet had separated from the King's party for fear of what might happen. His friends began working for him before leaving Bayonne. The Duke del Infantado gave Joseph his first uniform and Cevallos wrote, 8 June, that "his bearing and nobleness of heart were enough to win the provinces without the use of an army. (10a) Several of the deputies issued a proclamation, 8 June, calling upon their compatriots to stop the insurrection and

recognize Joseph as King, a man from whom they could expect great things. Ferdinand added his bit by announcing from Valencay, "I consider myself a member of the august family of Napoleon for having asked a niece whom I hope to marry. Ferdinand, moreover, wrote upon an occasion offering his felicitations "because of his satisfaction in seeing his dear brother installed upon the throne of Spain, that there could not be a monarch more noted for his virtue and for attaining the happiness of the nation."⁽¹¹⁾ While these few people were paying homage to Joseph, the people in Spain were in a state of feverish excitement and giving their grito de independencia, Viva Fernando VII, muera Napoleon.⁽¹²⁾ Meaning (cry of independence, long live Ferdinand VII! Death to Napoleon.)

Joseph entered Spain with few illusions and began to lose these on the way to his capitol, comprehending that these people were his enemies. He saw that which neither Napoleon nor his advisers had seen, the true spirit of the Spanish people, the hatred to his person and to all that was French. He was very quick to realize his position, and very frankly told Napoleon, "I did not encounter a Spaniard who showed respect to me except those who travelled with me I have for an enemy a nation of twelve million inhabitants, brave and exasperated to the extreme no one has told you the truth before. It was a mistake ; our glory will fade in Spain." ⁽¹³⁾ A

man who could so quickly size up his position and confess it, thinks Lafuente, was one of capability.

Joseph set about making friends and trying to win the friendship of Spain, but it was a vain effort. Scarcely had Napoleon issued his statement from Bayonne, "I leave, assured of my dominion in Spain," than the battle of Bilen, 20 July 1808, brought defeat and surrender to a French army.⁽¹⁴⁾ Bailen showed Europe that Napoleon and French armies were not invincible and this had a tremendous effect upon the people in Spain. In a way, this initial victory was the cause of many subsequent military defeats for the Spaniard. Each succeeding general felt the necessity of an offensive campaign. They were always defeated, but the incapacity of the Spaniards to see their own defects, while at the time rendering them open to defeat, also made them ultimately invincible.⁽¹⁵⁾

Joseph had issued a decree, 12 July 1808, which divided Spain into the six departments of Castile, Leon, Aragon, Navarre, Granada, and the Indies. The escutcheon of these was the ancient two globes and columns between which Joseph placed the eagle of his royal house.⁽¹⁶⁾ The decree was never full executed, for Joseph was soon to learn that the provinces could be administered only when under military discipline. Besides the French troops near Madrid retreated northward after the battle of

Bailen and Joseph fled, late in July 1808, to Vitoria behind the French lines. When Joseph abandoned his throne in Madrid, many of the Spaniards who had sworn fealty to his dynasty, now joined the popular side against him.

The troops that Napoleon had sent into Spain were young unseasoned recruits, and he now determined to lead veterans into Spain and personally reestablish Joseph on the throne. The resistance of the Spaniard to the veteran troops directed by Napoleon was quickly overcome and as the French approached Madrid, Napoleon issued a decree, 12 November 1808, in which he declared that those Spaniards who had gone over to the popular side were now enemies of France, guilty of treason, and therefore their property was confiscated. (17)

When the French entered Madrid, 4 December 1808, Napoleon issued several decrees which revealed him to the Spaniards as a conqueror, and as the upholder of his brother whereupon the Spaniard turned the war to one of vengeance. (18)

The Madrid decrees of Napoleon were drastic, directed principally at the Church and the nobility. The Council of Castile had made an effort to reassert itself and because of that, Napoleon declared it dissolved and ordered the arrests of its members as hostages. The tribunal of the inquisition was abolished and its property added to

that of the State. Monastic houses, and their membership, were to be reduced one third, the property of those suppressed being added to that of the State. All duties and banalities were abolished. Free will in industry was ordered. All interior customs houses were abolished and reestablished on the frontiers only. All seignorial courts were abolished and only royal courts were to exist.⁽¹⁹⁾

On 7 December, Napoleon issued a proclamation to the Spaniards in which he warned them to dire consequences. They were to determine whether they constitution would be their law, he told them, and if his efforts proved in vain and their conduct did not justify his confidence, then he had no choice left but to treat them as inhabitants of a conquered province.⁽²⁰⁾

Joseph wished to abdicate because Napoleon's decrees of 4 December, interfered with his right, although he did not wish to abdicate without the consent of Napoleon. However the notion of abdication continued to occupy his mind and he did not conceal his disgust with the whole situation. He even tried to trade his crown for that of Naples when he reflected upon pleasanter times he had enjoyed in southern Italy.⁽²¹⁾

Joseph retained, despite those who quit him, a great many Spaniards in his service and as his ministers. Yet if he followed the advice of these ministers, he was rebuked by La Forest, ambassador from Paris, who was

transmitting orders received from Paris. If, on the other hand, he followed such orders from Paris, the Spaniards complained. La Forest was really the power behind the throne because he was receiving instructions from his government and Joseph was obliged to put up with it. (22)

So sure was Napoleon of success that , 8 February 1810, he issued a decree by which the provinces of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, the territory north of the Ebro river, was attached to France. Each of these provinces were placed under the control of a general who was to receive his orders from Paris only. (23) As compensation, Napoleon contemplated the conquest of Portugal which he would offer to Joseph as an integral part of Spain. (24)

At the same time, Napoleon had in mind a plan by which all of Spain was to be divided up into sections and each part placed under the control of a general. But the success of this plan was subject to a decisive victory by General Massena in Portugal, meanwhile opposing Massena were the English troops, the only force then considered formidable by Napoleon.

Joseph could not approve a plan that would endanger the throne which he had not wanted in the first place, but Napoleon only supported Joseph as long as he was an aid to the general plan. The attitude of Napoleon was that if Joseph did not like it, he could abdicate; for Ferdinand, who could marry Carlotta, daughter of Lucien, would take

the broken kingdom.⁽²⁵⁾ The loss of the northern provinces took away from Joseph the credit his previous moderation had won for him. He sent his minister, Azanza to Paris with a protest to any plan that would take from Spain any of her territory. But in Paris, Azanza was told that Napoleon intended to take all of Spain.⁽²⁶⁾

In many ways, Joseph still tried to conciliate the Spaniards. He had a Spanish guard and declared later that if the subsidies from Paris had been sufficient to pay the Spaniards, he would eventually have won them over.⁽²⁷⁾ During 1809-11, indeed, many Spaniards, despairing of ever overcoming the invaders, were turning Afranceados.⁽²⁸⁾ Joseph talked a great deal and went in for fine display to win attention. He established bull fighting as a bid for popular favor. Italian opera owes its reappearance in Spain to the French invaders, the Italian songs and idioms having been barred from Spain since 28 December 1799, by Royal decree.⁽²⁹⁾

As the French military spread over Spain, the officers organized lodges of Masonry purely for propaganda purposes.⁽³⁰⁾ Two lodges were formed in Cadiz, one of which was very active in favor of Joseph. The success of these lodges was not very great. The best response came from the American deputies who were affected by prospects of civil disturbances in the colonies. In 1812, Joseph made an attempt to consolidate the dominion by uniting these

lodges under the Grand lodge of Spain and the Indies, as a special attraction for all liberals.⁽³¹⁾ The adverse influence of the church was too strong, however, for masonry was looked upon by Catholics as a secret and evil society condemned by the church.⁽³²⁾ When the Duke del Infantado, a liberal, became president of the Regency in 1812, it was a signal for the French to win over the ministers through trickery and bribery. There were proposed meetings along the borders of Portugal, where discussions were to be held over the feasibility of Joseph accepting the Cadiz constitution with a few necessary changes, but the Cortez and Regents ignored these proposals. Toreño declared that the statements of M. de Las Casas in a book called Memorial de Saint Helene,⁽³³⁾ claiming that the Cortez negotiated with the French, were falsehoods.^(33a)

Even with the passage of time, Joseph was unable to gain any appreciable support from the people. The war was becoming more and more one of vengeance and bitterness, for Joseph was deemed an intruder, whose forces overran the land and destroyed the crops, "a brother of Napoleon, hated and scorned because he was French."⁽³⁴⁾ The ordinary Spaniard always had the idea that he was deformed, a drunkard, and depraved. Force and flattery failed, when men refused to believe the testimony of their own eyes, that he really was an amiable and well meaning man.⁽³⁵⁾ He was ridiculed and caricatured in the press. He was called

the "Prattler of the market," because he talked too much and "King plague" because of the damage done in Madrid. Fervent Catholics prayed in the names of "Jesus, Maria, and the father of our Savior", rather than speak the name of Joseph. (36)

The freedom of the press sanctioned by Joseph and the Cortez permitted an internal attack that was worse than one of the bayonets. The press stirred up the religious question and printed critical articles against religion and the Pope. French money bribed it to print and spread heretical ideas. (37) The result could be only one thing, it brought the violent hatred of the Church which preached that the French were heretics who came to contaminate the purity of the faith and spread revolutionary propaganda of impiety. (38) The French were heretics who violated the holy places and burlesqued the devotion of the Spanish people. The Spaniards sought the aid of their patron saints. The virgin of Pilar made each Aragonese soldier a hero, the Castellanos appealed to Santiago, and San Fernando was asked to lend his assistance. (39)

Joseph was likewise not successful in keeping his diplomatic service intact. He wanted to be represented at, and receive envoys from, other courts for the dignity and moral effect it would have in stabilizing his own rule. When Joseph had retreated from Madrid in 1808, he had

left there the Papal Nuncio Gravina, Baron Strogonoff, Russian minister, and his secretary Baron Mohrenheim, and Guinotte, chargé d' affaires for the United States, and his secretary Mr. Irving.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Guinotte, it seems, was handling the Austrian, Russian, Prussian and Swedish affairs as well. Nuncio Gravina left Madrid along with the Junta Central and remained in Cadiz until expelled from Spain in 1813. Guinotte presented himself to the Junta at Aranjuez and at Seville, went to Triest, and returned to Spain where he was ordered to present himself to Joseph. He was also instructed to give over to the legation of Holland and Denmark all the papers he was holding for Russia, Prussia and Sweden. His associate, Irving became attached to the popular government at Seville and Cadiz.⁽⁴¹⁾ The Saxon Chargé de' affaires, Jacob William Persch was another who left and did not return.

General de Broc, a brother-in-law of Marshal Ney, was sent by the court in Holland to congratulate Joseph, but the accredited minister was Commander VernHuell, who left Madrid after a short stay and did not return. Meanwhile he left Von Zuylen de Nyevelt in charge of the legation. Baron Edmond Bourke represented Denmark at intervals. Joseph threatened to recall his chargé d' affaires, Rafael de Urquijo, from Berlin, if Prussia did not send a minister to Madrid. Frederick William finally sent, in July 1810, his chamberlain, the Count of Lehndorf.

The Count stopped over in Paris to pay his respects and Champagny told him to postpone his journey, because of the unsettled state of affairs.⁽⁴²⁾ Prince Repnin Volkonsky, a Russian commander captured at Austerlitz, was accredited as minister to the court of Jerome at Cassel. When this legation was abandoned in 1810, he went to Madrid. He was accepted because the Russians were not represented in Madrid 1810. In October 1810, Mohrenheim came back but was refused recognition because Count Repnin had been received. Later Mohrenheim was received as a "distinguished visitor."⁽⁴³⁾

The eastern campaigns of Napoleon in 1812-13, used up all the French reserve strength and most of the scanty resources intended for the armies in Spain. The difficulties became insurmountable. Poor land, poor roads, no sanitation, mountainous country, guerilla warfare, all denied success to an army whose strength was constantly diminishing.⁽⁴⁴⁾ The French slowly gave way and in retiring began to burn, destroy, and ravage everything of value. The palaces, churches, museums, archives and public places were sacked and robbed of valuable treasures.⁽⁴⁵⁾ A whole caravan left Madrid, 26 May 1813, laden with paintings, art objects, and church service destined for the galleries of the Louvre in Paris.⁽⁴⁶⁾

His position, as King of Spain and lieutenant of Napoleon, gave the command of the armies to Joseph. But

Napoleon should have known that Joseph was unable to command. The generals refused to obey him and even scorned him.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Some of the generals were getting their orders direct from Paris by virtue of the February 1810 decree. Eventually, June 1813, General Soult was sent to Spain as imperial lieutenant and took command of the armies — but in vain.

Napoleon's last desperate effort led him, in the end, to dethrone his brother and restore the imprisoned Ferdinand in a futile attempt to save himself and his dynasty. Before the significance of that step can be appreciated, however, it is necessary for us to have followed the course of the Spanish national uprising under the Juntas and Cortez.

FOOT NOTES. CHAPTER III PART I

1.	La España del Siglo XIX.	Vol. I	284
2.	Hume, Modern Spain.		94
3.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. I	34
4.	Idem.		
5.	Ibid.		35
6.	Salecido Ruiz, History of Spain.		447
7.	Lafuente, History of Spain. The O'farril family moved to Havana 1717	Vol. XXVI	458-60
8.	Idem.		
9.	Revista Archives.	Vol. XXIV	II15
10.	Annual Register 1808.		326
10A.	Revista Archives.	Vol. XXIV	II15
11.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	271
12.	Ibid.		270-I
13.	Joseph's Correspondance.	Vol. IV	381-3
14.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	275
15.	Trere J. H., Works.	Vol. I	121
16.	Revista Archives.	Vol. XXIV	276
17.	Ibid.		280
18.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	324
19.	Annual Register 1809.		731
20.	Tournier, Napoleon I.	Vol. II	67
21.	Revista Archives.	Vol. XXIV	275
22.	Ibid.		280
23.	Tournier, Napoleon I.	Vol. II	125

24.	Revista Archives.	Vol.XXIV	430
25.	Ibid.		274
26.	Tournier, Napoleon I.	Vol. II	126
27.	Gleig, Life of Wellington.	Vol. II	306
28.	Revista Archives.	Vol. XXIV	276
	Afranceados- A term used to designate Spaniards who turned French.		
29.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.		538
30.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War.	Vol. LXIV	408
31.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.		580
32.	Ibid.		579
33.	M. de Las Cases Memorial de Saint Helene These statments are not shown in Napoleon's correspondence.		
33A.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War.		409
34.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	273
35.	Butler Clark, Modern Spain.		14
36.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.		541
37.	Revista Archives.	Vol.XVIII	433
38.	La Espana del Siglo XIX.	Vol. I	284
39.	Ibid.		285
40.	Revista Archives.	Vol. XXIV	428
41.	Ibid.		429
42.	Ibid.		430
43.	Ibid.		429

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| 44. | Hayes, Political and Social History of Europe. | Vol. I | 553 |
| 45. | Lafuente, History of Spain. | Vol. XXV | 330 |
| 46. | Ibid. | | 331 |
| 47. | Ibid. | | 327 |

CHAPTER III. PART II.

POPULARISM ATTEMPTS AT SELF GOVERNMENT.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1808-1810.

A notable event marks the beginning of the Spanish resistance to the power of Napoleon. Murat gave out the story that Ferdinand was married to a niece of Napoleon and on, 2 May 1808, the people had gathered in Madrid to rejoice with the group that would follow Ferdinand home and celebrate his wedding.⁽¹⁾ The people became greatly excited, however, when they learned that the Queen of Etruria was leaving the royal palace for Bayonne. French troops began patrolling the streets and very soon a riot was started between the troops and citizens. The rioting continued for two days after which the people submitted only to the military superiority. The dos mayos, 1808, is the first sign of reproach and awakening of the Spanish people. It is their first protest against the deceit and iniquity of the invaders.⁽²⁾

The cry of independence had been given, but they had no government or leaders. Their king had renounced his crown to Napoleon at Bayonne. Napoleon had proclaimed Joseph, as King of Spain, but the Spaniards would not recognize him. The Duke del Infantado president of the council

of Castile had sworn allegiance to Joseph, and Murat had dissolved the Junta appointed by Ferdinand and sent its president, Don Antonio to Bayonne. These acts had left Spain without any semblance of a central government.

In the absence of a central government the people depended upon their local councils or Juntas, but in many places the local councils had fallen into disuse and it was necessary to create them anew. Most of the local governments that sprang up were of a spontaneous origin. (3) The objectives of these early Juntas were for local purposes only. They only attempted to arrange for their own affairs, each province or city acting as a separate entity. The people confused by the clamor of war had made no headway toward forming a new central government. (4) The council of Castile known for its attachment to absolute government, believed that it would be a popular idea, thought to conserve its power by proposing a union with the Cortez, but no attention was given this bid for power because the council was subservient to Joseph. (5) Each province felt itself little effected when some other province fell a victim to the French, but experience soon taught them the necessity of union. By the end of May, and June, several provinces had convened in a way under the leadership of General Castanos and a few had opened negotiations with the British commander at Gibraltar. (6)

The leaders in all parts of Spain perceived the necessity

of organized effort and began the task of forming a central government. Yet while they all agreed upon the necessity of one, they were not agreed upon the form it should take. (7)

Jose Palofax of Aragon doubted his authority to do so, but was obliged by necessity to call together the old parliament of Aragon. (8) This act contributed to the idea of a representative government and a few of the leaders from the several Juntas gathered in Madrid to form a central Junta. Floridablanca was chosen president and by the latter part of September 1808, the Junta Central began to function as a combined executive and legislative government. (9)

The Junta Central was in difficulties from the very first. The members, about twenty four, were divided among themselves as to policy. Some wanted a conservative policy while others wanted a very liberal policy. The local Juntas were hesitant to give up their power and the continual defeat of the army together with the contentions between parties prevented any semblance of real authority developing in the Junta Central. (10)

The French army successes of the winter of 1808-9 forced the Junta to flee Madrid and in December the Junta Central took up its position in Seville. The selection of Seville as a place of refuge was unfortunate. The local Junta of Seville had also assumed the position of a national assembly and contested the privacy of the

of the Junta Central. Floridablanca was forced to give up his place of leadership because of infirmities and died early in 1809. The loss of his leadership left a number of men struggling to gain the ascendancy. (11)

The constructive legislation of the Junta was insignificant. The chaos occasioned by the rapid advance of the French precluded this and aside from a few measures of anti-royal tendency, nothing was accomplished. Jesuits were allowed to return as secularized priests. The colonies were declared an integral part of Spain. The freedom of the press was favored by the liberal element which now had control of the Junta. It gave the liberals an opportunity to give notoriety to the abuses of power under Godoy. (12)

The freedom of the press only added to the confusion, by spreading a multitude of ideas of government and prevented close cooperation between the local and central juntas. In order to demand obedience and respect for the central government, a "Tribunal of Public Safety" was created with powers similar to those of the inquisition. (13)

The Junta Central was severely criticized because it could do nothing constructive, or prevent the disasters caused by invasion. The bickerings within the Central and the open rivalry between the central and local juntas led to changes in the form of the Central Junta. The Power was concentrated and to a few men in order to promote

unity and rapidity of action. ⁽¹⁴⁾ The Regency, thus formed in the early part of 1809, functioned as the executive authority until the Cortes assembled in 1810. ^(14A)

The Regency busied itself with providing for the army, establishing relations with England and issuing proclamations to the people. These proclamations are of interest as they reveal the intensity of hatred for the French and the nature of the appeal to arouse the people. One proclamation issued in 1809 by the Junta promised the return of Ferdinand who would convoke the Cortes and reform the abuses of the past. ⁽¹⁵⁾

The president of the Junta of Asturias appealed to the Italians, the Poles, and the Portuguese, to rise against Napoleon, leave his army, and aid in his downfall. ⁽¹⁶⁾ The most stirring appeal to the religious nature of the Spaniards was issued to the Galicians which said in part,---"Spaniards, you have alternative, you must clank your chains in infamous slavery or fight bravely for your liberty---The butcher will bathe his hands in the blood of our king---Spaniards, this is the cause of the omnipotent God. Under the hallowed standard of religion our ancestors gave freedom to the soil---Shall we fear to meet a confused crowd of detested atheists led by the avowed protector of the infidel Jen. You are the honored repositories of the sacred remains of the Apostle St James the patron of Spain. You are decorated with the awful trophies of the

(17)
most holy sacrament which adorns our standards?

War was declared against France by separate provinces and in some places no declaration was made, war simply existed. Asturias was the first of the provinces to declare war thus, and others did so in rapid succession.

The general uprising was followed by a period of assassinations, during which, scores of officials, hesitating officers, and traitors, friends of Godoy and friends of the French were killed. (18) The first recruits were untrained men and undisciplined, which resulted in defeat and further disorganization. The bands of guerrilla forces had better results. Many distinguished citizens were sacrificed because they could not lead these untried soldiers to victory over the better trained French. (19)

The battle of Bailen led each commander to strive individually for the glory attached to such victories. This display of individualism among the commanders and the inability of the government to form co-ordinated action resulted in serious consequences.

The executive commission or Regency was not all that the people expected. The men composing the Regency and Juntas were not free from personal ambitions. (20) The central government was blamed for all the calamities and the seat of government, Seville, was surrounded by French troops. In February 1810, the central government, which a veritable confusion of the Regency, the Junta Central and the Junta Supreme of Seville, was forced to flee

to Cadiz for protection. In Cadiz, this vague authority was contested by a local junta composed principally of merchants, who had organized for their own protection.

Various designs were charged to the juntas and to General Castanos. The people of Cadiz demanded a new regency

with real authority. The Junta had become an object

of derision and of hatred. (21) Many people began to

think it better to accept Napoleon than to continue

under such a makeshift government. (21A)

Some idea of its inefficiencies were noted and described by men of experience in English constitutional government. Frere, minister from England wrote in April 1809, "the Junta Central is an instable government, not monarchical, although it pretends to exercise the authority of a sovereign. It is not a popular government either by origin or composition." (22)

William Jacobs member of Parliament noted in 1810, "the present system unites the evils of the three forms into which governments are usually divided without possessing the advantages of either. One is the debility of a worn out despotism without its secrecy or union; the insolence and intrigue of Aristocracy without its wisdom or refinement; and the faction and indecision of a democracy without the animated energy of popular feeling." (23)

Count Altamira, president of the Junta was said to have "the physiogamy of a baboon and to possess little more intellect than that mimic of man---

The populace sneeringly call him King of Seville." (24)

The Junta composite in Cadiz, about 84 in number, became convinced that some other means of governing must be worked out, but no one wished to jeopardize his own position. (25)

The insistence upon reform at length brought about a decisive change. A new regency of five members was formed with the Bishop of Orense as president. (26)

The regency had full powers, and in February 1810, the juntas passed out of existence. (26A)

The difficulty of deciding in what manner a Cortez should be called, had prevented fulfillment of the decree of 22 May 1809, which announced the call for a general Cortez. (27)

It was at first believed that the call should have been for a representation of the estates of the nobles and clergy, thus forming the two traditional houses of the Cortez. When the order of convocation was published, however, it was only for a general Cortez. Membership was based upon manhood suffrage, members to be heads of families and twenty five years of age, with one representative for each fifty thousand population. (28)

The Summons to a parliamentary assembly was in itself noteworthy, but the invitation to the colonies was without precedent. (29)

FOOT NOTES. CHAPTER III PART II

1. Revista Archives	Vol. XVIII	426
2. Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	262
3. Ibid		267
4. Ibid		266
5. La Espana del Siglo XIX.	Vol. 1	239
6. Frere J. H., Works.	Vol. 1	78
7. Lafuente, History of Spain	Vol. XXVI	281
8. Butler Clark, Modern Spain.		15
9. Ibid		16
10. Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. 1	234
11. Salcedo Ruiz, History Of Spain.		542
12. Idem.		
13. Edinburgh Review September 1814.	Vol. XXIII	371
14. Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	314
14A. Writers vary to such an extent as to the date of formation that I have elected to use a general term.		
15. Annual Register 1808.		333
16. Ibid.		334
17. Ibid.		248
18. Oman, History of Peninsular War.	Vol. VI	70
19. Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	270
20. Ibid.		314

21.	Annual Register 1809.		160
21A.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones	Vol. I	432
22.	Ibid.		435
23.	Edinburgh Review 1811.	Vol. XVIII	137
24.	Edinburgh Review 1811.	Vol. XVIII	136
25.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. I	439
26.	Annual Register 1809.		160
26A.	Salcedo Ruez, History of Spain		543
27.	Ibid.		797
28.	La Espana del Siglo XIX.	Vol. I	200
29.	Butler Clark, Modern Spain.		21

CHAPTER III. PART III.

POPULARISM ATTEMPTS AT SELF GOVERNMENT.

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

1810-1814.

The Cortez assembled in Cadiz, 24 September 1810, and assumed the task of providing Spain with a responsible government. Its convocation represents a revival of the ancient privilege of participation by the people in the national government. In the absence of the king, patriotic Spaniards looked upon it as the sole expression of national unity. The Cortez represented the triumph of the political ideas which had filtered into the minds of the people. (1)

The Cortez was called into existence by the decree of 22 May 1809, and the memberships consisted of a number of regularly elected deputies supplemented by a group of self appointed members from among the refugees in Cadiz. (2) The membership consisted of 94 clergy, 8 nobles, 42 military men and the rest from various classifications. (3) The number of clergy represents about one third of the total number of deputies and explains the religious influence upon all the legislation. The majority represented the radical, progressive, industrial seaboard cities, while the conservative interior was not represented, due to

the French occupation of the territory. (4)

Upon first assembling, there were no outstanding leaders, although a large number of deputies distinguished themselves within a short time. Such men as Arguellas, Toreño, Quintana, Gallego, Gallardo, Martinez de la Rosa, Alcala Galiano, Lardizabal, and the Duke de Rivas were men who gained note. There was no decided division into parties at first, but soon a liberal group and a servile group began a contest for dominance in the assembly. (5)

The home of Doña Marparita Lopez de Morla, a friend of Madame de Stael in Paris, became the recreation center of the liberal group and the home of Bolk de Faber, whose son Fernan Caballero introduced romanticism into Spanish literature, became the place of entertainment for the servile group. The two outstanding men were both liberals. Agustin Arguelles, a professor from the University of Oriedo, had a wonderful power of oratory but did not possess a keen analytical mind. His friend, Diego Muñoz Torrero, a cleric and one time rector of the University of Salamanca, was more profound and argumentative. He was not always constructive, "but his logical acuteness always exposed the sophistry of his opponents." (6)

The Cortez organized itself by choosing Ramon Lozano Doce as president, Perez de Castro and Manuel Lujan as secretaries. A deputy Ramon Pover from Porto Rico was

made vice president. The Regency which had held the full control of the government since early in 1810, administered the oath to the deputies and after a short speech upon the gravity of the situation by the Bishop of Orense, resigned its powers to the Cortez. The Regency expressed the hope that the Cortez would establish a government which they believed most adequate for the country. (7)

Munoz Torrero proposed the first acts of the new government. His proposals, six in number, set forth the policy adopted and followed throughout the existence of the Cortez. Here were his proposals: "The national sovereignty resides in the Cortez. Conforming to the popular will, the Cortez proclaims and swears to Fernando VII, the one and legitimate King of Spain. The renunciation at Bayonne is void, an act of violence, and does not have the consent of the nation. The Cortez reserves the legislative power to itself. The persons to whom the executive power is delegated, is responsible before the nation. The persons of the deputies are inviolable." (8) The liberal party adopted these proposals as its policy and retained enough votes to prevent any change or variation from it.

The Cortez, as to general policies, prohibited deputies from soliciting employment, grace, or decorations from the government during or for one year after their

term of office. They divided the powers of government and named the confines of each division. They named a commission to codify the law, another commission to arrange for the government of the provinces and to organize the provinces and municipalities. They established the liberty of the press but with a censorship by three bishops on religious matters. Political writings were not censored. They permitted a latitude of free thought that was never known in Spain before. They gave the liberal idea opportunity to expand without restraint. They recognized Ferdinand as the lawful king and swore to maintain the monarchy. The past acts of Ferdinand were refused recognition, so that he would not be embarrassed due to his inability to exercise his prerogatives.⁽⁹⁾ On 1 January 1811, the Cortez put into a formal decree their refusal to recognize any act by Ferdinand while he was held a prisoner in France, and that decree was the basis of the later refusal to recognize the treaty of Valencay which released Ferdinand from his captivity.⁽¹⁰⁾

Europe was surprised that the men in the Cortez had such advanced political ideas and no one thought that the inexperienced Cortez could give so many proofs of its effectiveness. Much of the local opposition to the Cortez subsided as soon as it was learned that religion and the monarchical form of government would not be

disturbed.⁽¹¹⁾ The Cortez was obliged to gather material and moral force wherever it could be found. After establishing itself at home, it turned to England and later to Russia for external support and recognition.⁽¹²⁾

The Cortez provided for a division of powers by establishing a Regency which should act in the name of Ferdinand VII. While the Cortez, as a legislative body, wished to have the Regency as a symbol of the Royal power, they did not want to leave to the Regency any opportunity, between the two, for irresponsibility. For that reason, the Cortez always kept in very close contact with the creatures of its own making.⁽¹³⁾ These Regencies had membership of three to five persons and the personnel was changed on numerous occasions. One of the first acts in 1812, was the formation of a Council of State whose duty it was to advise the Regency. At this time an attempt was made to separate the Regency from the Cortez and make the Regency an executive body in fact as well as in theory. The Regency membership was increased to five members with much of the ministerial work passed over to the Council of State. A vote of 93 to 33 on 1 January 1812, refused a place on the Regency to any royal person.⁽¹⁴⁾

The first Regency was composed of three men, General Blake, Gabriel Cisca and Pedro Agar. The first two were absent and the Bishop of Orense was substituted for

General Blake, while Maria Ping was chosen to serve until Ciscar returned. In preparation for proclaiming the new constitution, a new Regency of five members was chosen, 12 January 1812. This Regency was supplemented by a Council of State. The Bishop of Orense was not elected to the new Regency because he refused to swear allegiance to all of the novel principles involved in the new constitution. The other two members of the old Regency became ministers in the new Council of State. The Duke del Infantado was named president of the new Regency but as he was serving as ambassador in London, he did not take up his new office until June. (15) The other four members were Mosquera, Villavicencio, Rodriquez de Rivas and Juan Perez Villamil. This Regency held office until March 1813, when the Cortez, at the request of Agustin Arguelles forced it to resign because it could not or did not enforce the law against the inquisition. (16) A new Regency, of the three men, was then elected and held office until the abolition of the Cortez by Ferdinand. The last Regency was composed of the Cardinal de Bourbon, Agar, and Ciscar. The most notable thing done by this Regency was the expulsion, 13 April 1813, of Nuncio Gravina. (17)

There was much alarm among the anti-reformists that the Cortez would continue its existence under the new constitution and as the servile group was always defeated

in the Cortez, they proposed, in October 1811, that a new Regency should be formed with the Princess Carlotta of Brazil as a member.⁽¹⁸⁾ The Regency should be given full powers and the Cortez adjourn.⁽¹⁹⁾ The liberals were alert and better organized however, and adopted instead a policy proposed by Arguelles.⁽²⁰⁾ The new legislation refused a place on the Regency to any royal person. It provided that the existing Cortez would not adjourn until all pending business was attended to and that the new Cortez should be convoked at the precise time stipulated in the constitution. It also provided that a committee of sixty members of the actual Cortez should remain in session during any interval that might exist between the adjournment of the actual actual and the assembling of a new Cortez.⁽²¹⁾ Thus, by legislation, the liberals assured themselves continuous control of the government.

The liberated press exercised a very great influence in Spain. Both parties were supported by papers and periodicals. Munoz Torrero, speaking in the Cortez said, "I beleive we would do treason to the public desires and that we would give strength to arbitrary government which we have begun to tear down, if we do not decree the liberty of the press. The censor is the last hold of the tyranny that has made us groan for centuries. The vote of the Cortez will destroy that tyranny today or

will confirm it forever." (22) 'The Spaniards had to be taught liberty anew. Arguelles learned liberty in England and broadcast his beliefs in the Cortez.' (23)

The liberals used the press to spread their ideas and to teach the Spaniard that there was a liberty of person and mind as well as a liberty of the State. They tried to teach that the word liberty was not merely a synonym for independence. (24)

French ideas and French armies over ran Spain with equal thoroughness. While the Cortez was devising means to drive out the French army, it was adapting the nation to new ideas that were French. These ideas were put into laws and regulations so that the French really won a moral victory by broadening the intellect of the Spaniards. New words, such as, new rights, liberty, democracy, universal suffrage, and constitution, were incorporated into the Spanish language. The press, whether friend or foe of reform, was giving these words and ideas to the people. (25)

The press worked for particular interest to a great extent. El Concisin wanted to abolish religion. El Semanario Patriotico published by Quintana, wanted to abolish the inquisition. El Telegrafo Americano worked especially for colonial legislation. El Tribuna Espanol took as a motto, "There is no virtue so pleasing to the gods as that of the tyrant." (26) The opponents of reform

used the press to abuse the assembly of which they were a part. The bitterness of the struggle led the Cortez to rule many deputies out of the assembly as enemies of the fundamental law. (27)

There were about forty deputies from the American colonies who protested any deviation from the declared equality of the colonies with the provinces. (28) The Cortez continued to extend rights to the colonies even when the rebellious sentiments were known. The Americans in the Cortez urged further concessions as a means of ending the insurrections. The Cortez, while extending liberties in the peninsula, could not well refuse. The Argentine Junta, in May 1811, professed fidelity to Ferdinand, but wanted to manage Argentine affairs. (29) The people of Venezuela repudiated Ferdinand, and decided they were no longer bound to Spain since the Royal family had deserted them. Both colonies assumed in principle that they were bound to the mother country only in the person of the sovereign. (30)

The most important decree of the Cortez was that of 1 January 1811, by which those most desirous of saving their religion and protecting their country, could unite. The decree acknowledged the legitimacy of Ferdinand, and sought to protect him. (31) A second important decree united the colonies as an integral part of Spain and was the first fundamental change. It would teach the

need of unity to preserve liberty.⁽³⁵⁾ The Grandees were offered that seignories should be abolished without compensations, while the smaller nobility were offended that equality and rights of man doctrines took away their only distinctions.⁽³²⁾ The mitas was abolished and Arguelles proposed the extinction of slavery in 1811 and again in 1813, but the subject was never acted upon. Many important and opportune reforms were instituted, but were reversed by Ferdinand. The Cortez remembered that in ancient times, the monarchy had declined with the decline of the authority of the ministers and Cortez and they did not want such a condition to recur.⁽³³⁾ The Cortez worked to break down all that remained of the ancient regime which involved the idea of privilege and oppression.⁽³⁴⁾ The political measures were more successful because they were not so difficult to change, but the social and economic reforms were difficult to administer. The French had carried off or destroyed so much property that most of the people were striving to ward off starvation. All their fears were concentrated on the French and their hopes were in Wellington rather than in a Cortez, that many did not understand.⁽³⁵⁾

On 13 April 1813, Cardinal de Bourbon, as president of the Regency, expelled the Muncio Gravince from Spain. This act was a serious responsibility for the Regency to

undertake and it hastened the reaction which was to follow.⁽³⁶⁾ The expulsion of the Nuncio came as a result of the contest within the Cortez, and finally between the Cortez and the Church, over the inquisition. The inquisition was abolished, 22 January 1813, by a large majority.⁽³⁷⁾ On 18 February 1813, a decree declared that not more than one convent of less than twelve persons could be in any town. A decree of 22 February 1813, commanded all priests to read the decree abolishing the inquisition in the churches for three consecutive Sundays. On the same day, another decree all pictures showing punishment imposed by the inquisition be destroyed. A decree, in June 1812, had confiscated to the State all property of the convents which had been destroyed by the French.⁽³⁸⁾ It was these four decrees that brought on the trouble between the liberals and the Church.

The Clergy had been guaranteed its right in earlier legislation and was for the most part advocater of freedom, but the contest over the inquisition changed its attitude toward the Cortez.⁽³⁹⁾ The priests refused to read the decree and received the support of the Nuncio.⁽⁴⁰⁾ They considered the decree an insult to the defeated side and offered many excuses for not complying with the law. The law was eventually enforced but the Nuncio who had always succeeded in holding his own with former govern-

ments, took up the issue with the Regency. He was banished from the kingdom and did not return until after the restoration of Ferdinand.

This long contest weakened the liberal party and drew together the opposing factions into a concerted endeavor against it.⁽⁴¹⁾ The clergy spread alarm among the people that heresy was coming into their faith and that infidels were in power. These doctrines brought indecision and skepticism to those, who before had not bothered with the business of government.⁽⁴²⁾ The liberal elements were encouraged to invade the churches in Cadiz and intimidate the priests and the royalists. The persecutions by the liberals of those who did not agree with them, brought reprisals the next year.⁽⁴³⁾ But the major factor in the difficulties of the Cortez — the major partisan issue was the chief handiwork of the Cortez, the constitution.

The "constitution of 1812" had its initial concepts in the reforms of Charles III and experience of the evils of political absolutism, religious intolerance, and exclusive interests of the last three centuries.⁽⁴⁴⁾ The framers of the constitution endeavored to bring ancient practices up to date, making such changes as were necessary to conform with the current political beliefs. The constitutional project was started, 9 December 1810, by Munoz Torrero. The first report of the committee appoint-

ed to study the project, was made 18 August 1811, and as the several sections were drafted, they were brought before the assembly for discussion. The completed document was promulgated as of 19 March 1812, so as to celebrate the anniversary of the riots at Aranjuez.⁽⁴⁵⁾

The first declaration established the National Sovereignty in the people.⁽⁴⁶⁾ The objection to this declaration as too democratic, was answered by Arguelles that every one knew of their attachment to the monarchical form of government.⁽⁴⁷⁾ The position of Arguelles was sustained by the assembly, when it refused to deny the king a joint power with the Cortez in making the laws.⁽⁴⁸⁾ The deputies believed that they had given the king ample powers and that he could exercise full authority except as Saavedra said, " he had to remember that he was not supreme since some power had been left to the people. "⁽⁴⁹⁾ the principal restrictions on the king were those which prohibited him from leaving the kingdom or contracting a marriage without the consent of the Cortez. The succession was provided for through male or female issue of the king.⁽⁵⁰⁾

Religion was of equal importance with the question concerning the power of the king. The one true Roman Catholic apostolic religion was accepted and was to be protected by known and just laws. This gained the friendship of the clergy and was a guarantee against the

establishment of the inquisition. (51)

The question of slavery was discussed at great length. The question was, "Should Africans, or descendents of Africans, be given full or limited privileges in America." (52) The question of citizenship had to be decided upon, for it was a necessary adjunct to the full participation in political rights. A decree of 15 October 1810, which had been intended as the basis of all such interests, did not provide for equality and in all subsequent discussions, the American deputies had enforced the interpretation of inequality of rights. (53) Such deputies from America wanted to extend citizenship to Africans, since representation in the Cortez was based on population; it would also increase the source of poll taxes. A compromise was reached by saying that, "after the year 1830, the exercise of the rights of citizenship will be given those who can read and write." (54)

The exercise of political rights in Spain and in the colonies was given to male persons twenty five years of age, who had resided in Spain or the colonies for at least seven years. In the election of deputies, a three grade (the three estates) indirect method was used. The representation in the ordinary Cortez was to be based on one deputy to each seventy thousand persons. (55)

The deputies referred back to the year 1518, for a precedent, in order to establish the line of succession

and to fix the dotation of the Royal family. The Cortez of 1518, meeting in Valladolid had declared, "that the King is the mercenary of his vassals." (56) This same precedent supported the national sovereignty doctrine also.

A cabinet of seven ministers, responsible to the Cortez, was provided for, but a minister could not speak on the floor of the assembly. (57) The cabinet was supplemented by a council of State of forty members chosen by the king from a list of names submitted by the Cortez. This council was to advise the king especially for passing judgement on the acts of the Cortez, declaring war, and making peace. It was also a court of adjudication in ecclesiastical and judicial questions. (58) The responsibility of the ministers to the Cortez was more nominal than effective, since they were to work by the command of the king, but as Toreño said, "the thought was there never-the-less." (59)

The constitution has been criticized by all schools of politics, yet no one can say that it did not have merit. It bears the characteristics of the epoch in which it was made and was applauded by many by many illustrious men who felt that it meant the regeneration of the Spanish nation. (60)

The chief defect of the constitution was its inflexible structure. It mixed precepts of natural rights, moral obligations and abstract doctrines with political

formulas. It should have been organic and easier to regulate and modify, without altering its fundamental and constitutional motive.⁽⁶¹⁾ The single assembly with the prerogative to initiate the laws, constituted a power so forceful that it subdued all other and placed the king in a humble position which he was not inclined to accept.⁽⁶²⁾ The absence of an expressive public opinion provoked the deputies to circumscribe the royal prerogatives with excessive limitations which no one had an interest to enforce. Moderation was lacking; the constitution was too extreme for a people who were hardly capable of having any.⁽⁶³⁾ To enunciate a general theorem at the risk of losing a practical advantage is the result of inexperience and intemperance. The Cortez provided no check upon itself, yet quickly condemned those who did not agree, as to the application of a general principle.⁽⁶⁴⁾

The principle of Justice must be understood and supported by public opinion to establish a real freedom. The constitution was not so interpreted in the application of its principles. In order to have freedom, it is necessary to constantly resist those abuses which lead to despotism. It was not reasonable to expect the people to reject one despotism only to accept another, about which they cared so little.

In France and England, the political revolutions

were preceded by literary and religious revolutions which prepared the mind and spirit of the nation for the political reforms. (65) Spain had no general intellectual preparation. The mass of the people cared nothing for the fine distinctions between legislative and executive powers. It was neither the time nor place for such discussions. The people had not sought a constitution — it was installed and thrust upon them by a group of deputies, many of whom were self appointed and did not reflect the real sentiments of the people, they professed to represent. (66)

The application of the constitution had caused the nobles to lose position and property while the people gained abstract rights. One group lost what they valued and the other got what they had not desired. "To the nobility, the Cortez was a leveller; to the clergy, the Cortez was a heresy; and to the common people, the Cortez was a traitor because the French had not gone." (67)

The constitution and the Cortez in their actual workings were relatively unimportant, but they formed a program which became the rallying cry for the popular democratic faction in years to come. (68)

EVALUATION of the CORTEZ.

The failure of the Cortez to firmly establish itself as an institution of government, was caused by a great

number of incidents and circumstances. The Cortez became languid because the parties permitted substantial politics to cease. Many members absented themselves and the enemies of reform hoped to gain more from other sources than from parliamentary debate.⁽⁶⁹⁾ The deputies made a mistake in denying the right to succeed themselves. The abnegation was well intentioned, but was a great error as a political measure. There was a provision that vacancies could be filled by anyone and this was the only way in which the experience of one session might be carried into the next. The Cortez failed to provide for the army or the treasury. They put too much dependence upon the supplies and assistance which they hoped to obtain from the colonies.⁽⁷⁰⁾

The ideas of the liberals were new. They were not the result of education, but ideas acquired and applied at a time when the minds of the people were too fully occupied with matters of economic necessity.⁽⁷¹⁾ The French had held Madrid, the traditional capitol, and the people were not accustomed to taking law and order from Cadiz. The yellow fever caused the death of many deputies who were the most capable and their influence was lost to the cause of free government. Many deputies hurried away from Cadiz at the outbreak of the yellow fever. Arguelles and other leaders were among those who left. The lower classes believed that they had been deserted

by those who professed to be their protectors.

The Cortez gave many reforms for economic and social welfare, liberalized industry, encouraged literary progress and supported education. They provided for taking up the waste lands and gave them to the poor, provided for enclosures, cultivation of land, broke up the mesta, and encouraged cattle breeding. The provided a chair of Economics and promoted schools for teaching agriculture. The laws on morality were revised as well as those for the punishment for crime. With such evidence of their good intentions, Lafuente thinks that, "It can not be denied that those noted patriots, were mostly characterized by their sincerety, good desires, the purity of their intentions, and the good faith which was evident in all their work. The proof of which is shown in all their acts.It is to be regretted that their successors were not possessed with the same true intent." (72) "The Cortez fell, but left its heritage for future generations to profit by and complete the regeneration of the nation." (73)

FOOT NOTES. CHAPTER III PART III

1.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	318
2.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.		797
3.	La Espana del Siglo XIX.	Vol. I	200
4.	Butler Clark, Modern Spain.		19
5.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.		548
6.	Edinburgh Review September 1814.	Vol. XXIII	374
7.	La Espana del Siglo XIX.	Vol. I	215
8.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.		545-6
9.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	320-2
10.	Annual Register 1811.		112
11.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	319-20
12.	Revista Espana.	Vol. II	73
13.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	380
14.	Ibid.		193
15.	Annual Register 1812.		161
16.	Salcedo Ruiz, History Of Spain.		555
17.	Idem.		
18.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	372
19.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War.		397
20.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	372-3
21.	Ibid		373
22.	La Espana del Siglo XIX.	Vol. I	199
23.	Revista Espana.	Vol. XXIII	9

24.	Idem.	
25.	Revista Espana.	Vol. XXIII 10
26.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.	546
27.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI 371
28.	La Espana del Siglo XIX.	Vol. I 205
29.	Annual Register 1811.	327
30.	Ibid.	231
31.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI 354
32.	Edinburgh Review 1814.	Vol. XXIII 375
33.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.	561
34.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI 361
35.	Edinburgh Review 1814.	Vol. XXIII 377
36.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI 381
37.	Lafuente, History of Spain,	Vol. XXV 406
38.	Ibid.	407
39.	Edinburgh Review 1814.	Vol. XXIII 375
40.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI 381
41.	Ibid.	378
42.	Edinburgh Review 1814.	Vol. XXIII 376
43.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.	550
44.	Revista Espana.	Vol. CXV 342
45.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.	552
46.	La Espana del Siglo XIX	Vol. I 207
47.	Annual Register 1811.	125

48.	La Espana del Siglo XIX.		207
49.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War.		390
50.	Idem.		
51.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War.		385
52.	Idem.		
53.	Idem.		
54.	Idem		
55.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXV	197
56.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War.		391
57.	Edinburgh Review 1814.	Vol. XXIII	365
58.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War.		391
59.	Idem.		
60.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	365
61.	Ibid.		368
62.	La Espana del Siglo XIX.	Vol. I	286
63.	Edinburgh Review 1814.	Vol. XXIII	366
64.	Ibid.		382
65.	La Espana del Siglo XIX.	Vol. I	282
66.	Idem.		
67.	Edinburgh Review 1814.	Vol. XXIII	377
68.	Chapman, History of Modern Spain.		494
69.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	403
70.	Edinburgh Review 1814.	Vol. XXIII	374
71.	La Espana del Siglo XIX.	Vol. I	284

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|-----|-----------------------------|-----------|-----|
| 72. | Lafuente, History of Spain. | Vol. XXVI | 387 |
| 73. | Ibid. | | 383 |

CHAPTER IV.

FOREIGN RELATIONS. SPANISH REVOLT 1808-14.

The question of foreign relations was one of vital importance during this period of 1808-1814, when the new order was emerging from the chaos left by the old. Then was needed particularly the protection, counsel, and confidence which friendly relations with other countries would give. The foreign relations were principally along two lines, that of recognitions and those arising out of the war against France.

In this discussion, the problem of diplomatic recognitions will be taken up first, however, it must be kept in mind that special problems which will be discussed later, arising out of the war were concurrent with, and in some instances even preceded the completion of these diplomatic relationships.

DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITIONS.

Having been allied with France, Spain was in 1808, nominally at war with all those countries opposed to France. To establish peace with these countries and obtain from them recognition of the new government was the principal problem. It was especially desirable to get recognition from England, Russia, Sweden, Prussia, Turkey, and from the United States. The most important of these was England.

The first event of importance was the establishment of Anglo-Hispanic peace relations, 4 July 1808, by the proclamation of the British Prince Regent. The Spaniards were urged to hasten the formation of a central government so that formal negotiation could relieve the hap-hazard method of dealing with the representatives of each province. This having been accomplished, an exchange of accredited diplomats took place. In order to elucidate further references, the men who represented each country during the whole period will be mentioned now. For Spain, Juan Ruiz Apodaca held the London post from August 1808 to July 1811. The Duke del Infantado from July 1811 until January 1812 when he was elected president of the new regency just formed in Spain. Fernan Nunez was appointed ambassador to London in January 1812, but did not arrive at his post until July. He held the post until April 1817, when he was transferred to Paris. For England, John Hookum Frere was appointed October 1808, and was relieved July 1809, by the Marquis Wellesley. The Marquis returned to England to accept a cabinet post in October and left Bartle Freer as chargé des affaires. In January 1810, Henry Wellesley, a brother of the Marquis, was named to the Spanish embassy and remained there for twelve years.

The first object of England was to get Spain allied to her for the duration of the war. Frere urged Florida-

blanca and Cevallos, October 1809, to send Apodaca the powers necessary to negotiate a treaty at London. As Cevallos did not think that Apodaca was sufficiently experienced, he suggested that the treaty be made in Spain, but Frere said that his powers did not permit this and Cevallos agreed to send the powers to Apodaca.⁽¹⁾

In the meantime, Apodaca had suggested to Canning, the British foreign Minister, that a treaty be made upon the bases of 1782, which would involve the possible return of the island of Trinidad to Spain. Canning, however, seeing that Apodaca lacked the full powers to negotiate a treaty, delayed the discussion.⁽²⁾

On 21 December 1808, Apodaca received his powers as minister plenipotentiary. Negotiations began and on 14 January 1809, the treaty of alliance was signed. By the treaty, England recognized Ferdinand as King of Spain and agreed to make adjustments for prize ships taken. England was to aid in a continuous war until Spain was free. Spain promised not to cede any territory to France or make peace except with the consent of England.⁽³⁾

In a subsequent agreement, February 1809, the commercial relations were placed on a more favorable basis for England. English goods could come into Spain at the same duty rates in effect prior to 1804, and on goods brought in for re-export, a duty of only two percent was to be levied. England could trade more advantageously with the Spanish colonies,

provided it was done through a Spanish port. (4)

While Frere was urging Cevallos to send powers to Apodaca, he suggested that Spain enter into a quadruple alliance with England, Portugal and Sweden. Cevallos, however, was afraid of entangling alliances, and Frere did not urge the point. (5)

TURKEY.

José de Enderez was named chargé d' affairs with Juan Jabst as secretary, to the embassy in Turkey, 12 February 1809, and was urged to hasten to his post in order to gain the recognition of Turkey. (6) Upon their arrival in July, the Grand Vizer refused to receive them because Joseph had already been recognized. Jabst, having remained with the British embassy in October 1810, was told to present his papers, for the Grand Vizer was ready to recognise Ferdinand VII. Unfortunately this required a fresh accrediting and Jabst was never able to obtain new letters from the Regency. Turkey, therefore, did not officially recognize Ferdinand until after his return to the throne.

UNITED STATES.

It will be recalled that Mr. Irving was instructed to present himself to the Regency at Cadiz. Spain, at the same time, was endeavoring to obtain recognition at Washington. Don Luis de Onis was sent to Washington as minister plenipotentiary, but the United States refused to

acknowledge or treat with him officially while the crown was in doubt and the two opposing governments in Spain were contesting for supremacy,⁽⁷⁾

RUSSIA.

Prior to 1811, the Cortez government did not attempt diplomatic relations with Russia. A consular service was all that was maintained. Francisco Zea Bermudez made a trip to Russia in February 1811, but soon returned to Spain. At the death of the consular agent Colombi in April, Bermudez asked to be appointed minister to Russia. He was appointed consul and given plenipotentiary powers to negotiate a treaty of peace and alliance.⁽⁸⁾ Bermudez went to Russia in July, with two letters from the Regency. One letter was for the Czar and the other one was for the minister of State. The letter to the Czar expressed the desire "to join our two sovereigns with permanent bonds."⁽⁹⁾ If this letter received attention, then Bermudez was to say that, if and when Ferdinand was free, the Regency would do all in its power to persuade Ferdinand to marry the sister of the Czar. The reason to be advanced for a treaty of alliance, was that while Spain desired to be free of complicated alliances, yet since the policy of Russia and Spain would never cross or interfere with the interest of either country, this alliance would be very acceptable.⁽¹⁰⁾ The marriage proposal was included, because rumors had persisted that Ferdinand had married

a Bonaparte princess. The rumors had the Spaniards and Wellesley quite worried for some time and indicated to them the means by which Napoleon might try to defeat the constitutional designs or the influence of England in Spain.

Russia was not ready to sign a treaty at that time, however, on 8 July 1812, a treaty was signed at Velicky Louky. The treaty established peace and provided for a continuance of the war. The Czar recognized as legitimate the Cortez and the constitution.⁽¹¹⁾ Such recognition was very happily received by the liberal party in Spain for this was the first official recognition of the constitution.

After the treaty was signed, the Czar appointed one of his court officials, Tatishcheff, as minister to Spain. However, Russia did not become represented in Spain until after the signing of the 30 May 1814 treaty of France. Meanwhile in going to take up his duties, Tatishcheff had stopped over in London where he learned that a question of diplomatic precedence had arisen between the Russian and Spanish ambassadors at London. He therefore remained in London for nearly a year before resuming his journey. Since, however, this question of precedence was of a diplomatic nature and delayed the recognition promised in the treaty, it will be discussed at this time.

In 1762, Russia had agreed to give precedence to Spain,

when their envoys of equal rank should meet. The Spaniards still thought that the old rule should apply in 1812-14, when the relative position of the two countries was quite different than fifty years before. The occasion to change the rule came about with the arrival in London, 13 December 1812, of Count Lieven as Russian ambassador. At the first formal affair, Castlereagh was in a quandary over the manner of handling the situation. The Russian was the honor guest, yet by the old Spanish rule, Fernan Nunez would take precedence. Fernan Nunez offered a solution. He suggested that they alternate and Castlereagh was glad to accept the suggestion. The Regency, however, refused to allow Fernan Nunez to alternate and ordered him to demand precedence. The Spanish theory was that Spanish diplomacy was of longer standing than the Russian. The sovereignty belonging to the nation was in deposit with and not with in the person of the Czar. Also Fernan Nunez had been ambassador resident in London prior to the arrival of the Russian.⁽¹²⁾ Nunez informed Castlereagh of his new instructions from Cadiz. Lieven then offered to alternate but Nunez felt that he could not agree. In answer to Castlereagh's question regarding attendance at a dinner to be given by the Prince Regent, Fernan Nunez replied that he could attend only as ambassador and not in a private capacity. As England had no rule on precedence, the Prince Regent

arbitrarily invited Fernan Nunez as a private citizen. Later at the celebration of the battle of Victoria, Lieven gave way to the Spanish plenipotentiary.

The Spanish position was handled in Cadiz by Don Pedro Gomez Labrador, but his assertive manner had not gained the prestige for which the Cortez was striving and in July 1813, he was dismissed from his position as a councillor of State. On 11 July 1813, the Spanish government ordered Bardaxi, the minister to Russia, to enter into a treaty with the Russians fixing precedence upon one of three ways. He was to suggest that, when matters of etiquette afforded equal position to their respective diplomats, the diplomats alternate in the preferred position. He might also offer that between diplomats of equal rank, precedence be determined by the length of service or according to the age of the diplomats. (13)

Bardaxi did not arrange a settlement of the question. It remained for Pizarro and Nesselrode, Spanish and Russian ministers, to arrange an alternating agreement, 16 May 1814, when the diplomats of Europe were gathered in Paris to make peace with France. This question of precedence was considered of sufficient importance to the diplomats of Europe that a permanent arrangement of it was provided at the Congress of Vienna.

SWEDEN.

Sweden recognized the Cortez and the constitution just after the treaty of Velicky Lanky. ⁽¹⁴⁾ England through her minister, urged Sweden to sign the treaty, but Sweden wanted to force English sanction to the treaty of Abo, of 1812, between Sweden and Russia, before agreeing to the Spanish proposal. ⁽¹⁵⁾ As Thornton, the English minister refused to give his approval to the Abo treaty, General Suchtelen, the Swedish minister, suggested that Spain pay five hundred pesos in lieu of the British approval. The Spaniards did not have the money, but Thornton, knowing that an English subsidy would be paid to Sweden anyway, offered to supply the money.

The treaty of Stokholm 1813, was forwarded to Spain for ratification and since it contained a money stipulation in which England was interested, it was sent by way of the London embassy. Fernan Nunez showed it to Castlereagh who approved the money payment. ⁽¹⁶⁾ With this added recognition, the liberal party in Spain took a more prominent part and interest in European politics.

PRUSSIA.

With Prussia, Spain opened diplomatic relations just at the time when all the governments of Europe, combined against Napoleon, were seeking closer diplomatic relations. The intensive campaign against France required constant contact between the diplomats of the Allies.

Evaristo Pizarro was appointed to Berlin 16 August 1813, but he did not reach Berlin until 27 October. His appointment was opposed by the pro-English party, but after being named, he went to Wellesley and assured him of strict cooperation with the British. On his way to Berlin, he stopped at London for a few days and was cordially received by all officials except by the Russians because of the precedence question. Upon arrival in Berlin, he learned that the King and his court were at the general allied headquarters and he left immediately to join the King's party.

Pizarro desired to arrange a treaty with Prussia, but as Prince Hardenburg, minister of Prussia, was arranging to go to Frankfurt, the making of the treaty was delayed. A treaty was arranged, however, 20 January 1814 at Basle.⁽¹⁷⁾ The treaty had one article distinguishing it from the other Cortez treaties, in that it simply recognized Ferdinand VII as King of Spain, whereas the previous treaties with Russia and Sweden had also recognized the constitution.⁽¹⁸⁾

The general articles of the treaty as Pizarro wrote later were not diplomatic, but just a litany divided into articles. This treaty, while a recognition of Spain did not create such an impression as did those with Russia and Sweden.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS.

With England and Denmark.

There were problems arising out of the Peninsular war which only England with her vast resources could solve. Money, munition, armies, military leadership, diplomacy, and counsel were greatly needed. All of these England gave in generous proportions. With the assistance of England, the central government was enabled to gain stability, a prime factor in carrying the war to ultimate success.

There was very little accomplished by Spain without the participation of England in some way. It was with English assistance that Spain was enabled to recall an army corps from Denmark. Since this episode comes as one of the first of the war, it might be well to discuss it before going into strictly Anglo-Hispanic relationships.

By virtue of the alliance with France, Spanish auxiliary troops were furnished to Napoleon. In the fall of 1807, when he was reorganizing his army, Napoleon assigned a Spanish corps of about 14,000 men under the command of the Marquis de la Romana, to a military post in Danish territory, which at that time was under the French control.

Count Yoldi, Spanish minister to Denmark, asked permission, September 1808, to put these troops aboard British ships under the command of Admiral Keats. (19)

The reply which Yoldi received, 9 September, from Count Bernstorff, Danish foreign minister, was so offensive that when Canning, British foreign minister, learned of it, he considered it a cause of war. He, therefore, advised the Junta after publishing a manifesto explaining the occurrence, to break diplomatic relations with Denmark, and to seize the Danish ships in the Spanish harbors. (20*) On 18 September 1809, this advice was followed. War was declared, and many Danish ships which had been in Spanish harbors since the break of diplomatic relations between England and Denmark in 1807, were seized by the Spanish government. Meanwhile the Spanish troops were taken aboard the British ships and transported to Spain where they arrived in October 1808.

ENGLAND

When Spain first came to war with France, which can be reckoned from the 2 May 1808, riots in Madrid, there was no central government in Spain. Each province acted separately and in its own way. None of them possessed the necessary requisites for war, hence they instinctively appealed to England for aid. They wanted money, clothing, food, the loan of ships, and munitions, but curiously enough, did not ask for men or military advice. As soon as it could be determined what their actual needs were, the British government supplied them generously. Ships were loaned to Spanish merchants to bring cargoes

from the colonies and quite often these cargoes were purchased by England even though much of the articles were given back to the Spaniards in the way of subsidies. (21) Until a central government was formed, that could secure some semblance of respect from the people, it was necessary for England to assume a somewhat paternalistic attitude toward the Spaniards, although the assistance was given in such a way that the Spaniards did not feel embarrassed or humbled in the least.

During the first years of the war from 1808 to 1812, England did not make systematic subsidies to Spain. In fact the Spaniards, prior to 1812, had not formed any central authority that could have handled their affairs in an efficient manner. Some idea of the exaggerated requests that were made for the munitions and money may be had by noting the request of Cevallos, newly appointed ambassador at London. In March and April of 1809, he asked for 600,000 rifles and from ten to twenty million pounds sterling. His request was turned down as an exorbitant one, yet the British tried to keep all the Spanish soldiers well equipped with arms and munitions. (22) In 1812, Parliament authorized a subsidy of one million pounds for Spain, which was subject to draft by the British minister in Spain. A like subsidy was paid in 1813, but had not been authorized by Parliament. The subsidy was paid upon the same basis for the first half

of 1814, when it ceased with the peace.

In June 1808, the Asturian envoys to London had assured Canning that men were not needed. Hence at first British troops were sent merely to Portugal, but subsequently British troops were landed at Spanish ports or marched into Spain from Lisbon, as the occasion might require. On 9 November 1808, Apodaca, Spanish minister in London, wrote a note to Canning expressing the desire of the Junta for some nominal control over the British auxiliary troops.⁽²³⁾ Shortly after, (on 4 December) General Romana was named by the Junta, commander of all Spanish forces.⁽²⁴⁾ Castlereagh, minister in the British cabinet hastened to instruct Sir John Moore, the British commander in Spain, 10 December 1808, to not let himself be compromised by any suggestions from the Spaniards.⁽²⁵⁾ He told Moore to co-operate with the Spaniards, but in no case or for no purpose was he to place British troops under the command of any Spanish general.

In December 1808 and January 1809, Moore was obliged to retreat and under such conditions that his troops got out of control at times. They threw away their supplies and committed depredations upon the people.⁽²⁶⁾ The conduct of the troops was harmful to the good relations between the two countries. The Spaniard remembered this retreat and later on when Wellington's troops repeated the depre-

dations after the battles of Badajoz and San Sebastian, the Spaniards made very serious charges against Wellington and the British government. Wellington was even accused of ordering the destruction of San Sebastian. (27)

When Henry Wellesley, British minister in Spain, first mentioned the idea of a united command under the British leadership, the Spaniards were suspicious and opposed to it, but as the victories came in 1812, the people regained a more cheerful attitude and 22 September 1812, Wellington was voted the supreme Spanish command. (28) The command brought greater burdens upon him, for thereafter it was he, and not the Regency, that was obliged to discipline the Spanish officers. The Cortez meantime retained the right to vote or refuse promotions in the army. Consequently, very often, Wellington would submit a list of promotions and the Cortez would completely revise his list. (29) The Cortez was happy over Wellington's victories, however, and voted him the title Duke de Ciudad Rodrigo and gave him the order of the Golden Fleece after the battle of Talavera. (30)

While Frere had been with the Junta Central and Regency at Seville, another local government, which claimed exclusive authority, had organized in Cadiz. As has already been stated, the French advance forced the Seville government to seek protection in Cadiz and a great confusion resulted over the question of authority.

A Regency having been decided upon as the best solution of their difficulty, Frere was invited to offer suggestions on a representative government. He gave some practical suggestions as to the placing of authority and the responsibility of ministers, but the Spaniards were obsessed with the idea that they should go back about three hundred years and bring forward the old forms of government with modifications. Frere's reasoning consequently did not appeal to them, yet his advice had much to do with getting the Regency started with a vestige of power in Cadiz. (31)

Upon his arrival in Cadiz, Frere met another problem that was causing much anxiety to the Spaniards. The British at Gibraltar had become alarmed at the rapid advance of the French. Gibraltar had to be protected and Sir Hew Dalrymple, governor at Gibraltar wanted to fortify Cadiz. Frere insisted that the anchorage be changed to facilitate the movement of British ships and that certain obstacles to the defense of the city be blown up. Castaños, one of the military chiefs, had opened the way for such demands by asking for assistance in defending the city, but he did not anticipate that the British would want to do it in their way. The Spaniards finally agreed although with some very strong opposition to the British. (32)

In the summer of 1809, Governor Campbell at Gibraltar,

successor to Dalrymple, wanted to send five hundred soldiers to Centa, a port just opposite Gibraltar. He also wanted to establish a trading post there to facilitate the African trade. Castaños, as the most influential military man in Cadiz, did not object to the trading post but he did object to sending soldiers. Frere took up the negotiation and obtained permission to send the soldiers and keep them there until the Spanish garrison was re-enforced. At first there were no difficulties over the arrangement, but in 1810, some one in Centa wrote a letter that was published in the "London Times." A copy of this paper eventually reached Cadiz and the Spaniards read that though the English were inferior in numbers, they could be masters at any time. The Spaniards protested and Wellington promised to remove the English troops, once security had been guaranteed. Henry Wellesley wrote to his government on 30 May 1810, that he believed the British had exceeded the provisions of their agreements. He also wrote to the governor of Gibraltar, asking him to have people there use more prudence in what they wrote or said. (33)

One of the thorny problems for Henry Wellesley was to keep the Braganza family of Portugal and the Bourbon family of Naples from disturbing the harmony of the harmony of the Spanish government. Early in 1808, Castaños and José Palafox of Aragon had feared that

Ferdinand would be killed by Napoleon and had expressed the desire to Sir Hew Dalrymple that Archduke Charles of Austria might come to Spain and assume the throne. Sir Hew agreed to assist them and ordered Admiral Collingwood to provide passage for the Archduke but the offer was never accepted. (34) This action stirred up other claimants for the place, but since Ferdinand was still living, these royal persons confined their efforts to obtaining a place on the Regency. Prince Leopold of Sicily, Don Pedro of Naples and Carlotta, sister of Ferdinand and wife of a prince of the Braganza family, were the principal ones, who sought the place on the Regency of whom Carlotta was the most persistent. As Wellington neared the border in 1813-14, the French Bourbons who were living in England urged the Spaniards to accept them in case the Spanish family did not return. (35) The British government however would not aid the French Bourbons and even expelled Prince Leopold from Gibraltar in 1809.

England was desirous all along for a strong central government in Spain, but did not want to interfere any more than was necessary. England's policy was to stand for the integrity of Spain, provided no accord was made between Spain and France in which case England was prepared to acknowledge and assist the colonies to independence. (36)

In 1810, Spanish colonies began to declare their independence or rise against the government in Spain.

The Cortez , unable to put down the insurrections, wanted England to aid. England offered a conciliating policy for which she wished to obtain greater freedom of trade. Spain wanted England to use force to subdue the colonies that were in rebellion, but Castlereagh tried to convince the Spaniards that the use of force would drive all the Colonies into rebellion. (37) Castlereagh beleived, that if Spain would not permit the colonies to trade on a basis equal to Spain, the separation of the Colonies was inevitable. (38) Castlereagh insisted that Colonial trade be put on a national basis with only a preference reserved to Spain. He felt that the Colonial resources were essential to a victory over Napoleon. He made three conditions which must be accepted by Spain before any aid would be extended for the purpose of re-establishing the harmony between the Colonies and mother country. Even though Spain refused to accept the conditions, Castlereagh never ceased demanding that there be no secret advantages reserved for any nation which might promise active aid, that mediation be applied to all Colonies, and that no force be used. (39) The Spaniards, however, could not forget their old traditional idea that force must be applied. Peaceful mediation was not a part of their method.

From 1810-12, various ideas were advanced in England as to the best policy in Spain. Many thought that

England should establish a viceroy in the guise of a minister. Some thought the Spaniards totally incapable of governing themselves. In the spring of 1811, when Wellesley proposed to organize the western portion of Spain so as to conserve resources and the Regency refused, there were minister in England who insisted that Cadiz should be seized and fortified. Wellington, however, refused to adopt the plan for he knew it would result in a break with the Spaniards. (40)

In preparation for his Russian campaign and because of reverses in Spain, Napoleon suggested peace terms to England, 17 April 1812, but as in 1808, he did not want to recognize the popular government in Spain. The proposals were for the withdrawal of all foreign soldiers from Spain. The integrity of Spanish territory was to be guaranteed by France. France and England were to withdraw their troops from Portugal, Naples and Sicily as well as from Spain. He left it for England to guess the meaning of the question which he veiled by saying that the reigning dynasty would be recognized and a constitution be given to Spain. (41) England refused to treat except that Spain be free to form her own government. These proposals failed, because neither Napoleon nor England was ready to withdraw from the peninsula.

The policy of England to retain the full confidence of her associated nations and to defend the eternal principles

of justice was not altered through out this most trying period. Her firm determination won the admiration of her allies and the respect of her enemies.

Castlereagh had determined the policy that England would exercise with regard to Spain. He told the Regency what this policy was and assured them of his determination to follow it through. He told the Regency in June 1813 that British troops would not be withdrawn even if Spain should ask it and that he was resolved not to alter his policy even without the co-operation of the Spanish auxiliaries.⁽⁴²⁾ A month later he wrote -- "The risk of treating with France is great, but the risk of losing our continental allies and the confidence of our own nation is greater. We must preserve our faith inviolate."⁽⁴³⁾

Castlereagh's constancy had its reward, for Spain by 1813-14 had won the favor of Europe. By contributing the victory at Bailen, she had shown Europe that the power of Napoleon was not invincible. The noble effort she was making to free herself, the activity of Wellington in Spain and Portugal and the fact that Napoleon was, at times personally directing the campaigns in the Peninsula, had caused Spain to be the chief concern of Europe. In 1812, the gigantic proportions of the campaign against Russia, drew away the attention of Europe, for the time, but in 1813, Spain again contributed the victory that showed Europe that the power of Napoleon could be broken.

The signal victory at Vitoria, 16 June 1813, came just after the allied had been defeated in Saxony at the battle of Lutzen and Bautzen in April and May. It gave the new courage, the new impetus and the new hope that final success was not far distant. It might be considered a turning point in the whole Liberation War.

PREPARATION for the PEACE CONGRESS.

Spain had been generally skeptical of alliances. There were two reasons for this attitude. First, Spain feared that alliances might bring about a premature peace, before Napoleon had been deposed. In the second place, Spain realized that she had no men who were the diplomatic equals of the statesmen of the other powers fighting Napoleon. (44) However, the Cortez had formed ties with several members of the coalition and had a claim to share in any peace dealings.

In the initial participation of Spain in the peace movements her affairs were handled by two well intentioned and fairly capable men. Fernan Nunez, ambassador at London and José Pizarro, minister plenipotentiary to Berlin.

On 31 May 1813, Castlereagh informed Fernan Nunez that notices had arrived of a proposed meeting at Prague where peace terms between France and her allies,

and England and her allies were to be discussed. (45) When the dispatch of Fernan Nunez, dated 16 June telling of this conference at Prague, reached Cadiz, Labrador, minister of State and those associated with him, considered the meeting as just one more of Napoleon's tricks. However the dispatch assured Spain that England would make no treaty that was against Spanish interests. The reply on 30 June, told Fernan Nunez that in case the congress did make peace, Spain would not be represented nor would she adhere to a peace while there was a single French soldier on Spanish soil or until Ferdinand was released without condition. (46) The regency evidently believed that England could induce Russia and Prussia to continue the war, for these objectives.

Meantime on 24 June, Fernan Nunez had assured his government that certain advantages would accrue to the allies from the armistice which had been arranged between Napoleon and the allies. England at the same time, told Wellington to push ahead as the armistice did not effect the activities of his forces.

For the rest of 1813, Spanish participation in allied diplomacy shifted from London to Berlin, until after Pozzo Borgo, Russian minister arrived in London with a message from allied headquarters in Germany. Then Fernan Nunez on 20 January 1814, wrote to his government that from what he had observed, he was positive that the true

mission of Pozzo Borgo had been to advise Castlereagh and secure his approval of a plan whereby the four principal powers would confine to themselves the task of making peace with Napoleon. Castlereagh had insinuated the same to the ministers of Portugal and Sicily by telling them that their presence was unnecessary at the general headquarters. (47) Fernan Nunez naturally objected to any such plan, having believed that the sacrifices of Spain entitled her to the same prestige as she had always enjoyed, and acted accordingly.

As has already been said, José Pizarro, minister to Berlin, also participated in the preliminary peace movements. Since the Spanish envoys to Russia and Sweden did not come to enter into the direct peace discussions, Pizarro had to serve as Spanish liaison diplomat with the Allies during 1813. Pizarro had as his secretary Justo Machado who later became attached to the Austrian court as chargé d'affaires.

It had been Labrador's idea not to send an envoy at all, but to depend upon England through Fernan Nunez to negotiate for Spain. But Labrador was dismissed from office, 11 July 1813, because of the way he had handled the precedence question. (48) When Cifuentes Manuel was chosen, 16 August 1813, to succeed Labrador as minister of State, he immediately appointed Pizarro as minister to Berlin. Knowing that the pro-English party opposed him, Pizarro

went at once to Wellesley to explain that his commission to Berlin was only a pretext to get him close to the Allied sovereigns and that the principal instructions had directed him to be in accord with England.

However, the instructions Pizarro received were considerable more complete. Spain, not desiring further conquest, did wish Parma, Placentia, and Quastalla restored to Maria Louisa, Louisiana returned or payment for the same by the United States or France. Spain was to work in accord with England and was to favor England as the moderator among the Allies. All alliances wither offensive or defensive with any allied nation were to be questioned, and in no case was an alliance to be made with France. Any clause in any treaty that would imply that Spain had not complied with all duties to France was to be neglected. Damages might be claimed against France to the extent of two and one half billion United States dollars. (49)

Pizarro had been sent to Berlin with powers which permitted him to accede the expected Prague arrangements. (50) However, he did not arrive in Berlin until 27 October, long after the failure of the Congress in August. (51) In the interval a great deal had already been done, in the way of discussions and planning of the peace terms. Moreover, he was not immediately taken into Allied councils.

It was only on 6 December 1813, that Pizarro was able to present his credentials and attach himself to the staff

of Frederick William, where, with Hardenberg, the Prussian minister, he made the treaty of Basle on 20 January 1814. This treaty is significant since Ferdinand was acknowledged king of Spain without the constitutional limitation which had been inserted into the treaties of Velicky Louky and Stockholm. (52)

Meantime an offer of peace had been made to Napoleon on 9 November 1813, at Frankfurt. Castlereagh, thinking that peace was near, asked Wellesley to make sure of the powers given to Pizarro and to learn whether Pizarro could sign a general peace. At this same time, Pizarro, knowing that political support at home was weak, wrote on 1 December, to his government. "Spain has no one here. My powers are limited to Prussia. I can be useful if you will sustain me. Our affairs need looking after. If you will sustain me I will work." (53) A copy of this letter, asking for full powers was forwarded to Fernan Nunez in London, who sent his brother to Cadiz to seek the appointment for himself. In this he was successful, being appointed 21 January 1814. In this way Pizarro was replaced by Nunez to sign the general peace. Upon hearing he had been replaced, Pizarro asked if it were for personal reasons. He was informed that a man close to the British government had to be chosen.

In consequence of the negotiations with Napoleon at

Frankfurt a peace conference met at Chatillon February 4 to March 19. At Langres, January 29, the four great allied powers, England, Russia, Prussia and Austria had tentatively agreed to confine to themselves the principal tasks of directing the peace negotiations at Chatillon. England insisted if any lesser Allies should be admitted that Spain must be brought in as a most interested power. If none were admitted, it would be established that Spain would attend all subsequent conferences only as a secondary power. (54) Of most importance to Spain in the Chatillon negotiations was the assertion that the Allies would demand a free Spain under the Bourbon rule. (55) Thus Pizarro was not given a chance to enter into direct negotiations, but prompted Castlereagh about the affairs most vital to Spain.

Pizarro, however, continued to follow the Allies and was one of those who signed the armistice at Paris on 23 April. (56) Soon after Fernan Nunez arrived from London and thereafter, Pizarro acted only as an advisor or an interested spectator.

Thus Fernan Nunez finally became the accredited representative of the Spanish government to the peace negotiations. But with Liverpool consistently holding him back, there was much impatient waiting at London and much had already happened when he finally, on 7 May, arrived at Paris.

FOOT NOTES. CHAPTER IV

1.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol.1	256
2.	Ibid		257
3.	Annual Register 1809.		736
4.	Ibid		741
5.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. 1	257
6.	Ibid	Vol. 11	218
7.	Ibid		219
8.	Ibid		434
9.	Ibid		436
10.	Ibid		438
11.	Annual Register 1812.		431
12.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. 111	102
13.	Ibid		230
14.	Lafuente, History of Spain;	Vol. XXVI	374
15.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. 111	230
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17.	Ibid		289
18.	Idem		
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21.	Revista Archives	Vol. XV	317
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27.	Oman, History of Peninsular War.	Vol. VII	35
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29.	Oman, History of Peninsular War.	Vol. VII	142
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31.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. 11	58
		Vol. 1	440
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35.	Ibid		92
36.	Ibid		250
37.	Webster Castlereagh Foreign Policy 1812-15		72
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39.	Ibid	Vol. 11	46-50
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41.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War.	Vol. LXIV	407
42.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. 111	272
43.	Castlereagh Correspondence.	Vol. 1X	32
44.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. 111	361
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47.	Ibid		292
48.	Ibid		282

49.	Ibid	284
50.	Ibid	282
51.	Ibid	286
52.	Ibid	83
53.	Ibid	281
54.	Ibid	286
55.	Webster Congress of Vienna.	66
56.	Villa Urrutia, Labrador.	45

CHAPTER V.

THE RESTORATION OF FERDINAND

VALENCAY

Sending back the Spanish Bourbons was an expedient inspired by distress only. Yet the idea was not a new one; Napoleon had even considered it in 1810, when Joseph dared to oppose him. The unsuccessful campaign of 1812, against Russia, the successes of Wellington in Spain, signs that all Europe was eager to rise against him, compelled Napoleon to abandon a part of his project and utilize all the resources at his command in the attempt to recover hope that a decisive victory would favor him, but by the summer of 1813, he determined to abandon Joseph, restore Ferdinand and obtain the evacuation of Spain by the French and British troops. (1)

Napoleon, while with his armies was trusting his minister of war Clark to keep him reliably informed of events in France and in Spain. Clark, however, was deceiving Napoleon as to the actual condition of the armies in Spain and when the news of the battle of Vitoria on 16 June 1813, reached him at Dresdaen, Napoleon decided to give up Spain. (2) About 1 July, Napoleon appointed Marshall Soult as his lieutenant and ordered him to take charge of the whole army in Spain. He also, ordered Joseph out of Spain to his French estate Mortfontaine, where he was to

remain in secrecy. The officials at Paris were ordered to arrest Joseph if he attempted to visit Paris or visit with any high officials. (3)

The task of restoring Ferdinand to Spain was not a simple one. Many things were of vital importance for the success of his entire program. Napoleon had certain pledges to offer to Spain, for which he wished to exact promises from Spain. Napoleon reasoned that on the one hand, the Spaniards wanted their king restored to them and the king desired his freedom, but on the other hand, Ferdinand might not honor a treaty made while he was in the power of France, and after once gaining his liberty he might insincere. Also, the English after having delivered Spain might not care to give up their advantage. The Spanish troops might want revenge on the French and an opportunity to retaliate. The Cortez would not want Ferdinand except under certain conditions, and would be reluctant to give up the power it had acquired. Napoleon therefore feared a treaty made in France might be recognized neither by the Spaniards nor English. (4)

However, he resolved to make a treaty with Ferdinand, to send it to Madrid by a reliable person, who could arouse a desire to see the old dynasty returned particularly if joined by the promise of France to evacuate their fortresses. (5)

About 1 November, Soult wrote to Napoleon that he believed the opportune time had come to start the negotiation with Ferdinand. (6) He expressed the opinion that the Spanish generals

were not pleased with the predominance of Wellington and that they would abandon the British alliance if they were assured of the return of Ferdinand and the retreat of the French army.

Upon receipt of this letter, Napoleon ordered that Count de La Forest be sent to Valencay for the negotiation of the treaty. He wrote a letter to Ferdinand, dated 1 November 1813, that he desired to make peace with Spain. He also said, that the English were stirring up anarchy and that he no longer wished to antagonize the church but create bonds of friendship. ⁽⁷⁾ The letter was sent to Paris and forwarded to La Forest with his instructions.

The instructions to La Forest called his attention to the fact that Ferdinand might have received information about the situation in Spain. Also that Ferdinand might want and was entitled to a council of advisers. La Forest was to note whether the Princes had any information that would be useful in the negotiation. Napoleon desired, that the negotiations take place before at least two other Spaniards who were in France, and for that purpose he directed the Duke de San Carlos and the canon Escoiquiz to present themselves at Valenacy. The Princes could have the assistance of any other person in whom the ⁽⁸⁾ trusted.

The instructions were dated 13 November 1813, and directed La Forest to offer peace between the two nations, and recognition of Ferdinand as king of Spain. The integrity

of Spanish territory was to be guaranteed. Fortresses and places occupied by the French forces were to be restored. The interests of Spaniards who had taken part in the events of the last six years and the interests of Frenchmen established in Spain were to be protected. The English army was to evacuate Spain as the French forces were withdrawn.
(9)

La Forest had been the French Ambassador at Madrid during the rule of Joseph and, on 1 May, had left Joseph at Valladolid and had gone to take a cure at Bagneres de Bigorre. Perhaps, while at Valenacy, he was in correspondence with an agent of the French government, Echavarria by name, who was directing an espionage service in Spain. The purpose of the espionage at that time was to stir up discontent among the Spanish and English army officers. M. Tassin was the director, in part of this spy service. A man, Du Clerc, presented himself to General Mina and revealed his real mission. M. Magdelaine visited the headquarters of Wellington and tried to deceive Wellington as well as his Spanish confident, the General de Alava.
(10)

La Forest, unable to do his own writing, chose M. Chevalier Pardessus to accompany him as secretary. They arrived in Valenacy and held the first conference with the Princes on 19 November. As secrecy was a primary object to all the negotiation, La Forest had traveled by command under the name of Del Bosch.

La Forest presented himself and gave the letter of Napoleon to Ferdinand. La Forest then pressed Ferdinand for an expression of his views but Ferdinand only expressed his appreciation for the generosity of Napoleon and that he would prefer to write personally to ascertain Napoleon's true intention. La Forest reminded Ferdinand that Napoleon had been explicit in the letter and that he ought to reciprocate because of the desire for a speedy conclusion of the negotiation. La Forest pointed out that the British had tried to spread anarchy, had assisted the liberals in Spain to establish themselves, and would defraud Spain of her colonies, but to no avail. Ferdinand thought that he should talk over the situation with his brother and Uncle and consult the existing government in Spain. (11) The visit on the 20th November developed nothing more than a determination by Ferdinand to write to Napoleon and a refusal to express himself on the proposals of La Forest. Ferdinand said he could not act without the consent of the Spanish people. While La Forest reiterated the points from the letter of Napoleon, La Forest presented the names of several Spaniards who were then in France but Ferdinand exclaimed that he did not have confidence in any of them. (12) La Forest told Ferdinand that Napoleon wished to present him to the Spanish nation as a liberator, who would end suffering and restore monarchy to its former position. (13) Ferdinand wrote a letter on 20 November, to Napoleon in

which he said "You have brought me to Valencay and if you would place me again on the throne of Spain, you could do it because you have the means to treat with the Regency and I have not. If your majesty desires to treat with me--- it is necessary to send here some deputies---. If the circumstances do not permit you to comply with this request--- I will remain here the rest of my life. I have no more interest in England than in France but above all I should hope for the best interest and happiness of my people." (14)

On 22 November, the Duke de San Carlos arrived and assured Ferdinand of the sincerity of Napoleon. San Carlos had been called from his imprisonment at Lons-le-Saulmier, and given assurances by Napoleon, then sent on to Valencay to act as advisor to Ferdinand. Napoleon gave him a letter, which he delivered to La Forest.

San Carlos and La Forest had a conversation on 23 November. San Carlos told La Forest that he had talked to the Princes and that they were evidently satisfied and appreciated the good intentions of Napoleon. He assured La Forest that Ferdinand would be sincere in any promise and advised La Forest not to rush things because the princes were very cautious and suspicious. (15)

In a conversation with the princes the same day, Ferdinand spoke of a treaty between Spain and England but did not know the provisions of it. He also doubted that ratification of a treaty could be obtained as quickly by a

representative as if it should be taken to Spain by himself. La Forest countered that suggestion by assuring Ferdinand (16) that San Carlos would be equally successful.

San Carlos requested details of La Forest so that he could convince the princes. He also asked that a provision of the treaty permit Ferdinand to invite the adherence of England to the agreement immediately after ratification.

The first draft of the treaty was made on 24 November, (17) and La Forest sent a copy of it to Napoleon. On the day following discussions were held over the manner of getting it approved and ratified by the existing government in Spain. San Carlos thought that passports ought to be provided at once. Two passports were desired, one for himself, using the name of Ducas and one for Jose Palofax. The Princes asked that Marshall Meazco del Ponte be sent for, so that (18) he might accompany the messenger as far as Madrid.

La Forest was questioned by his government as to the strict performance of his duty and on 29 November, he reported that he had been busily engaged since his arrival and that he had found the princes eager to talk with him. He said that Ferdinand mentioned a marriage of his own accord and had expressed his intention to be the ally of Napoleon when he returned to Spain, or if he remained in France to retain his esteem for the Emperor. La Forest assured his government that Ferdinand would demand ratification of

the treaty by the Regency and that there would be no obstacle to success in that respect. He reported that Ferdinand was already giving instructions to the commissioners so that the Regency might order Spanish generals to cease fighting, as soon as the treaty was completed. On 8 December, San Carlos urged La Forest to sign two drafts of the treaty but was advised to be patient until the completed forms were ready for approval and signature. (19)

La Forest continued to report the daily progress and said there was assurance of real friendship from the princes because they realized a strong bond must exist between the two countries for mutual protection. Spain, in her difficulties with Portugal over the colonies and the efforts of the Braganza family to obtain a recognition of a right to succeed to the Spanish throne, required that Spain remain in close harmony with France. (20) On 11 December, San Carlos revealed to La Forest that the princes had no money and could not make the trip on their meagre funds. The princes wanted Macanaz to draft the treaty in the Spanish language and were anxious for his return from Paris where he had gone to perform some errands for the princes.

The treaty was signed, 11 December 1813, by San Carlos and La Forest. It provided for peace and cessation of hostilities. Ferdinand and his legitimate succession were recognized, The territorial integrity of Spain

was guaranteed. All fortresses were to be surrendered to Spain as the English troops were withdrawn. Amnesty to persons favoring Joseph's rule and a return of all property illegally taken were provided for. All persons, who might be undesirable to the government, were to have ten years within which they might dispose of their property. French and Italians were to have property holding privileges equal to those of Spaniards. Ferdinand agreed to pay a pension to his father, Charles IV. Commercial relations were reestablished on the basis existing in 1792, until a new treaty could be made. (21)

There was no marriage provision in the treaty because Ferdinand believed that the sentiment of the Spanish people should first be learned. However, Ferdinand had expressed himself as being highly pleased with the prospects of having a Bonaparte princess for a wife. (22)

Considerable difficulty was experienced in selecting a man to take the treaty to Spain. The one chosen must have the confidence of the princes as well as command respect in Spain. Of those men considered for the mission, San Carlos was the only one who was entirely trusted by the princes. He was selected and Macanaz became chief adviser to Ferdinand. (23)

San Carlos was given private instructions by Ferdinand which La Forest did not know. (24) These instructions were to govern the conduct of San Carlos while soliciting

ratification of the treaty by the Regency. In case the Regency and the Cortez were loyal to Ferdinand, San Carlos was to tell them that Ferdinand would observe the treaty without exacting promises, then the Regency was authorized to tell the British government that Ferdinand would declare it null and void as soon as he was free to do so. If the Cortez and Regency were dominated by a Jacobin spirit, then San Carlos was to say nothing, except to urge ratification, leaving Ferdinand free to continue or stop the war as the interests of the nation required. (25)

In a conference attended by Pedro Macanaz, Jaun Escoiquiz, Jose Zayas, Jose Palofax, and La Forest it was decided to send a second envoy to Spain. Jose Palofax was chosen and started on 24 December, with a copy of the treaty. He traveled under the name of Taysier.

San Carlos arrived at Madrid on 4 January 1814, and revealed the purpose of his mission. The Regency confided the news to members of the Cortez and it was decided at once to refuse ratification. A copy of the decree of 1 January 1811 was attached to the reply which was prepared 8 January 1814, by Jose Luyando, the minister of state. (26)

The decree of 1 January 1811, it will be remembered, while declared that no act of Ferdinand, while not in full possession of his liberty, would be recognized by the existing government of Spain.

The letter contained only a cordial greeting, no mention

of the treaty was made. The Regency told San Carlos what had not been put in the letter. San Carlos was to tell Ferdinand that his liberty did not depend upon the benevolence of Napoleon but upon the express will of Spain and her allied nations who would recognize him as king. Ferdinand was also to be told that a congress would open very soon to arrange a general peace and that the confinements of the royal family would be of short duration. (27)

As soon as it was learned that San Carlos represented Ferdinand and had brought a treaty for ratification, the newspapers printed very sarcastic articles in jest. The actors made fun of him in the theatres. The reception was a disappointment to San Carlos but the message which he was to give to Ferdinand, cheered him. He asked the Regency to aid in clearing his name by telling of the good service he was doing. (28) Just before San Carlos left Madrid, the royal party leaders told him that the plans for restoring Ferdinand to absolute authority would be worked out by his friends. (29)

San Carlos left Madrid, 9 January, for Valencay and on 24 January, Jose Palofax arrived in Madrid with his message. He was given a like answer for Ferdinand, except that the Regency had by that time named a minister to the congress that would be held to settle the peace of Europe. (30)

Those remaining in Valencay were very impatient at

the delay in the plans. On 26 January, La Forest reported that the princes wanted to send Zayas to General Capons, Spanish general near the border, to ascertain if any news could be had from Madrid. The princes wished to know the opinion of the army and of the nation. They feared that San Carlos had been arrested and was imprisoned. They occupied their time discussing the Spanish constitution and possibility of capture by allied troops who had moved into French territory.

San Carlos reached Valencay on 12 February, and reported the news he had from Spain. The reply he brought angered the princes and they sent him on to tell Napoleon of the failure in the negotiation. (31) After the departure of San Carlos, La Forest received a letter, dated 8 February 1814, from Napoleon, instructing him to allow the Princes to return to Spain under the condition that they travel incognito. Suchet, the French commander, along the border was instructed at the same time to restore Spanish fortress in return for French garrisons. (32) The Princes wanted to send a messenger to recall San Carlos, who had gone to Paris to explain the failure of the treaty. But the order of Napoleon made it no longer necessary for the treaty to be ratified. Also the princes did not want Napoleon to know of the refusal of the Cortez to ratify. It would be Ferdinand as the restored king, who would ratify the treaty and no dependence upon the Regency would be necessary. La Forest discouraged

the idea, because he thought Napoleon might get valuable
 information from San Carlos. (33)

The princes became very anxious and asked La Forest to obtain the passports. They were without funds and expected him to furnish the money. Ferdinand told La Forest that he wished to stop the projects of the English in Spain. (34)

San Carlos was advised at Paris of the futility of further quest for Napoleon and he returned to Valencay about 16 February. La Forest expressed doubt that Napoleon would be able to finance their journey.

Pedro Macanaz was sent to Paris to make a loan and was successful in obtaining fifty thousand francs. (35)

Still hoping to find Napoleon, San Carlos returned to Paris where he remained for several days, but returned to Valencay on

9 March. The passports, which were signed by Napoleon

8 February 1814, at Nogent Sur Seine, were received 7 March and final preparation made for the departure. In order

to facilitate the journey, the baggage was sent through

(36)
 Bayonne.

AD INTERIM OPINIONS.

At this point while the princes leave for the frontier at Perpignan, we may as well take a moment to appraise the Valencay negotiations. In his dealings with the princes and their advisers, La Forest had been shrewd and versatile.

Carefully avoiding any appearance of forcing himself or his advice upon them, he, nevertheless, worked himself effectively into their confidences. It is interesting therefore to note, some of his confidential reflections upon the negotiations and negotiators as gathered from his reports to the French government.

La Forest helped the princes plan the conduct of San Carlos before the Regency and Cortez. He managed it so that if the Regency ratified the treaty, San Carlos instruct the Regency to order a cessation of war. To insure the continued support of the Cortez, a deputation from the Cortez was to go to Valencay and another to the border.

The first act of Ferdinand was to be a general amnesty to all Spaniards, French, and Italians as well as a guarantee of the security of property. Such an act would relieve anxiety over possible reaction against them. Incidentally it would commit Ferdinand to a policy from which he could not retreat with honor. If the Regency were to ask for conditions or guarantees, then San Carlos was to assure such modifications upon the return of Ferdinand. In order to avoid possible opposition to the return of Ferdinand or the interference of the English, San Carlos was to oppose any celebration. It was feared publicity of the proceedings might precipitate a civil war. (37) Any modification insisted upon by the Regency was to be subject to the approval of Napoleon.

He reported that the Princes were very tranquil and had confidence that the treaty would be a success. They believed Spain was weary of war, of anarchy, and of the English, which would be a clear indication of Spanish inclination toward France.

The Princes considered the necessity of being bound to the constitution but thought that a promise of a new constitution drafted in conjunction with a new Cortez would be acceptable to the people. If any attempt was made against them, they believed that a cry of "Ferdinand and peace" would prevail. For that reason it would be necessary to engage a few men who were experienced in directing public opinion. So confident were they, that it was suggested Suchet be given the power to convene a military convention, which could provide for the evacuation of the fortresses. (38)

Ferdinand decided not to enrage the people by any act, or to exercise any authority until after he was installed at Madrid in the prescribed form. He decided to be led but to observe very much and to praise very much the superior qualities of his subjects. He wanted to prove his gratitude by adhering to the constitution in the midst of the Cortez. His plans were to do nothing until after he had taken charge of the government and then determine his policy after learning the disposition of the army and the people. It would then be time to determine on a new constitution.

It was thought best to work slowly and to replace the ministers slowly and to keep himself surrounded by a council of state. (39) The princes believed that San Carlos should be made minister of state at once and eventually Macanaz was to get the ministry of Grace and Justice.

La Forest said that he found little talent in Macanaz and that San Carlos had shown his inefficiency and lack of decision by the manner in which he handled the mission to Madrid. He found Escoiquiz possessed with more energy, more learning, and capable of more profound thought. Escoiquiz was a man shrewd, clever, sensible, and a stranger to the passions of his fellow countrymen. La Forest regretted that his age, his robe, and public opinion would permit him a better position. Ferdinand, he said, had a great disadvantage, because he knew only how to chatter familiarly and not how to talk. He could express a simple idea, but he became confused on complicated matters. Ferdinand was obstinate when advised but he would be equally obstinate when he was badly advised. La Forest said that Ferdinand, while at Valencay, formed the habit of listening to his valets and if he did not change it would be hard on better ministers. (40)

La Forest had tried to impress his ideas upon the princes and upon their advisers and hoped the two fold impressions would be more durable. He knew that the princes would be subjected to different ideas in Spain but he said, "A large part of that which they are to do for us is

also for themselves and that is the basis of my hopes." He continued, "The faction, which is opposing us in Spain, will be the English, thinking it is for their profit. Circumstances place the princes in the position of doing the opposite. So I have found them supposedly impartial, but in reality, believing that they had great obligations to the English. I have left them today, (13 March 1808) not only very good judges of the politics of that power but profoundly hurt by the influence which it had on the simplicity of the Spaniards. I have felt reluctant to suspicion that the princes dissented with us and I have put so many tests to San Carlos, Macanaz, and Escoiquiz that I am inclined to believe there was honesty in their profession of faith."⁽⁴¹⁾

La Forest feared the effect of the English and the liberal party against the project of the princes and realized caution was essential. The Spaniards were against anything french and care had to be taken to put no obstacles in the way of Ferdinand if he were to succeed,

The princes thought to the very last that if Ferdinand had gone to Madrid with San Carlos, that Ferdinand could have taken over the government and put the treaty in force.⁽⁴²⁾ Palofax had brought back news of the decree of 2 February, passed by the Cortez, declaring that Ferdinand should exercise no authority, nor should anyone recognize him as having authority until after he had sworn to uphold the constitution.

La forest interpreted this decree to mean that Ferdinand would only be free after the Cortez had bound him and forced him to lend his name to approve all that had been done in his absence. (43)

The question arose then as to the legality of the treaty. It came as a surprise and as a check to the allied plans. England was more concerned over it than the other nations although none of the statesmen wanted to see a renewal of the family pact. The general objective was to defeat Napoleon but if this treaty was consummated, his advantage would be enhanced while the English would be greatly embarrassed in their military operations.

On 24 December 1813, Aberdeen, a British agent on the continent, wrote to Castlereagh and told him of a letter received by Metternich, Austrian Foreign Minister, which stated that Ferdinand was to be restored and the English were to be excluded from Spain. Metternich told Aberdeen that Napoleon had often remarked that the affairs in Spain could be easily arranged. Napoleon believed that when war went against him, he could send Ferdinand back to Spain and injure the British influence. Cook, another British agent, writing 5 January, believed that Napoleon should have released the Pope and whole Spanish family to prove his sincerity. Wellington wrote 16 January, and called attention to the unfavorable clauses. He said that Spanish finances would not stand the pensions provided for Charles IV

and that Spain would be at Napoleon's feet. He suggested that the other nations protect Spain from any such affair. (44)

Castlereagh believed Napoleon was trying to separate himself from the Spanish question and avoid the humiliation of having the allies take Ferdinand from him. He told the ministers at Langres, 3 February, "The allied sovereigns will not fail to remark that this treaty is null and void and of no effect, by the law of nations as well as by the laws of Spain. It was signed in breach of known and most solemn engagements of the Spanish government, with a captive monarch. The allied courts will not fail to appreciate the distinguished rebuke which has been given by Spanish honor and good faith." (45)

However in looking at the question without prejudice, Napoleon dealt with Ferdinand as sovereign with sovereign. Napoleon gave Spain all that she asked for and all or more than England had promised at Frankfort of Chatillon.

The other nations had dealt with the Regency who acted in the name of Ferdinand, surely Napoleon had a right to deal with him directly. Napoleon was still potent and that which he took away in 1808 could be given back in 1813. Napoleon did not say a word about what form of government Ferdinand was to set up on his return, whether it be absolutism or a recognition of the Cortez. Napoleon had treated fairly with Ferdinand by giving him a choice of any advisers he might choose. At the same time that Napoleon was dealing directly with Ferdinand as the head of a state, England was

holding this state as award and in a second rate capacity.

The two significant points in the whole affair are that Ferdinand had held aloof from any binding marriage provision and that the Regency had by refusing to ratify the treaty obliged Napoleon to release Ferdinand without any binding stipulations as to the future policy of Spain. (46)

Such were the differing views of the French and Allies upon the method and chances of the Bourbon restoration in Spain, as the Spanish princes set out for their kingdom. Meantime, what were the Spaniards thinking and doing about this restoration.

The Cortez which met in Madrid 15 January, had already learned of the treaty negotiated at Valencay and of the refusal to ratify it, by the Regency. Legislation of a general character therefore was almost abandoned, although several measures were passed. The taxes on certain commodities were abolished, pensions were voted to crippled soldiers, and celebrations ordered for the victories of the Spanish armies. However the subject uppermost in the minds of deputies was the return of Ferdinand.

By their celebrated decree of 2 February, the liberals hoped to leave no possible way for Ferdinand to avoid taking the oath to the constitution. On 4 February, the Cortez voted that the treaty entered into by Ferdinand, was null and void; as being contrary to the pledge given to England and the allies. (47)

By a further decree of 19 February, any person, who tried to change the constitution before eight years, would be declared a traitor and subject to the death penalty. (48) The severity of the penalty was prompted, no doubt, by a speech made by deputy Jaun Lopez Reina on 13 February, in which he said, that when Ferdinand was born, he was born with a right of having absolute sovereignty over the Spanish nation and the abdication of Charles IV had given him actually that undisputed right. (49)

The royalist party however informed the liberals that drastic decrees would do no good, for if Ferdinand should refuse to swear to the constitution, he would have many supporters. (50) Those, who were favorable to Ferdinand, made no great effort to vote or to change the attitude of the Cortez toward Ferdinand. These partisans simply refused to vote, or absented themselves from the sessions of the Cortez. If they had voted, they might have controlled the Cortez, but they blindly followed a few leaders who had no well formulated plan. (51) The royalists represented a group who were called "the representation of the Persians." By telling a story about an old Persian custom, they tried to divert public attention from the activities of the Cortez to the entry of Ferdinand into Spain. They said, that in olden times it was the custom of the Persians to have five days of anarchy between the death of one sovereign and the accession of the next one, so that the acts of the new sovereign would be all the more appreciated.

When Ferdinand went to Valencia, a petition with sixty nine signatures of the deputies was shown to him as evidence of his support in the Cortez membership. (52)

The Cortez, in the face of all that was going on, continued to prepare for the entry of Ferdinand in Madrid and seemed to have expected him to take an oath to the constitution. A large convent building was secured in which the celebration would take place. The last days of the Cortez were to be taken up with the entry of Ferdinand into Madrid.

BACK TO SPAIN

On 10 March 1814, Ferdinand sent Jose de Zayas to inform the Spanish that he would leave Valencia on 13 March and that preparations should be made to receive him on 16 March at Gerona. (53) In order to pass around the British army, Ferdinand and his party went to Perpignan, a French town near the border. A French agent, M. Petry, accompanied them to the border where they were to have the protection of General Suchet until they passed into Spain.

Upon his arrival in Perpignan, Ferdinand placed himself in charge of General Suchet. In conformity with the instructions of 8 February, Suchet was obliged to hold Ferdinand in custody and take him to Barcelona under an assumed name. Ferdinand, conforming to the same instructions,

(54)
had already assumed the name Duke of Barcelona.

Suchet upon the plea of General Capons, the Spanish general opposite him, and perhaps due somewhat to his own desire for hastening the release of French troops in Spain, agreed to ask for a change of instructions which would enable him to release Ferdinand and hold Don Carlos, brother of Ferdinand, instead. (55) Ferdinand and his party arrived in Perpignan on 19 March, and on 22 March, Suchet was prepared to carry his promise into effect.

General Capons with his Spanish army had moved into a position on the south bank of the Fluvia river just opposite the position of Suchet. Capons established temporary quarters at Bascara. The release of Ferdinand was planned for 22 March, but due to an overflow of the river, it was postponed until 24 March.

In the meantime, Suchet was promised by Ferdinand that French prisoners and garrisons would be returned. The promise was written out by San Carlos and on the margin of the note Ferdinand wrote, "I approve this officially-- Fernando." (56) At the same time, Ferdinand promised to conserve property in Madrid, which Napoleon had given Suchet.

In anticipation of the return of Ferdinand, the Cortez (57) had on 2 February 1814, issued a notable decree. This decree denied to Ferdinand the right to exercise royal authority, until after he took an oath to the constitution. At the same time it was decreed that Ferdinand, upon arrival

into Spanish territory, should follow a certain route down the coast to Valencia and then inland to Madrid. An elaborate plan was formulated in the full performance of which, every agency of the government was involved. The Regency was to issue instructions to all army officers, governing their conduct. General Capons was in possession of complete instructions, when he prepared to receive Ferdinand.

On the morning of 24 March, General Saint Cyr, Chief of Staff to Suchet, informed Capons that Ferdinand would cross over in a short time. Following this announcement, a party consisting of Ferdinand, Antonio his Uncle, and Suchet, surrounded by cavalry approached the river bank. A salute was fired on the Spanish side and amid the cheering Spanish soldiers, Ferdinand was received by General Capons.

Surrounded by a military escort, Ferdinand and Capons went to Gerona, where Ferdinand wrote a letter to the Regency to acknowledge the one given him by Capons, who followed the instructions given him by virtue of the 2 February decree. (58) The letter follows, "I have just finished the journey by the Grace of God, and General Capons has given me the letter, from the Regency, with the documents accompanying it. It informs me about all. I wish to assure the Regency, my greatest desire is to give proof of my satisfaction and of my desire to do whatever can be done for the benefit of my vassals. It is a great pleasure to

be in my own country and with the army, which has shown such generous fidelity. I, the King Gerona, 24 March 1814.
(59)
To the Regency of the Kingdom."

The receipt of this letter in Madrid was the occasion for great joy to the Regency and the Cortez. The letter was interpreted as an acknowledgement by Ferdinand. In order to celebrate the safe arrival of Ferdinand into Spanish territory, a three day celebration was ordered, prayers were to be said in all towns, a notice of the event was to be sent overseas to the colonies. In commemoration of the day, the Cortez decreed 24 March to be a holiday and a monument was ordered to mark the spot where Ferdinand crossed the river.
(60) They only awaited the happy day when Ferdinand would swear to the constitution in the assembly hall of the Cortez.

Suchet held Carlos until 26 March, and released him. He knew that the Spaniards had very little interest in Carlos, furthermore it was not an evidence of good faith to detain Carlos if he expected Ferdinand to remember the promise about French garrisons. Carlos hastened to join his brother at Gerona.

As a reward for his loyalty and good services, Ferdinand conferred the order of Charles III upon Capons.
(61) San Carlos wished to test the degree of loyalty of Capons for the constitutions but sensing the meaning of the questions, Capons only replied that all the Spaniards had sworn an oath to the

constitution and they observed and had to observe all
 (62)
 the authorities.

The journey toward Valencia was begun with Capoms accompanying Ferdinand and his party. The route took them through Tarragona and to Mataro on 28 March. They reached Reus on 2 April. Antonio became indisposed here and went directly to Valencia while the rest of the party changed its route. By decree, Ferdinand should have followed the most direct route but in Rues a group of citizens from Zaragossa asked Ferdinand to include their city in his journey. Ferdinand agreed to do so. The party turned from the prescribed route and passing through Poblet and Lerida, reached Zaragossa on 6 April.

The Holy week celebration was taking place in Zaragossa and Ferdinand remained there several days.

The popular acclaim accorded to Ferdinand was pleasing to him and in Zaragossa, the enthusiasm rose to delirium. Te deums were sung, banners were waved, the crowd embracing and rejoicing in the streets, all of it, as evidence of the
 (63)
 profound happiness of the people. Ferdinand was at that moment the master of all Spaniards. No one remembered that it was unlawful to recognize him as king until he had sworn to uphold the constitution. The liberals joined the most ardent royalists in the demonstrations. The majority of the Cortez understood that the state was in his hands and the Cortez attempted to capitalize his popularity by

declaring that in all cases Ferdinand should be referred to as "Fernando el Aclamado" (Ferdinand the Acclaimed).

When Ferdinand was preparing to leave Zaragossa, Capons resolve to return to his army. Kissing the hand of Ferdinand, he said to him, "Senor, I know that you do not have enemies, but if some one should be, you can count upon my loyalty and that of my command." Ferdinand replied, (65) "That I know, I shall count on you." Ferdinand, then gave Capons a gold box garnished with pearls.

The journey was resumed and on 11 April at Daraca, the first council was held by Ferdinand and his followers to determine the future conduct of Ferdinand. The demonstrations had great effect upon Ferdinand in shaping his policy. In the council were Ferdinand, Carlos, Count de Montijo, Jose Palofax, the Dukes of Frias and Osuna, and San Carlos. San Carlos and Count de Montijo advised Ferdinand not to take an oath to the constitution. Palofax believed that he should take the oath. Osuna was undecided, while de Frias believed that he should take the oath with a proviso, that certain necessary changes be made.

Segorbe was reached on 15 April, and another council was held. Those present were Ferdinand, Carlos, San Carlos, Pedro Labrador, Palofax, the Dukes of Frias, Osuna, and del Infantado, and Pedro Macanaz. The Duke del Infantado said that there were three ways: to swear, not to swear, or swear with reservation. He believed that the latter way was the

best. Palofax, Frias, and Osuna repeated what they said in Daraca. Labrador said, "Swear to nothing; there are only a hand full of liberals." (67) The Count de Montijo had been sent to Madrid to learn the sentiments of the people there and was not present at the meeting in Segorbe.

On 16 April, Ferdinand went to Valencia and held a reception. This was contrary to the decree, but Ferdinand seemed no longer to care for the Cortez or its decrees. A committee representing the Cortez presented him with a petition containing the signatures of sixty nine members who would support him. A periodical published by Justo Pastor Perez, carried an article offering to support him. General Elio, a strong partisan against the Cortez, came to Ferdinand and said, "I deliver to You, Senor, the baton of a general; seize it." (68) When Ferdinand hesitated to take it, Elio told him to take it and from it, he would acquire new valor and new strength. Elio also brought his staff officers and had them pledge their loyalty to Ferdinand. Because his attitude toward the Cadiz constitution was well known, Henry Wellesly assisted monarchy by paying his respects to Ferdinand. (69)

The news of the abdication of Napoleon relieved Ferdinand of his scruples, and the decree of 4 May, was published. In this decree, Ferdinand declared he would not take oath to the constitution. He declared all acts originating from it were null and void. Anyone who might

try to enforce any of the constitutional laws, made an attack upon his sovereignty. He declared those persons guilty of treason, who might support the constitution. The constitution was refused because it contained revolutionary and democratic principles of the French revolution, (70) Ferdinand declared that he hated absolutism and would call together a new Cortez and assured a reasonable liberty and a liberal press. At the same time however he was aiding in the overthrow of the existing Cortez.

As a final act at Valencia, Ferdinand demanded and received obedience from the man who came to obtain his compliance with the constitution. Cardinal Luis de Bourbon, president of the Regency and Jose Luyando, secretary came to Valencia in order that they might accompany him back to Madrid for taking the oath. When the Cardinal and Ferdinand met, Ferdinand thrust out his hand to receive the kiss. The Cardinal hesitated but was commanded and obeyed, although he knew that he had, by that act, surrendered the authority that he had sworn to protect. (71)

In the meantime a detachment of troops had been sent toward Madrid under the command of General Whittingham. These troops were to have been used to overthrow the Cortez but because Ferdinand had to delay a few days on account of his gout, the Cortez was overthrown in a different manner. (72) On the night of 11 May, Vicente Maria Patino delivered to Antonio Joaquin Perez, president of the Cortez

and a royalist, the decree of 11 May, as it is now known. (73)
 It called for the abolition of the constitution and all acts to be null and void. General Eguia began the arrest of all the leaders of the liberal party that could be found. Some of those arrested were Alcala Galiano, Agustin Arguella, Pedro Agat, Gabriel Ascar, Diego Munoz Torrero, Martinez de la Rosa and Manuel Quintana. Several leaders escaped, among whom were Toreno, Isturiz, Tacon, Cuartero and Caneja. The first two, Toreno and Isturiz went to England and initiated a newspaper and magazine tirade on Ferdinand.

The next morning after the arrests Count de Montijo precipitated a cry against the liberals. There was no resistance by the people, who also aided in destroying all signs of constitutionalism. The "Lapsida de la Constitutions" or rocks placed in the public squares to celebrate the constitution, were destroyed; images and effigies of the Cortez were dragged through the streets and broken. (74)

Ferdinand accompanied by five thousand troops was near the city. Wild demonstrations, often aided by the soldiers, acclaimed him from every side. He entered Madrid, 13 May, as King absolute, for the only authority that might have contested him had been destroyed. (75)

FOOT NOTES. CHAPTER V.

1. Revista Archives.	Vol. XXV	11
2. Thiers, Consulate and Empire.	Vol. 1X	67
3. Idem		
4. Ibid		304
5. Ibid		304
6. Revista Archives.	Vol. XXV	12
7. Villa Urrutia, Reclamaciones.	Vol. 111	317
8. La Forest, Correspondence.		168
9. Ibid		171
10. Toreno, History of Peninsular War.		499
11. La Forest, Correspondence.		172
12. Ibid		178
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15. La Forest, Correspondence.		188
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24.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. 111	327
25.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	18
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27.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones,	Vol. 111	330
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29.	Ibid		331
30.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War.		501
31.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. 111	335
32.	La Forest, Correspondence.		277
33.	Ibid		275
34.	Ibid		279
35.	Ibid		283
36.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. 111	337
37.	La Forest, Correspondence.		226-30
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41.	Ibid		242
42.	Ibid		298
43.	Ibid		299
44.	Castlereagh Correspondence.	Vol. 1X	172
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46.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. 111	325
47.	Oman, History of Peninsular War.	Vol. VII	306
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49.	Idem		
50.	Oman, History of Peninsular War.	Vol. VII	307
51.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War.		520
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53.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	85
54.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War.		511
55.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	88
56.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War. (He cites Memoirs Of Suchet Vol, 11 Page 525)		511
57.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	26-27
58.	Ibid		90
59.	Idem		
60.	Ibid		91
61.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	89
62.	Ibid		92
63.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.		559
64.	Ibid		559-61
65.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	92
66.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.		560
67.			
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69.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. 111	341
70.	Annual Register 1814.		68-69
71.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVI	95
72.	Toreno, History of Peninsular War.		521

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| 73. | Lafuente, History of Spain. | Vol. XXVI | 105 |
| 74. | Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain. | | 562 |
| 75. | Lafuente, History of Spain. | Vol. XXVI | 103-4 |

CHAPTER VI.

SPAIN AND INTERNATIONAL RECONSTITUTIONS.

THE FIRST PEACE MAKINGS.

The ministers of the victorious Allied gathered in Paris during April and May 1814, for the purpose of making peace with France. In previous conferences at Basle, Langres, Troyes and Chaumont, the minister of the four great powers, England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, had formulated the principal articles that were to be the bases of peace. Certain problems only remained to be settled, but the four powers insisted in Paris, that as before, at Prague and Chatillon, the discussion of these problems would be confined principally to them selves. The lesser powers were to be admitted to discuss only those questions of immediate interest to themselves. Fernan Nunez, as we have seen, was to represent Spain. Pizarro and Machado who had been following the Allied general headquarters were also at Paris, but they were not accredited for the conference and could have no official functions to perform.

Fernan Nunez had gone to Paris fully expecting to have equality with the other ministers. He believed that

he would be able to represent Spain in a manner that would do her credit, and enable her to take a prominent place in the politics of Europe. He was to be disillusioned. In fact his whole time at Paris was only a disappointment to him and to Spain. To begin with, he had been detained at London until the conference was well started. Besides when, upon his arrival in Paris 7 May, Fernan Nunez took charge of the embassy in Paris he discovered that all the important papers were locked in a predecessor's trunk before he eventually secured these papers. (1) There was a greater anxiety, however that handicapped all his negotiations. Fernan Nunez had been duly accredited to the peace congress by the constitutional government prior to the royal restoration and he was harassed from the start of his mission by the fear that Ferdinand might not confirm his appointment. For it must be remembered on 10-14 May 1814, Ferdinand was abolishing the constitutional government and re-establishing himself on the throne as an absolute monarch. On 11 May, he wrote for a confirmation of his powers and on 17 May, he wrote again to Ferdinand explaining how it contributed to the inferior position of Spain in the negotiations. (2)

The first conference of importance was on 11 May with Castlereagh, Talleyrand, La Forest, and the Dukes of Artois and Berri. Here Nunez was informed that he

would be asked to sign the treaty as fixed by the four great powers and leave all other questions open until the Congress being planned for Vienna.⁽³⁾ He was not invited to sit with the ministers of the great powers, but he was assigned to sit on a committee on minor problems, the chairman of which was Münster Hanoverian minister.

The instructions given to Fernan Nunez were the same as those given to Pizarro, the previous summer, with certain modifications and additions. Among the new requests to present to the congress at Paris, were the restoration of the Pope, and the restoration of Ferdinand IV to his throne in Naples. In case Spain was refused the Italian states demanded for herself, he might accept Sardinia instead. No treaty involving the commercial interest of Spanish colonies was to be considered. The Bourbon family pact, if renewed was to be on an equality basis only.⁽⁴⁾

In the conferences which he attended Fernan Nunez tried to get recognition for his claims for the restitution of art objects and other valuables which had been carried off by the French army. He was overruled by the Allies who said that such matters must be subject of private negotiations between France and Spain. In regard to the claim on Louisiana, he was told that France did not have the money with which to make a

refund, nor could France be expected to secure a return of the territory from the United States. As for the Italian states, these were not at the disposal of France. Castlereagh was supporting Spain, however, for the repossession of half the island of Santo Domingo.

As time went on, Fernan Nunez found himself in an increasingly embarrassing position. The treaty was nearly ready for signature, but the government at Madrid had not confirmed his powers and he doubted his authority to sign in the name of Spain. On 22 May, he told San Carlos, who was now Minister of State, that the dispatches coming from Madrid were so confusing that neither he nor Pizarro were able to understand them. (5)

The Allies were ignoring him because of the inconvenience he was causing them. The Russians were still showing an attitude of contempt toward him because of the precedence question. This question, however, had been settled 16 May by a formal exchange of notes between Pizarro and Nesselrode, the Russian minister. On 8 June, the settlement, on the alternating plan, was published by formal notice to all European courts. (6)

A despatch from Madrid dated 16 May, soon informed Fernan Nunez that he should return to London because another envoy would take his place. He showed the despatch to Castlereagh who urged him to sign the treaty since the Spanish government had no one there to take his

place. Castlereagh furthermore assumed responsibility for advising Fernan Nunez to sign even were he notified of his replacement, and on 27 May, Castlereagh instructed Henry Wellesley at Madrid to tell the Spanish government that he had so advised Nunez. (7)

In response to the urging by Castlereagh, Fernan Nunez wrote again on 28 May, for authority to sign the treaty which the great powers were going to sign on 30 May. On the same day, Machado who was ambitious in his own behalf, urged Fernan Nunez to do nothing that would disgrace Ferdinand or that would jeopardize his own honor. With this sort of advice, coupled with his own indecision, he refused to sign the treaty unless his powers were confirmed. Castlereagh pointed out that the Allies would be gone from Paris before a new envoy arrived, but Fernan Nunez was adamant. He feared that Ferdinand would not ratify a treaty which he had signed and that it would compromise his honor. (8)

Machado, on 31 May, sent a dispatch to San Carlos calling attention to the necessity of sending to Vienna, a man of dignity and ability. At the same time he was urging Fernan Nunez to send a note to Talleyrand asking to be excused from the conference of 7 June, at which time the minor powers signed the treaty. (9) Later, Fernan Nunez received a dispatch dated 6 June, in which San Carlos expressed the satisfaction of Ferdinand over

the manner in which he had conducted himself and ordered him to return to London where he would continue in the good graces of the King.⁽¹⁰⁾ San Carlos also informed him that upon the arrival of Pedro Gomez Labrador, all the difficulties would cease.

Labrador was named as the successor of Fernan Nunez to the peace congress, with the title and rank of ambassador. San Carlos, however, could not enlighten him any as to the precise interpretation of the oral instructions, which were a vague repetition of those previously given to Fernan Nunez. They were, "an abundance of words without ideas," and were not supplemented until 1 August, when San Carlos told Labrador that perhaps he could go to the Congress, find out what they were talking about and act in the interests of his country.⁽¹¹⁾ The lamentable part of the whole situation was that Labrador never was able to get much better advice during the whole time of his ambassadorship. San Carlos was eventually replaced by a more capable minister, Cevallos. But by that time a camarilla of personal advisers of Ferdinand, had formed which denied to the Minister the privilege of consulting freely with the King. However, Labrador went to Paris where he arrived on 16 June 1814, and informed Talleyrand that he came possessed with the proper credentials.

Labrador's credentials happened to be a letter signed by Ferdinand instead of the full powers and it

really gave him the position of an "illustrious stranger." (12)
 On 5 July, Labrador had an audience with Louis XVIII, but due to the deficiency of Labrador's credentials and Louis XVIII's gout, the reception was not a very cordial one.

Labrador, like all Spaniards having felt that Spain was entitled to a place of honor, was badly disappointed when he arrived to sign the treaty. When he told Talleyrand that he had powers to negotiate a treaty, he was informed that the treaty between Spain and France was already made and that he might sign it, provided his powers were good. (13)
 Labrador countered by proposing a direct treaty between France and Spain, but he failed to carry his point. He then proposed that the treaty be written in both French and Spanish, but since the other Allies had accepted the French language copy, Labrador was obliged to surrender that point. He next proposed that a special article be interpolated in the treaty which would guarantee French assistance in gaining the return of the Italian States. Thereupon Talleyrand reminded him that France was not in possession of them, nor could she guarantee them to Spain. Louis XVIII finally did agree that restitution of valuable objects would be made without the formality of a prepared list. (14)

Talleyrand was interested in protecting a firm that was supplying a fleet at Brest. He also wanted to protect

the Afranceadoz and suggested that secret articles to such effect be attached to the treaty but Labrador pretended that he had instructions against such points and Talleyrand did not insist. However, Labrador suggested that Talleyrand provide him with a list of those persons whom he desired to protect and direct it to Ferdinand. Talleyrand prepared the list and on 20 July, gave it to Labrador who at that time signed the treaty of 30 May.

When Labrador sent a copy of the treaty to Madrid for ratification, he sent along with it a report of all the difficulties which he had to overcome. He fully expected considerable praise and a reward, such as the Cross of Charles III, but Ferdinand only complimented him.

Since Spain was unable at Paris to get recognition of her claims to the Italian states, letters were directed by the Madrid government to all the Allied courts asking for aid, but no appreciable results ensued.

Of the three men in Paris at the time of the Peace negotiations, Villa-Urrutia thinks Pizarro was the most capable. He received freely and conducted himself as a real functionary. Fernan Nunez was perhaps the next best although he was reserved and was always seeking advice and preferred to transact all of his business privately. Labrador was the least capable. He was brusque, and often insulting. He placed insulting cards on his door chastising the French.

Labrador and Pizarro quarreled over the haughty manner and petty notions of Labrador. (15) L

Labrador was no exception to the Spanish school of diplomats, who received their appointments through intrigue. Labrador had received his recognition by maintaining himself at a respectable distance from the king and court, the favor of the Camarilla. He was left to grope his way because of vague instructions. Naturally, diplomatic failures resulted from the inability of the government to know what its interests were and to orient itself properly in European politics. Besides just when Labrador, at Paris, was trying to recover lost prestige, a family quarrel of the Spanish Bourbons brought upon him, as the representative of Spain, more difficulties.

Charles IV, living at Rome, had sent Don Felipe Viergol to Paris with letters addressed to the Allied sovereigns asking for aid in regaining his throne or if that was impossible, to give him a minor throne such as that of Algarves or the Balearic islands. He also wanted the right to send an envoy to the Congress of Vienna, and asked the Prince Regent of England to represent him at Vienna. (16) Louis XVIII wrote privately to Charles and told him that the fear of a reactionary government in Spain would be the occasion for disturbances in France and Germany. He added there were rumors of questioning the legitimacy of Ferdinand's royal status due to the

manner of the abdication at Aranjuez. (17) Charles wrote that he himself was yet the lawful king and asked the aid of the sovereigns. These reports scared Ferdinand and his court, who knew that violence had been the means by which he had acquired the throne and he decided to not acknowledge further obligation to his father. Charles was then forced to seek aid from the Pope. (18) The result of the family quarrel was that allied sovereigns refused to take further notice of the affairs and Labrador suffered because of it.

During July and August, Labrador endeavored to learn what position his government was going to take in regard to the Polish and Saxon question, but he did not receive an answer to his inquiry for several months. (19) He was able, however, to get a restatement of the instructions which had been given to Fernan Nunez. There were some variations which may be noted. France was to restore Cayenne in Guiana, although the Portuguese were principally interested in that project. Labrador was to ask the powers to obtain Louisiana from the United States, and leave it to the United States to get a refund of the money. The island of Sardinia was to be accepted in lieu of the Italian states if they were not regained. Naples was to be restored to the legitimate king. The family pact might be renewed only on a basis of equality. Sequestered property was to be provided for. A claim for the return

of stolen art objects and valuables was to be made against France. If France was not able to pay the two and one half billion dollars (United States dollars) demanded as damages, six or eight thousand mares and two thousand stallions could be accepted in lieu of the money. The question of commerce with the colonies was to be passed over if possible. In regard to Afranceados, Labrador was to smooth over the question and leave Ferdinand unrestricted. (20)

After the Paris conferences Mettermich and Count Blacas of France are said to have urged Labrador to make an attack on the isle of Elba. They told Labrador that the King of Spain, being by right the real owner, could justly make a raid and seize the island. A further argument that only Spain could do the trick, was that Spain had not been a party to the actual negotiation with Napoleon. Pozzo Borgo told Labrador that Spain could do Europe a favor by seizing Napoleon. Labrador reported this proposal to Madrid on 13 August. (21)

During July and August 1814, Labrador reported that quarrels between the great powers mad it almost impossible for the smaller powers to get a hearing. The Austrians were ignoring Labrador in order to avoid a discussion of the Italian affairs. The English and Russians were not friendly to one another because of the marriage failure between the Prince of Orange and the daughter of the

Prince Regent. The Russians had not entirely forgotten the precedence affair and ignored Labrador. Labrador thus found that Talleyrand was about the only one free or willing to talk to him. Just before leaving Paris in September for Vienna, Louis XVIII, at the request of Talleyrand, gave Labrador two "orders of Saint Esprit" which he was to forward to Ferdinand and Carlos. (22)

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

The treaty of Paris, 30 May, had provided for the Congress to be called within two months. Then by secret agreements between themselves the four great powers had sought to determine the manner in which the unsettled business would be done at the Congress of Vienna. Finding it impractical to continue discussions at Paris, the Allies had adjourned to London. But in London the Allies found it equally difficult to continue their discussion, which fact necessitated postponement of the Congress at Vienna. It was not until September that the first Allied diplomats arrived at Vienna.

The personnel of the Congress of Vienna included many of the most prominent men of Europe. Lord Castlereagh, Lord Steward, Lord Clansarty, and later Lord Wellington. The Russian Tsar was assisted by Nesselrode, Capo O' Istria, Austett, and von Stein. Frederick William

was there with his ministers, Hardenburg and Humbolt. Louis XVIII sent Talleyrand, la Besnardiere, and Dalberg. Labrador, Machado, Bustillo, and Gutierrez del Rios went to represent Spain. Others were Palmella for Portugal, Lovenheim for Sweden, Münster for Hanover and Consalvi for the Pope. The Emperor of Austria was not to the Congress while his interests were ably cared for by Metternick, Gentz and Wessenburg.

It had been intended that the Congress would meet to ratify that which had already been prearranged, but the failure to get a final agreement on all questions at Paris and London, required further discussions at Vienna. The principal questions open for final settlement were the Saxon and Polish problem, providing a constitution for the German Confederation, the reformation of the independent states in Italy, as well as reassertions on river navigation and the slave trade.

The course of the Congress can be divided roughly into three parts. The organization of the Congress and first discussions came between September 1814 and 1 January 1815. The second period extends from about 1 January to 15 March with the most important work of congress having been accomplished between 9 January and 15 February. When Napoleon escaped from Elba, the Congress was interrupted and the sovereigns and chief ministers gave considerable attention to the preparation for war against him, leaving

a considerable part of the work for lesser ministers to complete. The third period begins about 15 March and ends with the signing of the general act, 9 June. It will now be shown how the Spanish participated in the Congress thus constituted.

Spain in the Congress of Vienna.

The views in this treatment of the Congress of Vienna, are the reflections of the Spanish ambassador and the Spanish writers who look upon this whole period as the most melancholy of all Spanish History. No attempt will be made to criticize the policy of Labrador or of Spain except as may be necessary to show why Spain was unequal to the task of fully recovering her former prestige in European politics.

Spain, as we have seen, had not been consulted about the treaty with France which she was asked to sign without any chance to change it.⁽²³⁾ All that she had acquired by that treaty was one half the isle of San Domingo and a promise of French support to her Italian claims which were to be discussed at Vienna. In this Congress, she tried for more, she could not have hoped for less. The Congress, it was claimed, was to bring a reconstruction of the social order, a regeneration of the of the political system, and a durable peace based upon a just settlement of the contested questions. But to a nation whose every desire was thwarted, as the negotiations

proceeded, the Congress could be looked upon only as a place where the conquerors divided between themselves the spoils of the conquered. (24)

Labrador accompanied by Machado and Bustillo arrived at Vienna, 17 September. He established an embassy extraordinary at the Palfy palace, 50 Minoritten Platz which is now known as Schencken strasse.

Upon reaching Vienna, Labrador was met by Evaristo Perez de Castro, who had been serving as chargé d' affaires in Vienna. Castro was made secretary to the Spanish ministers, but in October was obliged to go home because his personal fortune was not sufficient to sustain him longer. His place was taken by Camilo Gutierrez de los Rios, a brother of Fernan Nunez. Labrador and his associated did not collaborate any more than was necessary. Del Rios was a libertine who cared very little for the more sedate Labrador. Machado was ambitious for his own sake and does not seem to have assisted Labrador to any extent. (25)

Once the Congress was underway, there were several topics in which Spain was vitally interested. These were: the organization of the Congress, the Polish Saxon question, the return of Louisiana territory to Spain, the Italian affairs, slave trade and the return of Olivenza to Portugal. While the discussions of these subjects at the Congress were interspersed and concurrent, an effort will be made

here to take them up separately and in the above order.

While Labrador was present, he did not take a very active part in the organization of the Congress. He did not want to talk much for he thought that those who talked most were the least capable.

On 19 and 22 of September, the representatives of the four Allies; Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England met to arrange the future conduct of the Congress. They drew up a protocol stipulating that the principal part in the decisions of the Congress would be confined to themselves. They invited Labrador and Talleyrand to approve this arrangement on 30 September. Talleyrand objected to such an arrangement and Labrador heartily supported him. (26)

These two urged that the Congress be assembled rather than do the work through committees. On 1 October, Talleyrand addressed a note to Labrador and to the ministers of the four great powers suggesting that the general congress be organized by the eight signators of the Paris treaty. (27)

On 4 October, Talleyrand addressed a note asking that the general congress be called. The next day, the Allies asked him to withdraw his note, but he refused. He did agree, however, to a delay in calling the congress. (28)

It was decided on 8 October to delay the call for the Congress until 1 November and on 14 October the representatives of the German states met to discuss a constitution for the Confederation. (29)

At the suggestion of Talleyrand, a committee of the eight powers arranged on 30 October, as a directing committee, and on 1 November, four sub-committees were formed. Metternich was selected as president of the Congress. It was decided on 18 November, that the calling of the Congress would be postponed indefinitely. Meanwhile the committees appointed had begun their discussions and on 9 -14 December other committees were formed to decide the question of diplomatic precedence, river navigation and slavery. (30) The last named committee never acquired more than the nature of a conference due to the protests by Labrador and Palmella.

During these conferences, Lord Stewart noted that Talleyrand wickd enough to gather the ministers of the minor powers about him and caused trouble for the four great powers. (31) On 1 October, Labrador had presented the Tsar with the order of the Golden Fleece at which time, Alexander said that he wanted to talk to Labrador as a soldier and not as a politician. Alexander told Labrador that France had been the enemy of both and that Spain should not ally with France. This suggestion intimated the truth of the saying that Russia and Prussia wanted to maintain a hostile attitude toward France even though a peace had already been made. (32) When the ministers of Sweden and Portugal were admitted to the conference on 30 October, they did nothing more than offer a protest against the

slave trade article and to ask Spain for a return of Olivenza. They beleived that these two questions should be the first ones to be settled by the Congress. (33)

The first months of the Congress were taking up with the matter of organization and the dissensions among the principal powers over the proposed settlements in Saxony and Poland. It was not until after 1 January that the five principal powers, Austria, Russia, Prussia, England and France came to any particular agreements.

On 1 January 1815, news was received of the peace of Ghent between England and the United States. A triple alliance was formed 3 January between England, France, and Austria who had taken a determined stand against Russia and Prussia. Tallyrand was taken in on 9 January, as one of the great power representatives. During all these months, Labrador could do but little. He was a member only of the Italian committee and that on the slave trade. He had no definite program to follow and wrote quite often for further instructions.

After the Paris treaty, Labrador should have received instructions relative to the Saxon and Polish questions, but he did not. Since these two questions pertained to the enlargement of Prussia at the expense of Saxony, and the establishment of the Duchy of Warsaw as an intregal part of Russia — Spain was not directly interested. However, Labrador insisted that he be informed of the

position of his government. Cevallos wrote on 23 September, that Spain would entrust her interests to Caulaincourt, the Duke of Vicenza, a French minister formerly accredited to the Tsar. (34) The task of Vicenza was to court the favor of the Tsar for an alliance, perhaps a marriage for Ferdinand with the Tsar's sister Anne. Cevallos believed that Vicenza could do more for a Russian-Spanish alliance if it were bound by a marriage contract. Ferdinand believed that a marriage with the grand duchess Anne would be of mutual benefit to both Russia and Spain. (35) At the same time, Alexander was skeptical of the professed friendship of Austria. He sensed a close relationship between Austria and France and so began courting the favor of Spain. At that time, the Tsar was not unfavorable to a marriage between Ferdinand and Anne, if it could be arranged. The Tsar was moved to keep Austria from profiting too much from her new position, hence he was favorable to Spain who had counter claims to Austria in Italy. (36)

Before the dispatch from Cevallos reached him, Labrador had tentatively acquired the support of Russia for the Spanish claims in Italy. Labrador desired to see Saxony retain her integrity and he believed Alexander had in mind some plan for attaching Poland, yet the need of Russian aid in Italy overshadowed such scruples as he might have for Saxony. A few days later Russia announced her plan

for a duchy of Warsaw, and Prussia expressed her demands for Saxony. Austria was not opposed to these claims provided that she was not encroached upon too closely by Russia and that she could be left alone in Italy.

Labrador was a follower of Talleyrand's doctrine of legitimacy. He did not agree to Prussian encroachment, yet he feared if he stood for legitimacy in Saxony, he would lose support for legitimacy in Italy. In his dilemma he wrote for new instructions.

Cevallos wrote 3 November, that Vicenza had been instructed to watch developments and to work cautiously. Vicenza was to be careful neither to compromise himself nor to break the balance of power in Europe. (37) Labrador got no satisfaction out of such ambiguous phrases, but because of his own vanity, he disliked to be continually writing for new instructions. The instructions showed a change of policy for Ferdinand and his chief interest can be detected. He wanted Princess Ann and preferred to place his trust in Vicenza rather than Labrador.

Labrador's instructions did not require that he adjust his policy in the Congress to any plan. He had nothing to do, nor did he do anything. No one asked his opinion or his vote. The Saxon and Polish questions were settled without his assistance in anyway. He wrote to Cevallos 14 December, that he and Talleyrand had prepared a protest against the Prussian aggression, and that

Bavaria, Württemberg, and the principal states of Germany would sign it. Labrador believed that England and Austria should never have agreed to the Saxon arrangement which was not based on justice or reason. Never-the-less, he was instructed 9 January 1815, to subscribe to the Saxon agreement, but as he never did sign the final act of the Congress, he could truthfully say that he had never contributed to the inequities of the partition.⁽³⁸⁾ It was a point of pride in later times for Labrador to say that even though he had not saved justice, he had preserved his honor by being free of any responsibility of the ambitious spoliations of others.

Heretofore, Labrador had been allowed to follow the leadership of Talleyrand, but an incident happened in Paris that threatened the cordial relations between France and Spain. General Mina and several followers had fled from Spain because of an attempted rebellion against Ferdinand. They went to Paris where they joined a number of other persons who were dissatisfied with Spanish affairs. In Paris, Mina was recognized by the Spanish chargé d' affaires, Casa de Flores. Upon his own authority, Casa de Flores had Mina arrested as a traitor to Spain. As soon as Louis XVIII learned of the arrest, he instructed the acting foreign minister to dismiss Casa de Flores from the French court. The Spanish government was very much incensed over the abrupt manner in which its official had

been treated and made several protests to the French government.

Meanwhile the insistence of Labrador for new instructions for the Congress were finally having effect with the ministry at Madrid. A fresh scheme of procedure was sent to Labrador on 26 December. It was to be virtually a campaign of bluff for the revision of the Peace of Paris provisions as to Spanish interests. Significantly it was to start with another effort to undo the treaty of 21 March 1801, involving the retrocession of Louisiana to France in exchange for an Etrurian kingdom for Maria Louisa.

It will be remembered that the instructions of January 1814 to Fernan Nunez had directed him to request that the restitution of Louisiana territory be made a part of the Paris treaty. When Labrador had been appointed Ambassador in May, he had planned to ask that the Paris treaty restore Louisiana to Spain and let the United States get its money back from France. But Castlereagh had told Fernan Nunez at that time, that neither he nor any other diplomat with sane judgement would entertain the thought of taking up questions entirely foreign to the purpose of the conference. (39)

Now by the 26 December, instructions Labrador was to start by asking that Austria return Tuscany to the Queen of Etruria. Failing to gain that concession, he was to ask that Austria urge England to take Louisiana as a condition of peace between England and the United States. At the

same time, since it was known that Talleyrand would ask Labrador to sustain his objection to the proposed Saxon settlement, Labrador should agree to do so, but in return for the favor, that Talleyrand must agree to return either Louisiana or the money and six ships which had been given to Napoleon. (40)

In the meantime, Labrador, apparently of himself had made some such proposal to the Congress, for on 27 December he wrote that the Congress refused to correct those errors which Spain had made by dealing with the Directory and Napoleon. He considered Louisiana as lost but hoped that the other colonies would not feel that they too should want freedom from Spain. (41) In a letter to Cevallos 14 March, Labrador said that he had proposed to Wellington that England should take Louisiana and hold it for Spain. Wellington, he said, offered to communicate the proposition to London, but when Fernan Nunez mentioned it to Castlereagh, he said it was impossible because British troops had already withdrawn from New Orleans. (42)

The chief interests of Spain, however, were centered in Italy which accounts for the keen disappointment over the manner in which the settlement was made. Briefly the claims were these: Maria Louisa, daughter of Charles IV and sister of Ferdinand was the wife of the Duke of Parma. Parma being a small duchy in northern Italy. In the treaty of 21 March 1801, between Napoleon and Charles IV, the Duke

of Parma had renounced his rights to Parma and Napoleon had given it to Luis, the son of the Duke, the kingdom of Etruria instead. In this exchange Napoleon received, beside Parma, the Louisiana territory and six ships from Charles. (43) Later on in 1807, Napoleon and Charles IV made the treaty of Fontainebleau 27 October, in which Napoleon agreed to create a kingdom of Lusitania out of the northern portion of Portugal. He promised this kingdom to the Queen of Etruria and her son Luis for which they renounced their rights to the Kingdom of Etruria. Napoleon never fulfilled his promise regarding the kingdom of Lusitania because he never did conquer Portugal. Ferdinand aided his sister, therefore, in setting up a claim for the restitution of the Kingdom of Etruria or some other state of equal size and population.

In Naples Murat had been made King by Napoleon and he retained the Kingdom of Naples by virtue of a treaty of January 1814, with Austria. The French and Spanish Bourbon families desired to regain the kingdom of the two Sicilies for Ferdinand IV who had been deposed by Napoleon.

Austria, on the other hand, desired to strengthen her position in Italy. She had been a party to the treaty of Fontainebleau, 11 April 1814, which deposed Napoleon and gave the Duchy of Parma to his wife as an estate that could be inherited by their son. It was thought in Austria that Spain would not be of much political importance.

for some time, but would try to gain friends in support of her claims to Lucca and Parma.

One of the first things asked for by France and Spain was that the house of Bourbon be returned to Naples. Mettermich declined to discuss the question, stating that Austria, was bound by a treaty which she must observe. (44)

Mettermich beleived that the Queen of Etruria was entitled to indemnity due to the arbitrary acts of Napoleon, but he was obliged to do the will of Francis II in regard to the territory and brought the Archduchess Marie Louise from Savoy where she had been residing. (45)

In one of his first interviews, about 20 September, with Mettermich, Labrador protested the granting of Parma to Marie Louise. Two days later when he talked to Francis, the Emperor told him that the treaty of January in regard to Naples, and that of Fontainebleau in April in regard to Parma, tied his hands. However, he should have no objection if anyone, not bound to Murat, would put him off the throne. He said that Parma had been given to his daughter without his knowledge or consent, but regardless of who received it, he wanted better order maintained there. (46)

The question concerning Italy were taken up in geographic order with Savoy coming first. No objection was offered when Talleyrand suggested that Savoy remain in possession of the then reigning family. (47)

Genoa came next. The plan was to annex Genoa to

Sardinia-Piedmont, accordingl to the stipulations agreed to at Paris. The Genoese disliked the Piedmontese to whom they were to be joined. Such a plan was contrary to the promise of Bentinck, British general in the late war who had assured them their independence would be maintained. (48)

The Genoese formed a plan that would give them an independent sovereign who according to Marquis de Brignole, was to have been the young king of Etruria. (49)

Labrador had great hopes at one time that Metternich would be won over to the Genoese plan. Metternich had many doubts about forcing the Genoese and he let it be known that he was not inaccessable to the tendency of interests. But neither the Queen of Etruria nor Spain could furnish the five hundred thousand florins which Metternich is said to have expected as a bribe. (50)

Labrador reported this suggestion on 23 September 1814, and asked if Genoa would be acceptable as an indemnity to the house of Parma. On 9 October, the reply directed him to gain the support of the northern powers. The agreement at Paris to augment the territory of Sardinia Piedmont prevented this plan from becoming effective. Labrador argued that it was neither conducive to peace nor a safe guard against French entry into Italy because the dissatisfied inhabitants would welcome French troops to deliver them from a hated yoke.

Labrador was sure that he would have won his point if Providence had not decreed that the congress of Vienna was

to be the most unjust of any that had ever been held and was to unite the most incapable men of state that Europe had ever named to settle points of such magnitude. (51) He expressed that opinion in his dispatch of 14 November.

The next proposal was to give the Queen of Etruria the Papal legations, but she refused to accept anything that the Church might claim. (52) On 22 November, Labrador asked formally for Tuscany. He acted alone since he inferred from what he had heard that his associates on the commission did not intend to aid him. (53) Talleyrand suggested that all hereditary lands be restored to the house of Parma. Those who favored Spain were willing to accept that proposal since Austria intended to keep the three duchies and give the three legations as their equivalent. (54)

The Queen of Etruria wrote to Labrador and told him to ask for Parma and Lucca, but he thought Lucca would be a poor acquisition, since it was so close to Tuscany. The Queen of Etruria, at the request of friends, gave a dinner in Paris at which time she named M. Goupy, a banker, to represent her at Vienna. He arrived late in September but never accomplished anything. He and Labrador could not agree and only confused things. The instructions which he had were never recorded and apparently Labrador never knew what they were. He made a mistake, however, by not aiding M. Goupy instead of opposing him. (55)

On 17 January, Labrador reported that he had proposed

that the three duchies, Parma, Guastalla and Placentia be given to the Queen of Etruria and that Lucca be joined to Tuscany. In lieu of a realm, the ex-Empress Marie Louise was to receive a pension of one million francs a year which was to be paid by Austria and Tuscany. Castlereagh had approved the plan and Alexander did not oppose it. The Queen of Etruria had written in the meantime and asked for the three duchies and the cities of Spezia, Lodesano, Reggio, Lunigiana, and Lucca. Labrador did not have any success with that plan because in his dispatch of 31 January, he said that those with him knew little about it except what looked nice on a map. (56)

On 13 February, Metternich offered as a counter proposal, Parma, Placentia, and Guastala, except that part north of the Po river which included the city of Guastala with a population of fifty four thousand. Labrador objected to the exception, yet this offer was the best proposition that had been suggested because it was free of any pension stipulations. (57) Labrador was happy that this offer would not leave any estate to the son of Napoleon and it would not contain anything that might be claimed by the Pope. He thought that at last he had scored a triumph, but on 19 February, he wrote that the arch duchess had appealed to Alexander for aid. He blamed Metternich for the failure of the plan because General Neipperg had been given the task of gaining the consent of the Archduchess and he had

failed. He said in his dispatch that if Austria did not do as Metternich proposed, that he would renew his claim to Tuscany. Failing in that, he would expose to all Europe that instead of remembering all the promises of Paris, the Congress had promoted as much usurpation and as many ambitious projects as they accused Bonaparte of perpetrating. (58)

Labrador failed because upon every side he was reminded of the earlier trades of Parma for Tuscany, and of Tuscany for Portugal, which were object lessons to teach him the errors of the previous king. At the same time, he noticed that Alexander and Eugene Beauharnais were together a great deal. He also noticed that Alexander dined with the Archduchess many times. It was rumored that Eugene would get a duchy in Italy. Labrador exerted himself to oppose all the malevolent forces which he thought were set against him and only the moderating influences of Wellington and Talleyrand prevented greater dissensions. (59)

The negotiations were interrupted at this point by the return of Napoleon. The action of Napoleon, however, gave Labrador the opportunity to say that the treaty of 11 April 1814, was broken and that he might justly claim Parma. He proposed that Lucca and a pension be given to the young Luis, the pension being paid by Austria and that at the death of Marie Louise, Parma should go to Luis. Since Castlereagh was to pass through Paris on his way to

London, he suggested that Castlereagh present the proposition to Louis XVIII and to General Vincent, the Austrian ambassador. The proposal was approved by them but Talleyrand objected. He had so opposed the Austrian plan of supporting Murat, that he believed Metternich was passing him over by appealing directly to Louis XVIII for a settlement.

Labrador pointed out that since the Prince of Orange had been provided for; that the King of Sardinia had fled and had been allowed to return to an enlarged state, it was only just that the proposal be approved. He referred the matter to Ferdinand who advised him not to sign the treaty until a more equitable settlement was made. The arrangement finally reached, gave Lucca and a pension to the Queen of Etruria and her son. The Archduchess was given the three duchies as a life estate and at her death, it remained for the whole matter to be readjusted.

During the progress of the Congress, Castlereagh carried on negotiation with all the ministers for the abolition of the slave trade. The slave trade was a topic of intense interest in England and the government had been urged to bring about the abolition of the trade by other countries. The response which was given to the proposals of Castlereagh were far short of what he expected. He found that the people of other countries were not interested in the question. It had not become the moral issue as

it had in England. The slave trade was a lucrative business in which government officials and in some instances the sovereigns of other nations were interested.

As for Spain, Castlereagh was not very successful in obtaining any decisive results. He proposed to Labrador that the slave trade be abolished, but Labrador replied that it would be very difficult to obtain the consent of the King. He suggested that perhaps it would be better to defer the question until a later date, or at least not to contemplate the immediate suppression of the trade.⁽⁶⁰⁾ It was argued by the Spanish and Portuguese minister that the proportion of population between free persons and slaves, was not so great in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies as in the English colonies. There was no fear of slave insurrections, nor was there enough labor in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies.

Castlereagh succeeded in getting a general clause, favoring abolition of the trade, inserted into the treaty, but specific arrangements were left to be worked out between England and individual governments. Spain and England eventually agreed to a private treaty in 1817 which provided for the eventual abolition of slavery in the Spanish dominions. This agreement will be discussed in the following chapter. One of the first proposals made by the Portuguese at the Congress was for the return to Portugal of Olivenza. This was a small tract of territory taken by the Spaniards in the settlement of the War of

Oranges in 1801. The other governments were favorable to the return and an article of the treaty urged that Spain return the territory. By the time the treaty was signed, the Portuguese had already agreed that the return was a question wholly for the Spanish government to decide. This acknowledgement on the part of the Portuguese government was made in reply to a letter of Ferdinand dated 31 March 1815. (61)

The Congress of Vienna came to a close with the signing of the general act of 9 June 1815. The sovereigns and principal ministers had already left Vienna to direct the renewed warfare against Napoleon. In conformity with his previous declarations and upon the advice of Ferdinand, Labrador refused to sign with the other powers.

Labrador thought that the other powers still looked upon Spain as having all the debilities of the former reign. He thought that by refusing to sign the treaty, it would show the powers that they were mistaken. By not signing, Spain would be free of all the faults and injustice which he believed were in the settlements.

AFTER THE CONGRESS.

The return of Napoleon and the "Hundred Days" had changed circumstances to such an extent that the Allies decided a new peace with France was necessary. Consequently, the representatives of the governments went to Paris to open negotiations.

Labrador left Vienna 11 July, and went directly to Paris for the new peace negotiations. By September, the discussions were resumed and Labrador was assigned to a committee that was to examine the previous treaties to ascertain which articles had not been fulfilled. As a member of this committee, Labrador was privileged to recall the disappointments of Spain in regard to Louisiana, Parma and Tuscany.

Labrador adopted new tactics in Paris. He resorted to note-writing as a more effective means of forcing his views upon the other ministers. He seems to have lost prestige rather than gained any advantage, however, for the Allied ministers took advantage of his absence by bringing the Spanish ambassador to Paris into the discussions.

Labrador learned in September that a reparations program had been arranged, but that Spain had been left out of consideration. He protested against the discrimination and on 1 October, wrote a note in which he asked that France cede the border districts of Mont Luis and Bellegarde to Spain as an indemnity.⁽⁶²⁾ Castlereagh and Capod Istria, a Russian minister, favored the proposal, but Humbolt of Prussia opposed it. It was finally agreed that Spain should receive a money allotment from the indemnity, which the Allies proposed to exact from France.

Spain, however, was neglected in the treaty which was practically ready for signature by 3 October. Labrador

believed that Spain was only asked to sign a treaty, which sanctioned the sacrifices of France in favor of the other allies. It was arranged that special articles but after the treaty was signed, it was impossible to ask France to pay money or cede territory to satisfy the unrecognized claims of Spain.

Coincidentally with the Second Peace of Paris, the Great Powers created by a quadruple Alliance, the Concert of Powers. Labrador believed he had a chance to demand equality in the Concert for Spain. He had had an opportunity for such a move at Vienna, when the Allies formed an alliance against Napoleon, but this time at Paris they did not even invite Labrador to join. (63)

In Paris, as previously, Labrador refused to sign the treaty of 20 November, which re-established peace. He did not believe that Spain should accede to all the unjust demand upon France since the claims of Spain had been ignored.

In February 1816, Labrador held a conference with the Duke of Richelieu, minister of France, in which the unadjusted claims of Spain were enumerated. These claims emanated from the treaty of Basle 1795; those arising from the unfinished treaty of 1801, and those left from the treaty of Paris, 20 July 1814. (64) These discussions led on into the summer of 1816 without reaching any complete agreement.

In the summer of 1816, a change of policy was adopted by Spain and Cevallos told Labrador that Spain should sign the treaties. Cevallos pointed out that it was not fear, but a desire to no longer jeopardise the claims of Spain. He emphasized the fact that their policy of resistance was not bearing fruit.

On 24 August, Labrador had a talk with Wellington at Paris. Wellington advised Labrador that it was impossible for Spain to gail all her aspirations and that she should co-operate with France and the Allies. Wellington advised that Spain sign the treaty of Vienna and that of Paris as well as join in the compact with the Allies and France for settling the affairs in Italy.⁽⁶⁵⁾ The conciliatory gesture by Wellington converted Labrador to a policy of co-operation and he sought the concurrence of his government. On 2 September, therefore Cevallos told Labrador to sign the treaty of Paris if he could obtain any part of the reparations.⁽⁶⁶⁾

As a result, it was agreed that a conference would be called in Paris at which time there was to be a complete settlement of all outstanding problems. But Labrador was not to see complete success, for just as he thought final reward for his labors was at hand a Cabinet reorganization at Madrid, March 1817, resulted in a corresponding change in the diplomatic service. Labrador was sent to Rome as ambassador to the Pope and Fernan Nunez

was changed from London to Paris, The Duke of San Carlos was sent to London and Cevallos was sent to Naples. Pizarro assumed the duties of Cevallos as minister of State. (67)

The meeting in Paris of the ministers took place in April 1817, and Fernan Nunez represented Spain. His instructions were four in number and related entirely to the settlement of the Parma affair with Austria. He was instructed to obtain five hundred thousand francs additional to complete the one million franc pension promised to the Queen of Etruria. The succession in the Italian states belonging to Spanish Bourbons was to be by Spanish law instead of by the Salic law. The title of majesty was to be given the infant Luis and the Austrian garrison at Placentia was to be removed. (68)

Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian ambassador, thought himself indispensable to the negotiations, although he conceded to Wellington the management of the discussions. Fernan Nunez thought that the best method was to talk frankly with Baron Vincent of Austria. Vincent was willing to have a frank discussion and the proceedings moved along rapidly.

Vincent was instructed to oppose the million franc pension. If the Allies believed that the Queen of Etruria should receive that amount, then he suggested that the extra amount be apportioned by the Allies. He could not

agree to a suspension of the Salic law or to the withdrawal of the Placentia garrison. He could not agree to the majesty honor for infant Luis, since that would deprive Napoleon's son of the honor. (69)

Wellington thought the garrison was essential, but France knew that it was a barrier to her. Richelieu, therefore voted with Fernan Nunez on that point, but they were outvoted. The British government had not yet recognized the Queen of Etruria and could not support the majesty honor for Luis. Yet it was to the general interest of Europe that the son of Napoleon should never assume a sovereign position. The conference, therefore, asked Austria to arrange for him to have a title and an estate in Bohemia.

As a compromise offer, Fernan Nunez agreed to accept a pension of eight hundred thousand francs and Baron Vincent consented. Pozzo de Borgo drew up the agreement as a protocol and Wellington acquired the approval of all the nations represented.

The protocol provided that Parma Placentia, and Quastalla should, after the death of Marie Louise, go to Maria Louisa, Queen of Etruria, and her son Louis. The right of succession would be in the male line. Lucca should go to Tuscany at the same time that the three duchies should pass to Maria Louisa and her son. (70)

The protocol was signed on 6 June 1817. On 8 June,

Fernan Nunez signed the treaty of Vienna and on 9 June he signed the 20 November 1815 treaty of Paris. (71)

The treaty on Parma was not well received in Madrid at first and Fernan Nunez was severely criticized, but in a short time he was praised for having brought to a happy conclusion the long period of controversy.

We have seen how Spain was forced to adopt a new policy and co-operate with the other nations of Europe at foreign capitols. Now let us go back to Spain and see what was going on at Madrid. We will review briefly that epoch of Spanish history which all Spaniards agree was the most melanchology of all.

FOOT NOTES. CHAPTER VI.

1.	Villa Urrutia, Labrador	45
2.	Ibid	47
3.	Ibid	45-47
4.	Ibid	55-60
5.	Ibid	48
6.	Ibid Reclaciones.	Vol. 111 114
7.	Castlereagh, Correspondence.	Vol. X 45
8.	Villa Urrutia, Labrador.	49
9.	Ibid Relaciones.	Vol. 111 313
10.	Ibid Labrador.	51
11.	Ibid	54
12.	Ibid	70
13.	Ibid	66
14.	Ibid	66-69
15.	Ibid	52
16.	Ibid	74-75
17.	Ibid	77
18.	Idem	
19.	Ibid	139-40
20.	Ibid	61
21.	Ibid (This story can not be verihied from any other source. It is given here only to show the class of material that may be found in Spanish accounts.)	60
22.	Ibid	84

23.	Webster, Castlereagh 1812-15.		287
24.	Villa Urrutia, Labrador.		127
25.	Ibid		122-3
26.	Pallain, Talleyrand and Louis XVIII, Correspondence,		12-26
27.	Ibid		28
28.	Webster, Congress of Vienna,		66
29.	Ibid		68
30.	Ibid		73
31.	Bath Archives.	Vol. 11	450
32.	Villa Urrutia, Labrador.		135
33.	Ibid		138
34.	Ibid		140
35.	Ibid		81
36.	Idem		
37.	Ibid		143-4
38.	Ibid		148
39.	Ibid		150
40.,	Ibid		144
41.	Ibid		145
42.	Ibid (Fernan Nunez letter 31 May 1815.)		153
43.	Cantillo, Tratados.		691
44.	Metternich, Papers.	Vol. 111	584
45.	Ibid		580
46.	Villa Urrutia, Labrador.		154-5
47.	Thiers, Consulate and Empire.	Vol. 1X	72
48.	Annual Register 1815.		3

49.	Villa Urrutia, Labrador.		156
50.	Ibid		158
52.	Idem		
53.	Ibid		159
54.	Idem		
55.	Ibid		160
56.	Ibid		162
57.	Ibid		164
58.	Ibid		164-5
59.	Ibid		167
60.	Lafuente, History of Spain	Vol. XXVlll	44
61.	Villa Urrutia, Labrador.		182
62.	Ibid		174
63.	Ibid		196
64.	Ibid		197-204
65.	Ibid		204
66.	Ibid	Relaciones.	Vol. lll 455
67.	Ibid		460
68.	Ibid		469
69.	Idem		
70.	Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty		526
71.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.		471

CHAPTER VII.

FERDINAND AND REACTION

When Ferdinand returned to his throne, 13 May 1814, he had promised, by his decree of 4 May, an enlightened government that would establish the liberty and security of persons and of property. He promised to do everything that was for the good of his kingdom.⁽¹⁾ Yet while these promises were being made he was committing those first acts of despotism that were to be protested by the people of all Europe. He began a reign that was so void of all good, that Spain has ever since been far behind the other nations in the stride toward better things. He had no such insight as his neighbor and kinsman Louis XVIII, who cast a veil over the past and was content with those things of greatest concern to his country. Ferdinand had no reason to justify his perfidious conduct or licentious cruelty.⁽²⁾ Soon after his return he fell in with a group of implacable and self interested men, known as the Camarilla. These men having a very sinister influence on him, he easily drifted into reaction and persecution. Ferdinand was ignorant of the real condition and needs of Spain, yet he did not bother to acquaint himself with them.⁽³⁾ By his first acts he revealed his true character. He threw discredit and disgrace upon all former governments and was extremely injurious to his own cause.⁽⁴⁾ He began by throwing into prison thousands of those persons who had

resisted Napoleon and to whom he owed his own crown.

San Carlos promised Wellington that the Cortez would be assembled at once. All prisoners were to be released except those who were to be tried and they were to be given fair trial without loss of time under judges of independent jurisdiction. He said Ferdinand was determined to carry into execution all that he had promised in the decree of 4 May. Wellington warned that a severe policy should be only of a temporary necessity and would be violently attacked in all parts of Europe. He left a memorandum for Ferdinand which was lost by San Carlos. (5) Instead of releasing imprisoned liberals on 30 May, San Fernando's day, as San Carlos had promised would be done, Ferdinand issued a terrible decree, by which thousands of persons, who had supported Joseph, were exiled. Not only themen, but their wives were exiled. Only children under twenty years of age were allowed to stay and they were subjected to police inquiry. (6)

On 31 May 1814, Ferdinand named a cabinet composed of the Duke of San Carlos minister of State, Pedro Macanaz, minister of Grace and Justice, Francisco Equia, minister of War, Cristobal de Gongora, minister of Interior, and Luis de Salazar, minister of Marine. With this group of men, all firm believers in absolutism, he began to ignore all the reforms and laws of the interregnum and resorted to the status of 1808. All new institutions and political bodies were replaced by old forms and organizations. The captain generals were invested

(7)
with their former powers of administration.

A ministry of Police and Public Security was established. General Pedro Agustin Echavarri was named to this office. This general had distinguished himself by his cruelty to everyone connected with the French garrison at Cordova. Not being subject to any court or tribunal, he could allow his ruthlessness full play. (8) The practices, invogue at this time, are very well illustrated by the case of Jaun Sevilla, an official in the war department. He issued an order which caused a great miscarriage of justice. A reward was offered to anyone who might discover the person who issued the order. Sevilla was identified as the man, but instead of being punished he was given a reward for his faithfulness to duty. (9)

The man who established the first military commission to try the conspirators at Cadiz was discharged, because he was not radical enough. The conspiracy at Cadiz was for the purpose of reestablishing the constitution and it was feared that similar conspiracies prevailed in other places.

Consequently in September 1814, a commission called Negrete (black) was sent into Andolusia to investigate. Soon the jails were full of suspected persons. (10) These outrages brought public disapproval especially from military men and ex-soldiers. General Mina took up the cause against these acts of cruelty and led his troops in revolt in September. Macanaz the writer of 4 May decree, believed he could offer some leniency to the liberals and still hold

the favor of Ferdinand. He was banished in November for entertaining any such ideas, his arrest having been personally directed by Ferdinand.

On his birthday 14 October, Ferdinand issued a proclamation of amnesty to a long list of prisoners, except to those men who were imprisoned for committing acts, that were tabulated on an equally long list. This last clause counteracted the good of the first, for most of the prisoners had committed the acts named on the list. The copies of newspapers and books representing free thought in anyway were carted to the public square and burned.⁽¹¹⁾ Within two years only one newspaper remained throughout all Spain.

The inquisition was revived only in Spain. The order for this came 21 July 1814, upon the urgent pleas of the church officials, who had exaggerated absolutist ideas, were members of the Camarilla. Office holding was usually without regard to talent, ability, or morality. It was only necessary to have the favor of the Camarilla or be a hater of liberalism, to hold office. As the clergy were most consistent opponents of liberalism, they occupied many offices.⁽¹²⁾ The most intellectual clerics were not always the office holders, because the more ignorant men were the more zealous absolutists, and were chosen for office. The order of Loyola (a Jesuit Society), was permitted to return in May 1815, after forty eight years of exile. Many of the Jesuits, who had been expelled by Charles III returned and paraded through the

streets of Madrid.

While all these atrocities were perpetrated, Ferdinand was being praised by a large majority of the people, yet there was an under current of dissatisfaction that was gradually growing and gaining the strength to make open manifestations of disgust, and protest against his wretched policies. Societies were founded that became strong enough to make Ferdinand hesitate in his ruthless methods. The severity of the police and the inquisition aroused such antagonism that by September 1815, Ferdinand was forced to abolish the ministry of police and banish the cruel minister who headed this department. Canon Ostolaza a member of the Camarilla and Escoiquiz were forced to retire from public life and were confined in a monastery in Seville. (13)

The Masons gathered strength and assisted in spreading propaganda against Ferdinand. The army became imbued with these same ideas. A conspiracy called the "Triangle" was founded. It was never known when or where this conspiracy started, but by 1816, it had reached great proportions. Its mode of operating was for one person to tell two persons, each of those to tell two more, so on ad infinitum. (14)

The persecution of the liberals was a great impetus to their cause, by contributing greatly to their ideas and diffusing their principles among the people. Persecution having always sympathy, was the stimulus for secret societies which became the forerunners of the revolution of 1820. (15)

The inefficiencies of the government and the loss of of revenue from the rebellious colonies left the public treasury empty most of the time. As a consequence, the expenses of the government were not paid, the trade and commerce declined and the army, without pay or proper sustenance became mutinous. The foundation for the 1820 revolution was being laid, yet Ferdinand could not bring himself to improve the situation.

While Ferdinand was destroying all former achievements in social and political endeavor, Europe was looking on with serious intention of interfering. The newspapers of England, France and Germany were printing tirades against Ferdinand. When Wellington was arranging for his army to oppose Napoleon March 1815 he wrote to a British agent that the Spanish could do nothing without British money but that Great Britain would give them none. (16)

He told Labrador at Vienna in March 1815, that if Spain sent exchange officers to the army staffs, to send only well dressed, educated and capable men. He said that the previous exchange officers had been so ignorant, so grotesque and so ragged, that it was one thing that had caused Europe to look down on Spain. He also told Labrador that Spanish finances had been handled so poorly that no nation would trust her with its money. (17)

Talleyrand told Labrador also at Vienna, that the system of government in Spain conformed so little to the rest of the powers that he would not doubt if the congress demand

(18)
 a change. Metternich thought Spain was a chaos of
 absurdities and corruption but he did not think that foreign
 interference had done or would do any good. (19)

Ferdinand by his own acts drove people away from Spain
 and forced them to attack him in the foreign press.

Toreno, Isturiz, and Estrada were in England furnishing the
 press with articles on the Spanish constitution and attacks
 on Ferdinand. Many Spaniards were in France and Germany
 doing the same thing. In the fall of 1814, Fernan Nunez
 was ordered to protest to the British government and to
 demand the extradition of Toreno and his associates. (20)

In this he was unsuccessful, for Ferdinand had no way of
 stopping the attacks in the English press as the British
 government would not intervene. Fernan Nunez even resorted
 to bribery but was unsuccessful. He was supplied with
 articles from Spain written in praise of Ferdinand, which he
 was to have published in the papers to allay the British
 attack upon him. Nunez actually bought space in a London
 periodical but the publication was of such low type that
 his articles were not effective. In October 1814, he wrote
 to Ferdinand that it did no good to protest to the British
 government for he was advised to obtain greater tranquility
 in his own country. He said that the press in England had
 no limits, and he could not attempt to answer all the insults
 about Ferdinand. (21)

Similar efforts were made to stop the
 attacks in France and Germany but Louis XVIII would not

interfere because the press was already under supervision.

During this trying period, Spain was being subjected to foreign influence especially by England, France and Russia. For several years England had guided the Spanish state to a very great extent. After the war, the Czar began a program of forcing Russian influence into the governments of the minor powers. In Spain, the Russian and English influences clashed. The Russian program was confined principally to managing other peoples business as Metternich expressed it. (22) While England had a predetermined policy from which she would not deviate. England did not care to interfere with the internal government of Spain, yet she refused to stand aside and let others reap the benefit of Spanish trade. The English wanted to have the advantages of the Spanish colonial commerce and also were working for the abolition of the slave trade. (23) Upon Ferdinand's return he had the colonies in a state of virtual insurrection. They had become dissatisfied because the weakened Spanish government had wasted away their resources without any benefits in return. The war period had enabled them to effect certain revolutionary principles that prevented a reconciliation with Spain. As Ferdinand did not have the means by which these colonies could be brought back to the fold, it was necessary to seek the assistance of foreign governments. The English were willing to mediate but insisted that it be done in her way. Ferdinand had renewed a commercial treaty with England 5 July

1814, which was satisfactory to neither Spain or England.

England had urged the abolition of slavery as an article in the treaty, for which she was willing to assist Spain in bringing back to the colonies by peaceful means.

But Ferdinand would not agree to any slave trade article, and thought England should use force if peaceful mediation failed. England believed if Ferdinand would not permit the colonies to trade on an equal basis with Spain, then their eventual separation from the mother country was inevitable. Ferdinand was unable to forget the traditional Spanish use of force and turned to other sources from which he hoped to obtain help. (24)

Tatischeff, the Russian minister had worked himself into the group of personal advisers of Ferdinand and was exercising a sinister influence over him. Tatischeff gave Ferdinand the promise of military aid, Russia, having become an influence of some consequences in France, induced France to also lend her assistance to the Spanish project. (25) The idea was acceptable to the party in power in France, because of her internal instability and the belief of the leaders, that prestige at home could be insured by an active and successful participation in foreign affairs. But because England refused to permit Russian and French influence to overshadow her interests in Spain. Ferdinand was forced by necessity to refuse the assistance of Russia and France and to listen to England. In 1817 England informed them there must be no interference by an armed force. (21) Spain was also fearful of the United States, who supposedly neutral, was nevertheless,

favorable to the emancipation of the colonies. Cevallos had informed Charles Stuart that after Joseph became king, he had offered to sell Florida to the United States.

Mr Irving, charge d'affaires, for the United States, did not deny the fact, but he had told Joseph that the United States would not pay him one cent for the territory which he did not own.
(27)

For these reasons Ferdinand became more conciliatory toward England because of his dire need of money to finance his own endeavors against the colonies and the British willingness to pay, he agreed to abolish the slave trade.

A treaty to this effect was made 23 September 1817, wherein Spain agreed that in consideration of 400,000 pounds sterling she would abolish the slave trade after 1820 and permit British armed forces a limited amount of jurisdiction
(28)

to make abolition effective. Unfortunately Spain did not profit from this subsidy. Tatishoff had at the same time induced Ferdinand to purchase some Russian ships, which were to be used in transporting Spanish troops to South America. As soon as the subsidy credits were passed to Spain, Ferdinand turned the money over to Russia, even though the ships had been unfit for service when they had arrived at Spanish ports.

The effort of Ferdinand to reconquer his lost colonies was the cause of his downfall.
(29) He had allowed Spain to become a chaos of absurdity and corruption.

The revolution in the colonies could not be stamped out by a blind obstinate policy that was void of moderation. He could not depend upon the loyalty of troops sent to the colonies for that purpose. The soldiers at last mutinied and refused to impose further abuses and despotism upon the colonies.

Colonial separation was a deadly blow to the Spanish ancient regime. It destroyed the foundation of governmental revenues and struck at those necessities which were greatest. The loss of colonial revenues required that the church and aristocracy be taxed. The procedure by which these changes were brought about was a precarious one. It required a complete economic and social change, which was violently (30) opposed by the clerical class.

If Ferdinand had used moderation to any degree, he probably would never have had effectual opposition rise against him. But he was born an absolute king and had those ideas of absolutism inculcated into him from childhood. The period of captivity in France did not moderate his principles but made him more obstinate and more treacherous. The English condemned him, even those who had favored his return and approved his refusal to swear to the constitution. The French resented his treatment of their nationals. Generally indeed, he was condemned in foreign countries. The few bits of approbation increased by flattery were enough to precipitate him into his sinful

iniquitious career. (31) Ferdinand never realized that the end desires must be kept constantly in view, and that inconsistency has its place only in the choice of means.

All the liberal writers who predominated just after Ferdinand's death, labeled him as a monster, a tyrant, and a vile person in all the relationship of life. (32) One writer speaks of Ferdinand in this manner, "Who was Ferdinand?, he was the idol of Spain and was loved by all Spaniards. He had not done anything good but had done evil things. When he entered Spain, they all adored him and after committing those great crimes, they adored him nevertheless. To me Ferdinand appears as one of those idols which were cowering in the temple. Yet I can not say that he did not have fortitude because then some of the voluptuous realities could not be explained." (33)

FOOT NOTES. CHAPTER VII.

1.	Annual Register 1814.		68-9
2.	La Espana del Siglo XIX.	Vol. 1	293
3.	Toreno, History of the War.		524
4.	Edinburgh Review 1814.	Vol. XXIV	534
5.	Brialmont and Gleig, Life of Duke of Wellington.	Vol. 11	352
6.	Lafuenre, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVII	3
7.	Ibid		5-6
8.	Ibid		48
9.	Ibid		31
10.	Ibid		34
11.	Annual Register 1814.		78
12.	Lafuente, History of Spain.	Vol. XXVII	12-14
13.	Ibid		60-2
14..	Ibid		70
15.	La Espana del Siglo XIX.	Vol. 1	304
16.	Castlereagh Correspondence.	Vol. X	322
17.	Villa Urrutia, Labrador.		170
18.	Idem		
19.	Temperly Canning Foreign Policy.		8
20.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones.	Vol. III	354
21.	Ibid		357
22.	Temperly Canning Foreign Policy.		8
23.	Webster, Castlereagh's Foreign Policy 1815-22.		413

24.	Webster, Castlereagh's Foreign Policy 1812-15	70
25.	Ibid 1815-22	408
26.	Cambridge, History of British Foreign Policy. Vol. 11	64
27.	Villa Urrutia, Relaciones, Vol. 11	219
28.	Webster, Castlereagh Foreign Policy 1815-22.	459
29.	Temperly Canning Foreign Policy.	10
30.	Fueter, World History.	53
31.	Lafuente, History of Spain. Vol. XXV11	38
32.	Salcedo Ruiz, History of Spain.	564
33.	La Espana del Siglo XIX. Vol. 11	175

CONCLUSION.

In treating the subject, Spain in European Reconstitutions, we find it divides itself into two phases, the relation of Spain to European reconstitutions and her own internal reconstitution.

In her external relationship, it has been shown, Spain did not take a place of first importance among the other nations. There is no doubt she would have, if she had deserved more recognition, but she was solely responsible for the petty part taken, and her secondary position in the alliances formed during 1814-15. She lacked men, who were the diplomatic equals of the statesmen representing the other powers. Hence she was skeptical and held herself aloof from active alliances. Failing to participate, to the fullest degree, in the Coalitions against Napoleon, she failed to grasp the full import of the situation and did not realize that her own inconsistencies were relegating her to a place of secondary importance.

In the peace meetings at Paris and Vienna, Spain again again demonstrated her lack of statesmanship. While other nations were adjusting themselves to the new order and accepting those changes which would contribute toward the conservation of the net gains of the Revolution, Spain could only make impractical demands, which the other

diplomats would not consider.

Her internal condition was one of chaos, with no means of regaining order. The confusion of changing governments had taken her farther out of the general trend of European politics. The reaction, which followed the restoration of Ferdinand, was not compatible with the accepted order and was the occasion for the prudent and tolerant statesmen of other nations to look upon her with disdain.

The reasons for this reaction have been shown, but should be reviewed. Up to 1808, the course in Spain was similar to that in other countries. She had had a period of enlightened despotism, which was equal to that of any other nation. But when the French Revolution advanced to the violent stage, Spain drew back and began a reaction that was to retard the progress she had made. At the same time her internal distress increased as the government became more subservient to Napoleon. Dissension in the Royal family culminating in the riot at Aranjuez of March 1808, was conducive to greater interference by Napoleon. Thus, through his trickery at Bayonne, Napoleon secured the Spanish crown and proceeded to introduce French institutions into Spain, placing his brother Joseph upon the throne. The Spaniards, revolting against French aggression, set up their own government. They drafted a constitution and proclaimed the sovereignty of

the people, which Ferdinand denied upon his return. This effort at Reconstitution was a failure. It was premature, it could not last.

If Spain had been located in the central part of Europe, a cure for many of her ills would by necessity have been forced upon her, but the geographic position isolated her from the progress of other parts of the continent. While a sincere desire for change in France preceded the Revolution, no such preparation was manifest in Spain. The Spanish people had remained docile and liberty was unknown until it was proclaimed by a minority party in the midst of a destructive war.

The constitution which had been the crowning achievement of the liberal party was as impractical as the absolutism it replaced. It had sought to combine precepts of natural rights, moral obligations, and abstract doctrines, and was so regulated that no alterations could be made without modifying its fundamental motives.

It was into such a state of political confusion that Ferdinand returned. At Valencay, Ferdinand and his advisers discussed the manner in which they would respond to the constitutional government upon their return to Spain. The question arose whether Ferdinand should disregard the constitution entirely or promise a new one drafted by himself, or one drafted in conjunction with the Cortez, or if worst came to worst, should he accept the constitution of

1812 with intimations of a plan to revise it later.

However, after reaching Valencia, Ferdinand, jubilant over the enthusiastic welcome accorded him, declared against any constitution, disapproving all that constitutional government had done.

It had been presumed that the experiences of the war would have imbued the people with a sense of responsibility and encouraged a struggle against despotism and bigotry, but circumstances showed that only a considerable minority accepted the liberal tendencies, and that the general mass of the people were fitted only for that form of government for the people, but not by the people. Yet for the time the constitution had been the fundamental law of the land and was the starting point of the constitutional development in Spain.

The reaction which followed the apparent failure of reconstitution was accompanied by such excessive abuses that the spirit of the Revolution was kept alive. Liberalism grew and took on new significance, even in the period of reaction. While the working of the Cortez and constitution were not important in themselves, they divided the people into parties, stimulated free thinking, and formed a program which became the incentive throughout the 19th century for greater effort toward intellectual and political advancement.

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